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Summary 
Decades of classic economic research have neglected the role of incidental and integral 
emotional factors in human decision-making. Standard economic models assume that 
decision-making is consequentialist in nature: Decision-making is postulated to be guided 
by the decision maker’s rational assessment of desirability and likelihood of alternative 
outcomes, i.e., by his strive to maximize utility (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). However, 
advances in psychology and behavioral economics led to the gradual acceptance of 
incidental and integral emotion-related forces on decision-making. Still, we particularly 
lack detailed insight into the neurobiological mechanisms of the interaction between 
emotion and decision-making.  
The purpose of this dissertation was to gain a more detailed understanding of these 
neurobiological substrates of the modulatory effects of different emotion-related factors on 
decision-making. To this end, four studies investigated different aspects of this interaction 
with behavioral, neuroimaging and neurostimulation tools.  
Study A employed transcranial magnetic stimulation in order to investigate the 
neurobiological mechanisms causally underlying the framing effect, a decision-making bias 
hypothesized to be based on the influence of integral emotion on the decision-making 
process. This study shows that temporal disruption of activity in unilateral dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, a brain region known for its involvement in cognitive control, does not 
lead to changes in framing susceptibility, and casts doubt on the essential role of this brain 
region in the framing effect.  
In Study B, the effects of incidental anticipatory anxiety on risky decision-making 
in a non-social context were investigated. The results demonstrate that induced anxiety 
leads to significant changes in neural value coding (especially in insula, ventral striatum and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex), without changes in observable behavior (i.e., choices).  
Study C focused on the effects of incidental anticipatory anxiety on social decision-
making. Anticipatory anxiety caused a breakdown in trusting behavior, which was 
correlated with activity and connectivity changes in neural social cognition networks (e.g., 
temporoparietal junction, posterior superior temporal sulcus). The results of Studies B and 
C highlight the task- and context-specific effects of anxiety on behavioral and neural 
aspects of non-social and social risky decision-making.  
 v 
Study D addressed the neuroanatomical substrate of emotion-related traits (i.e., 
personality and emotion-related traits) consistently found to influence daily decision-
making. I found unique and specific associations between distinct affective and personality 
features such as impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality and brain 
morphometry. Importantly, the identified brain regions have been shown to be (functionally 
and structurally) involved in decision-making and valuation. This finding emphasizes the 
association between affective and personality traits and variation in individual decision-
making styles. 
In sum, this dissertation contributes to a detailed understanding of the modulatory 
influence of emotion on decision-making. I present different neurofunctional and 
neurostructural correlates of emotion-decision-making interactions, which are highly task-
dependent. Notably, these findings might offer a neurobiological account for deviant 
decision-making observed in numerous psychiatric disorders such as anxiety and affective 
disorders.  
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1 General Introduction 
Decades of economic research have denied the essential role of emotion in decision-making 
and choice. That is, standard economic models assume that human decision-making is 
consequentialist in nature: Decision-making is postulated to be guided by the decision-
maker’s rational assessment of desirability and likelihood of alternative outcomes, i.e., by 
his strive to maximize utility (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). Expected utility (EU) theory, a 
canonical normative model of decision-making under risk and uncertainty, is such a 
normative benchmark defining the axioms that are necessary and sufficient for the 
representation of an individual’s preferences by means of an expected utility function (e.g., 
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). 
However, empirical evidence has demonstrated systematic violations of EU theory. 
Importantly, researchers regularly found EU-inconsistent risk aversion patterns such as the 
reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which describes risk aversion for potential 
gains compared to risk-seeking for potential losses, and set out to explain these deviations. 
It has been argued that the observed behavioral anomalies can be ascribed to the unrealistic 
assumptions EU theory makes about emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Therefore, 
influential approaches such as the Appraisal-Tendency-Framework (ATF; Han, Lerner, & 
Keltner, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) aim to explain these deviations by more 
realistic assumptions about the influence of emotional factors on decision-making and 
judgment. The ATF distinguishes between the distinct effects of specific emotions on 
decision-making, assuming that different emotions elicit specific motivational and cognitive 
processes. It predicts domain-specific effects of emotion on decision-making due to 
emotion-specific appraisal tendencies. According to the ATF, anxiety is associated with the 
appraisal of an uncertain existential threat and situational control, resulting in an action 
tendency to reduce risk in anxious states. Anger, in contrast, is characterized by individual 
control and certainty, leading to more optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices. 
Emotional states also influence the depth of processing. It has been shown, for instance, that 
high certainty emotions such as anger and happiness lead to heuristic processing, whereas 
low certainty emotions such as fear and sadness are characterized by analytic processing 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001) 
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Together with neuroscientific findings on affective influences on decision-making 
(for review, see Phelps, Lempert, & Sokol-Hessner, 2014), models such as the ATF called 
for the integration of emotion into economic models of decision-making and the inclusion 
of emotion-related factors into utility calculation.  
Emotion is not a unitary concept, but can broadly be defined as a discrete and time-
restricted response to internal or external events, comprising features such as subjective 
experience, physiological responses, bodily expression and action tendencies (Phelps, 
2009). Emotional factors have been increasingly acknowledged to influence humans’ 
decision-making. We can distinguish these multifaceted, biologically mediated emotional 
responses, which are elicited by specific internal or external events, from affect, which is an 
umbrella term comprising emotion, mood and emotion-related traits. Mood, in contrast to 
emotion, is primarily marked by subjective feelings without necessary psychophysiological 
changes, a lack of a contextual “trigger” and longer durations. A common taxonomy of 
emotion employed in psychology and behavioral economics is the distinction between 
expected and immediate emotions: Expected emotions, on the one hand, are expected to be 
experienced as a future consequence of choices taken. Importantly, these predicted 
emotions are not experienced at the moment of choice, but materialize during the 
experience of the consequences of the selected option. Their inclusion into the calculation 
of expected utility explained aberrations from EU theory’s axiomatic predictions and 
improved the predictive power of economic models of decision-making. For instance, 
changes in probability weighting could be predicted by consideration of “affective utility” 
(Walther, 2003). Immediate emotions, on the other hand, are experienced at the moment of 
choice and only compatible with classic economic theories when they are normatively 
related to the decision-making situation at hand (integral immediate emotions). Incidental 
immediate emotions are baseline affective states that can be situational or dispositional 
(e.g., personality or affective traits). They are normatively unrelated to the decision-making 
situation at hand. Hence, the influence of incidental emotion on choice and judgment 
represents a major violation of classic economic theories of human decision-making, as this 
would imply that decisions are influenced by factors unrelated to the utility of their 
consequences (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008).  
The influence of incidental emotions on choice has thus been denied by traditional 
economic theory. Psychological research, however, has found that incidental emotions carry 
over to the subjective value assessment of available choice options and emphasized the 
relevance of incidental emotional factors for the predictive power of economic models 
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(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). A multitude of studies showed 
that emotions elicited by stimuli unrelated to the decision-making situation at hand 
influence judgment and cognitive processing (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 
1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). People’s judgments are often related to their current 
affective states, influencing, for example, consumer judgments (Yeung & Wyer, Jr., 2004), 
life satisfaction judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and economic decisions (Lerner, 
Small, & Loewenstein, 2004). Furthermore, individual differences in affective and 
personality traits are systematically associated with interindividual variation in decision-
making. Studies have revealed, for instance, a positive relationship between trait anxiety 
and risk-avoidant decision-making; normally and pathologically anxious people typically 
tend to take less risk in choice situations (e.g., Giorgetta et al., 2012; Grecucci et al., 2013; 
Maner et al., 2007). Empirical findings have paved the way for the rising acknowledgment 
of incidental emotion in behavioral economics. However, the specific behavioral and 
neurobiological mechanisms leading to the modulatory effect of incidental emotions on 
decision-making are largely unknown (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Phelps et 
al., 2014).  
Neuroeconomics, a discipline investigating the neural basis of decision-making by 
means of combining tools from neuroscience, economics and psychology, has recently been 
used to gain knowledge on decision-making processes in healthy persons (Platt & Huettel, 
2008; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008) and on aberrant decision-making processes in 
psychiatric disorders (Kishida, King-Casas, & Montague, 2010). It offers quantitative and 
objective assessment of both behavioral and neural decision-making parameters and 
supports endeavors to identify biomarkers of normal and pathological cognition, thus 
helping to identify the neurobiological basis of psychiatric diseases. For instance, as 
affective and anxiety disorders are characterized by both deviations in decision-making and 
affect, neuroeconomic research has recently started to identify the relationship between 
cognitive and affective aberrations in those disorders (e.g., Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, & 
Dayan, 2013; Paulus & Yu, 2012).  
In line with this, further insights into the behavioral and neurobiological 
mechanisms that determine how specific emotions influence and interact with the decision-
making process may be especially valuable for psychiatric research and diagnostics of 
maladaptive emotional responses that require a deeper knowledge on the influence of 
particularly incidental emotions (Kishida et al., 2010; Kishida & Montague, 2013).  
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Hence, this dissertation project set out to shed light on the behavioral and 
neurobiological underpinnings of emotion-related influences on decision-making in order to 
bridge the persistent knowledge gap on the interaction between affect and decision-making 
outlined above. The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  
First, I will summarize relevant theoretical approaches from psychology and 
economics to the interaction of emotion and decision-making followed by behavioral and 
neurobiological findings on the modulatory role of emotion in decision-making. Second, I 
will provide an overview of the motivation and rationale underlying the four studies I 
conducted (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 comprises detailed summaries of these studies. Based on 
the summaries, I discuss these studies, the deducible conclusions, and ideas for future 
studies in Chapter 3. The original papers discussed in this dissertation can be found in 
Appendix A, B, C and D. 
1.1 Emotion-related influences on decision-making: Past 
research and theory 
1.1.1 Integral and incidental emotional influences on decision-making 
Both psychology and traditional economic theory acknowledge the influence of integral 
emotions on preferences. However, the disciplines disagree about the role of incidental 
emotions in decision-making. Whereas psychology has acknowledged the influence of 
incidental emotions on decision-making, these task-unrelated dispositional (e.g., affective 
traits) and situational (e.g., affective states) emotional factors and their influence on choice 
and judgment have been denied by traditional economic theory due to the axiomatic 
properties of original EU theory. Nevertheless, in recent years, the accumulating empirical 
evidence for the modulatory influence of incidental emotions on decision-making could not 
be ignored by economic theory either. The following sections provide an overview of 
theoretical and empirical aspects of integral and incidental emotions with respect to their 
influence on decision-making, with a focus on yet unanswered questions. 
As pointed out by several researchers (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Walther, 
2003; Xu et al., 2013), emotions may influence decision-making via choice heuristics that 
are informed by affective responses to the decision-making context, especially when 
confronted with potentially aversive outcomes. It was found that the anticipation of 
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potential outcomes of a risky decision evokes emotional reactions and influences valuation 
and preferences (Caplin & Leahy, 2001; Loewenstein, 1987). These “anticipatory” 
emotions, which are inherent to or elicited by the choice situation, often propel behavior in 
directions different from those predicted by EU theory. There are two common behavioral 
deviations from EU theory, which have stimulated abundant research in economics, 
psychology, and neuroeconomics and are often attributed to the influence of integral 
emotions on decision-making. 
The first of the behavioral phenomena describing a stark deviation from rational 
choice theory is the framing effect. It is a strong violation of the description invariance 
axiom of EU theory implying that equivalent descriptions of a decision problem lead to 
systematically different choices. That is, discrete choices between a risky and a riskless 
option of equal expected value depend on the description of the decision problem in 
positive versus negative terms (“gain frame” versus “loss frame”, respectively). It has been 
repeatedly observed that positively framed descriptions of such choice sets are associated 
with risk-aversion, whereas negatively framed choice sets elicit risk-seeking (e.g., 
Kühberger & Tanner, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). The framing effect has first been 
explained by prospect theory (PT; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which is a descriptive 
model of decision-making under risk. PT is characterized by several core components: It 
comprises an inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function, w(p), capturing 
overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high probabilities. It 
also comprises a value function, v(x), over losses and gains relative to a reference point. 
The value function is convex for losses and concave for gains, contributing to risk-aversion 
for gains and risk-seeking for losses, respectively. It is assumed that the framing 
manipulation determines whether outcomes are evaluated in terms of gains or losses relative 
to a reference point (often the status quo), thus eliciting distinct risk-averse or risk-seeking 
behavioral patterns.  
The investigations of the basis of the framing effect resulted in its conceptualization 
as an emotional bias in decision-making, which is attributed to the influence of integral 
emotions on risky choice (e.g., Cassotti et al., 2012; De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & 
Dolan, 2006; Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Xu et al., 2013). The emotional account of 
the framing effect is supported by neuroscientific evidence. Functional neuroimaging 
studies have investigated the neural correlates of different framing effect scenarios. Most 
prominently, De Martino et al. (2006) investigated the susceptibility to framing in risky 
economic choice. These researchers mainly compared neural activity for frame-congruent 
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choices with frame-incongruent choices. That is, they contrasted neural activity during 
choices made according to the behavioral tendency imposed by the frame (i.e., choosing the 
safe option in the gain frame versus choosing the risky option in the loss frame) with neural 
activity for choices taken against the behavioral tendency imposed by the frame (i.e., 
choosing the risky option in the gain frame versus choosing the safe option in the loss 
frame). While increased amygdala activation was observed for frame-congruent decisions, 
frame-incongruent decisions were correlated with increased activation in dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). This activation pattern, 
especially the amygdala activation for frame-congruent decision-making, was interpreted as 
evidence for an emotion-driven framing effect, which can be overcome by the 
implementation of cognitive control over behavioral tendencies imposed by the frames via 
DLPFC and ACC (however, see Talmi, Hurlemann, Patin, & Dolan, 2010 for conflicting 
results). Strong empirical evidence demonstrates the substantial role of both ACC and 
DLPFC in the implementation and maintenance of top-down cognitive control over 
behavior and decision-making (Coutlee & Huettel, 2012; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Both right and left DLPFC have been observed to be 
involved in computations relevant to those functions (Fecteau et al., 2007; Figner et al., 
2010; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Knoch et al., 2006). However, direct causal 
evidence for the role of prefrontal brain structures in resistance to framing is missing since 
the conducted neuroimaging studies (De Martino et al., 2006; Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, & 
Just, 2005; Xu et al., 2013) offer solely correlational evidence of brain structures with 
functional relevance for framing effects. Hence, an endeavor of this dissertation project was 
the investigation of the neural mechanisms causally underlying the impact of and resistance 
to integral emotions on decision-making. 
The second important deviation from the predictions of EU theory is loss aversion. 
It describes the consistently observed increased sensitivity to losses compared to gains and 
people’s tendency to place greater weight on potential losses than equal-sized gains. Loss 
aversion is another core characteristic of PT and captured by the value function’s greater 
steepness for losses than gains. Although no canonical definition of loss aversion exists, the 
loss aversion coefficient, λ, is usually calculated as the ratio between the slope of the value 
function for losses and the slope of the value function for gains, that is, the mean or median 
of v(-x)/v(x) (Fox  &  Poldrack, 2009). It is suggested that more hedonic impact is lent to 
losses than gains leading to multiplicative overweighting of losses relative to gains. 
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Camerer (2005) has even described loss aversion as a “fearful overreaction to transitory 
loss” emphasizing the emotional component hypothesized to underlie the aversion to losses. 
Electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies also set out to illuminate the 
neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss aversion. Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) observed 
increased skin conductance responses (SCRs) to losses relative to gains: This finding was 
interpreted as evidence for the increased emotional arousal associated with losses relative to 
gains as increases in SCR are an indicator of increased emotional arousal. SCR 
measurement has been successfully used in previous research to monitor and validate 
changes in emotional arousal (e.g., Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). Furthermore, research 
demonstrated that the degree of loss aversion can be manipulated by means of emotion 
regulation techniques (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps, 
2013) and that the observed reduction of loss aversion due to emotion regulation correlates 
with decreased amygdala activation during the choice situation (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). 
These findings supported the conceptualization of loss aversion as an emotion-driven 
process and were interpreted as empirical evidence for the impact of integral emotions (i.e., 
negative emotions inherent to losses) on decision-making. In a similar vein, De Martino, 
Camerer, and Adolphs (2010) demonstrated decreased degrees of loss aversion in patients 
suffering from Urbach-Wiethe disease (UWD), which is characterized by amygdala 
calcification, and thus draw the conclusion that loss aversion is driven by an emotional 
mechanism. However, these results should be taken with care as we cannot rule out the 
existence of other neural dysfunctions associated with UWD in those patients, and the 
possibility of confounding anatomical deviations limits the explanatory power of lesion 
studies in general. Contrary to the above described findings, another study on the neural 
correlates of loss aversion (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007) did not find loss- and loss 
aversion-related activations in amygdala and insula, which are brain regions typically 
associated with emotional processes and the processing of negative emotional stimuli 
(LeDoux, 2003; Paulus & Stein, 2006). Tom et al. (2007) rather pointed to a one-
dimensional valuation system processing both gains and losses instead of separate neural 
coding systems for losses versus gains. They concluded that loss aversion is not very likely 
to be an emotional overreaction related to fear. Importantly, however, this conclusion has to 
be taken with care as the authors drew it upon a null result and based on reverse inference. 
To sum up, loss aversion reflects valuation-related processes and might be used to 
identify changes in valuation and subjective value assessment invoked by changes in 
incidental emotional states. Although accumulating empirical evidence supports the notion 
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of loss aversion as an emotional phenomenon (De Martino et al., 2010; Sokol-Hessner et 
al., 2009, 2013; Sokol-Hessner, Hartley, Hamilton, & Phelps, 2014), a final conclusion 
about the behavioral and neurobiological processes underlying loss aversion has not yet 
been drawn.  
Taken together, both loss aversion and the framing effect may be characterized as 
being based on the effect of integral emotions on decision-making, as these behavioral 
phenomena represent individual emotional responses that are elicited by the characteristics 
of a choice at hand. However, we still face deficient knowledge on the causal neural 
mechanisms leading to the effect of integral emotions on choice and judgment. I therefore 
conducted a study to investigate the neural mechanisms causally underlying framing effects 
on decision-making. 
On the other hand, task-unrelated emotional influences on decision-making can be 
described as emotional background to the decision at hand, without any normative relation 
between this baseline affective state and the decision-making task. These incidental 
emotional responses are typically elicited by situational sources (e.g., sunny versus rainy 
weather) or due to dispositional sources (e.g., dispositional anxiety). In recent years, a 
multitude of studies showed the influence of incidental emotions on decision-making (e.g., 
Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Harlé & Sanfey, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 
2004). Different theoretical approaches have been developed to explain the mechanisms 
underlying incidental (but also integral) emotional influences on judgment and choice. 
Early valence-based approaches categorizing affect into positive and negative dimensions 
stated that emotions of the same valence should have similar effects on decision-making 
and risk perception (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Although parsimonious, the valence-based 
approach was not able to explain the observed opposing effects of emotions of similar 
valence on decision-making (for review, see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Based on these 
findings, models taking into account specific effects of emotion on judgment and choice 
such as the ATF (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) have been developed. As described above, it is 
assumed that specific emotions are linked to cognitive appraisals and motivational goals, 
which in turn are associated with specific action tendencies. By means of these action 
tendencies and associated goal-directed processes, emotions exert influence on decision-
making. The validity of ATF predictions has been verified in a series of experiments (e.g., 
Han et al., 2007). According to the ATF, the effects of emotion on decision-making are 
mediated by emotion-specific appraisals of certainty and control rising from specific 
emotions. Despite existing psychological theories and rich empirical evidence, economic 
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research still fails to include the influence of incidental emotions in its theories of human 
decision-making (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008).  
Apart from theoretical considerations, we can clearly observe a newly developed 
interest in the mechanisms underlying the effects of emotions on judgment and choice – 
with a focus on negative emotions such as anxiety. This is evident from the large number of 
studies conducted on this issue (e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Giorgetta et al., 2012, 2012; 
Robinson, Charney, Overstreet, Vytal, & Grillon, 2012; Robinson, Letkiewicz, Overstreet, 
Ernst, & Grillon, 2011; Robinson, Overstreet, Charney, Vytal, & Grillon, 2013). Acute or 
state anxiety represents an adaptive emotion and carries substantial evolutionary value as a 
functional response to imminent danger, but pathological degrees of anxiety imply 
detrimental consequences for individual functioning (Rosen & Schulkin, 1998). 
Furthermore, anxiety forms a major personality trait, referring to an individual’s relatively 
stable disposition to feel anxious, i.e., his general level of anxiety. Pathological anxiety as 
found in psychiatric diseases such as anxiety and affective disorders is associated with 
aberrant decision-making (Monterosso, Piray, & Luo, 2012; Paulus & Yu, 2012; Treadway 
& Zald, 2011). Both dispositional anxiety and state anxiety generally correlate with 
increased risk avoidance (for review, see Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Facets of 
dispositional anxiety – trait anxiety, worry, and social anxiety – correlate with increased 
risk-avoidant decision-making in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) in healthy 
subjects (Maner et al., 2007). This pattern of increased risk-avoidant behavior was also 
found in pathological trait anxiety (Giorgetta et al., 2012; Maner et al., 2007) (see section 
2.3). In line with the findings on the effects of dispositional anxiety on decision-making, 
investigations employing the experimental induction of anxious states also report generally 
increased risk-avoidant behavior in anxious or stressed states (Clark et al., 2012; Maner et 
al., 2007). 
Despite the recent awareness of the substantial interaction between anxiety and 
decision-making along with the detrimental consequences of pathological anxiety (Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2013; Hartley & Phelps, 2012), we still face deficient knowledge on the 
neurobiological substrates of potential interactions between incidental anxiety and decision-
making. The trajectory from normal to pathological anxiety is thought of as a continuum 
(Rosen & Schulkin, 1998) and insights into neural processes underlying the progression 
from adaptive to maladaptive anxiety may bear implications in regard to treatment and 
prevention of psychiatric disorders. To the best of our knowledge, no combined behavioral-
functional studies on the interaction between emotion and decision-making have been 
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published yet. This seems especially surprising considering that both normal and 
pathological anxious states cause aberrant decision-making in complex social and non-
social situations (e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Grecucci et al., 2013). Furthermore, taking into 
account the neural correlates of both economic decision-making and anxiety, substantial 
interactions between the two domains seem very likely as a broad overlap in the brain 
regions involved in both emotion and economic valuation exists (for review, see Hartley & 
Phelps, 2012). Brain structures such as the amygdala, insula, ventral striatum (VS) and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) have been shown to be involved in both emotion 
processing and value-based decision-making (Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2009; 
De Martino et al., 2010; Denny, Ochsner, Weber, & Wager, 2013; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Rangel et al., 2008). Despite this 
obvious overlap between the neurocircuitries of anxiety and decision-making, substantial 
knowledge about the interaction between incidental emotion- and economic valuation-
related neural processes is lacking.  
In order to elucidate the impact of adaptive and maladaptive anxiety on decision-
making with regard to their neural and behavioral underpinnings, I set out to add to the 
small number of studies conducted on this issue in the behavioral (e.g., Berghorst, Bogdan, 
Frank, & Pizzagalli, 2013; Clark et al., 2012) or neurofunctional domain (e.g., Gold, Morey, 
& McCarthy, 2014). I thus investigated the influence of experimentally induced anxiety on 
decision-making with two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies.  
1.1.2 Social and non-social frameworks of decision-making 
Emotions are said to be inherently social, that is, they are often elicited by and expressed 
towards other people. Humans are also able to regulate their emotions in order to adapt to 
social norms and influence other persons (Fischer & Manstead, 2009; Keltner & Lerner, 
2010; Kleef, 2009). Thus, it seems important to also consider the interaction between 
emotional and social factors in decision-making. We can distinguish between situations 
where choices take place in a “social vacuum”, that is, individual choices in which the 
decision-maker must only consider his own values and preferences to select an option, and 
situations in which the individual’s outcome depends on concomitant choices of others. A 
behavioral economic paradigm comprising this social component is, for instance, the trust 
game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), while the classic mixed gamble task (e.g., Tom et 
al., 2007) is an experimental paradigm of individual (i.e., non-social) decision-making.  
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Importantly, recent behavioral and neurofunctional studies point to the substantial 
influence of incidental emotions on social decision-making situations. For example, 
experimentally induced incidental disgust has been shown to modify selling and buying 
prices (Lerner et al., 2004), behavior in the ultimatum game (Bonini et al., 2011; Harlé & 
Sanfey, 2010) and moral decision-making (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that incidental 
sadness reduces selling prices, but increases buying prices, leading to a “reversed” 
endowment effect (Lerner et al., 2004). Sadness has also been associated with increased 
dictator generosity in the dictator game (Tan & Forgas, 2010). Harlé & Sanfey (2007) 
reported increased rejection rates of unfair offers in sad as opposed to amused and neutral 
mood states. Although multiple studies compared social to non-social decision-making 
(e.g., Phan, Sripada, Angstadt, & McCabe, 2010; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2004; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), research on the neural 
correlates of emotional influences on social decision-making is rare (however, see Harlé, 
Chang, van’t Wout, & Sanfey, 2012). One may speculate about interactions between 
emotion- and social cognition-related neural computations for social decision-making 
situations, which are not present in non-social decision-making tasks (for a framework of 
social versus non-social decision-making, see Ruff & Fehr, 2014). Thus, highly specific 
modulatory effects of emotion on social versus non-social decision-making may be 
expected. To probe this conjecture, I conducted two fMRI studies, which investigated the 
influence of incidental anticipatory anxiety on decision-making in a non-social and a social 
context decision-making task.  
1.1.3 Influence of personality and emotion-related traits on decision-
making 
In recent years, the modifying influence of personality and affective traits on various forms 
of decision-making has been increasingly acknowledged (Davis, Patte, Tweed, & Curtis, 
2007; Giorgetta et al., 2012; Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 
2013). Thus, a further study of this dissertation project aimed to complement research on 
the morphometric brain properties that uniquely predispose an individual towards a 
particular decision-making style. 
The fact that no canonical definition of personality exists hampers research on 
associated topics, but most biopsychological theories state that personality reflects stable 
emotional and motivational attributes of a person (DeYoung & Gray, 2009; Yarkoni, 2015). 
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Given that the proximal source of human behavior is the brain, empirical evidence 
demonstrated that variation in brain anatomy and function correlates with interindividual 
variation in behavior (Kanai & Rees, 2011). Decades of research revealed the heritability 
and genetic basis of personality traits and identified the stable structure of personality to be 
based on biological factors (Bouchard Jr & Loehlin, 2001; Van Gestel & Van Broeckhoven, 
2003). fMRI studies reported that individual personality differences are reflected by 
differences in functional brain activity (e.g., Canli et al., 2001; Kumari, Ffytche, Williams, 
& Gray, 2004). Thus, researchers became interested in complementing the knowledge about 
the biological basis of personality and set out to expand it to the neuroanatomical 
dimension. The relevance of personality was additionally emphasized by its observed 
modulatory effects on decision-making, which has been repeatedly demonstrated (Lauriola 
& Levin, 2001; Lauriola et al., 2013). 
The study I conducted focuses on the neurobiological basis of stable personality and 
affective traits that are commonly assumed relevant to individually varying decision-
making styles. The aim was to establish a comprehensive assessment of those traits relevant 
for decision-making in combination with brain morphometric data. Personality and affective 
traits, which have consistently been shown to modulate decision-making, were targeted in 
this investigation. In the following paragraphs, these traits will be described. 
Sensation seeking has been defined as the tendency to seek intense experiences. In 
order to experience varied, novel and stimulating sensations, sensation seekers are willing 
to take “physical, social, legal and financial risks” (Zuckerman, 1994). Sensation seeking is 
mostly assessed by means of self-report measures, which acknowledge sensation seeking as 
a heterogeneous construct. Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS-V; Zuckerman, 
1996) is an operational measure of sensation seeking tendencies assessing the personality 
construct via four subscales (thrill and adventure seeking, experience seeking, boredom 
susceptibility, disinhibition) designed to reflect the multiple dimensions of sensation 
seeking. 
Impulsivity, on the other hand, is a key concept in psychopathology and 
conceptualized as deficient planning ability and lack of reflectiveness, carelessness, rapid 
action taking and decision-making. Impulsivity is not a unitary trait, but a complex 
multidimensional construct. Different measures have been developed to assess impulsivity. 
Stop-signal reaction time tasks (Logan, 1994) and Go/No-go tasks (Ruchsow et al., 2008) 
are commonly used in order to assess the inhibition of prepotent responses to assess facets 
of motor impulsivity. Delay discounting tasks (Rachlin & Green, 1972) have been used to 
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experimentally measure impulsivity in financial decision-making situations. Furthermore, 
self-report measures of impulsivity have been applied in order to quantitatively assess a 
person’s subjective perception of his or her impulsive characteristics. The Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) is frequently used to assess 
distinct aspects of individual differences in impulsive traits (motor, attention and non-
planning dimension). Importantly, the different impulsivity measures assess distinct aspects 
of impulsivity and do not necessarily substantially correlate with each other (Bevilacqua & 
Goldman, 2013). 
Both sensation seeking and impulsivity lead to interindividual differences in both 
real-world decision-making and experimental settings. Two studies (Sweitzer, Allen, & 
Kaut, 2008; Zermatten, Van der Linden, d’ Acremont, Jermann, & Bechara, 2005) found 
that increased degrees of impulsivity led to increased disadvantageous decision-making in 
the Iowa gambling task. Furthermore, a meta-analysis (Lauriola et al., 2013) on the 
influence of impulsivity versus sensation seeking on behavior in the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART) identified small to moderate effect sizes for the association between sensation 
seeking and risky decision-making, whereas only small effect sizes for the relation between 
impulsivity and risk-taking were found. Despite the conceptual relatedness between 
sensation seeking and impulsivity, prior research demonstrates the need to distinguish 
between these two heterogeneous concepts, as different associations of impulsivity and 
sensation seeking, for example, with addiction, were reported and their contribution to 
decision-making in health and psychiatric diseases seems to differ (Ersche, Turton, 
Pradhan, Bullmore, & Robbins, 2010). Furthermore, factor analysis suggested impulsivity 
and sensation seeking to be different concepts (Magid, Maclean, & Colder, 2007). 
Lastly, negative emotionality describes the tendency to experience negative 
emotional states. It corresponds to a dominant neuroticism factor within the Big Five 
personality inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and has been shown to be related to affective 
and anxiety disorders (Boschloo et al., 2013; Tackett, Waldman, Van Hulle, & Lahey, 
2011). It was demonstrated that pathological negative affectivity (i.e., increased probability 
of experiencing negative moods and emotions as well as emotional distress as seen in 
various psychiatric disorders) is associated with changes in decision-making (Giorgetta et 
al., 2012; Grecucci et al., 2013). As described above, several behavioral studies have shown 
that increased trait anxiety, a component of negative emotionality, is associated with 
increased risk avoidance (Giorgetta et al., 2012; Maner et al., 2007). Excessive anxiety, in 
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turn, is a core symptom of and risk factor for different psychiatric disorders (Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2011).  
Taking into account the heritability of personality and genetic factors moderating 
interindividual variation in impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality 
(Bevilacqua & Goldman, 2013; Domschke & Deckert, 2012; Stein, Jang, & Livesley, 1999; 
Stoel, De Geus, & Boomsma, 2006), it seems very likely that there are structural and 
functional brain correlates of those personality and affective traits as well.  
In fact, several studies have investigated the structural as well as functional 
correlates of impulsivity, yielding an inconsistent picture of the neural representation of 
impulsivity. Schilling et al. (2013) measured impulsivity by means of the Temperament and 
Character Inventory (TCI-R; Cloninger, 1999) and found a negative relationship between 
impulsivity and left orbitofrontal (OFC) grey matter (GM) volume in a healthy adolescent 
sample. Matsuo et al. (2009) also reported reduced left and right OFC GM volume as a 
function of increasing impulsivity (total BIS-11 score). More specifically, these authors 
observed a negative relationship between motor impulsivity and left OFC as well as a 
smaller right OFC GM volume in case of higher non-planning impulsivity. Furthermore, a 
negative relationship between anterior cingulate volume and impulsivity (total BIS score) 
was observed. In contrast, another study (A. K. W. Lee, Jerram, Fulwiler, & Gansler, 2011) 
reported negative associations between attention and motor impulsivity with left superior 
temporal gyrus and a positive relation between non-planning impulsivity and left OFC GM 
volume and lateral frontopolar cortex. These inconsistent results are most likely due to 
methodological issues, such as personality measures employed, analysis methods used for 
behavioral and brain morphometric data (e.g., simple versus multiple regression) and the 
number of subjects. 
In comparison, studies on the neuroanatomical correlates of sensation seeking are 
rare. Martin et al. (2007) reported a positive relationship between right hippocampal volume 
and experience seeking, a facet of sensation seeking. A study on the functional correlates of 
sensation seeking (Joseph, Liu, Jiang, Lynam, & Kelly, 2009) found that individuals with 
strong sensation seeking tendencies showed stronger fMRI responses to high-arousal 
stimuli in insula and posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex, whereas low sensation seeking 
persons were characterized by greater activation to high-arousal stimuli in anterior cingulate 
cortex and anterior medial orbitofrontal regions. These results have been interpreted as an 
overactive approach system in high sensation seekers versus a dominating inhibition system 
in low sensation seekers.  
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Regarding negative emotionality, different components of this personality construct 
were investigated. For instance, researchers sought to identify the neuroanatomical 
correlates of state and trait anxiety (Spampinato, Wood, De Simone, & Grafman, 2009) 
using the state-trait-anxiety inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983). While they found a positive correlation between anxiety and ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus), inverse correlations between anxiety and several 
brain regions such as bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, rostral anterior cingulate cortex 
and post/retrosplenial cingulate cortex have been observed. Yamasue et al. (2008) employed 
the TCI-R in order to assess harm-avoidance as an anxiety-related measure and found 
gender-unspecific reduced right hippocampal volume as a function of increasing anxiety. 
Furthermore, they reported a negative correlation between anxiety and left anterior 
prefrontal cortex GM volume in female but not male participants. A further study (Omura, 
Constable, & Canli, 2005) found a negative correlation between anxiety (assessed via NEO-
PI-R neuroticism scale) and right amygdala GM volume, while DeYoung et al. (2010) 
observed negative relationships between the same personality measure and dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex, medial temporal lobe and precentral gyrus. Positive associations were 
observed for mid-cingulate cortex, caudate, and regions in middle temporal gyrus and 
cerebellum. Notably, Hu et al. (2011) could not find significant correlation between 
neuroticism and local GM volume. Although most studies identified associations between 
interindividual variation in anxiety and anxiety-related measures and brain structure, the 
variation in results across studies is remarkable. Different personality measures, analysis 
methods, and numbers of subjects are again possible explanatory factors for the inconsistent 
results yielded in these studies. 
In conclusion, improved assessment of personality and affective traits, its 
combination with brain morphometric data, and an appropriate number of subjects may be 
necessary in order to achieve valid results on the neuroanatomical basis of personality and 
its modulatory role in interindividually varying decision-making styles. 
1.2 Purpose of this dissertation 
Although recent research has identified neurobiological correlates of decision-making on 
the one hand and has investigated behavioral and neurofunctional properties of emotions 
and personality on the other hand, we still lack detailed knowledge about the neural 
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patterns, which underlie the interaction between decision-making and emotion-related 
factors. Furthermore, the context of the decision at hand, in the sense of a social or non-
social context the decision is made in, and potentially systematic interactions with 
emotional factors deserve further attention and clarification. Therefore, I set out to a more 
nuanced investigation of these relationships. The following four investigations on the 
impact of affective factors on decision-making were conducted: 
(1)  I performed a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study on the causal 
mechanisms underlying inhibition of risky choice framing effects (i.e., suppression 
of affective heuristics, which are supposed to be based on the effect of integral 
emotion on decision-making (section 2.1 and Appendix A). 
(2)  The behavioral and neurofunctional effects of incidental emotions on risky 
economic decision-making in a non-social context were investigated in an fMRI 
study where incidental anticipatory anxiety was induced via the threat-of-shock 
technique. The effects of incidental anticipatory anxiety on subjective value 
assessment were measured with behavioral, electrophysiological and neuroimaging 
tools (section 2.2 and Appendix B).  
(3) The behavioral and neurofunctional effects of incidental anticipatory anxiety on 
social decision-making were investigated in a second fMRI study with the main 
goal to investigate changes in trusting behavior due to anticipatory anxiety using a 
within-subject design (section 2.3 and Appendix C). 
(4) Lastly, the neuroanatomical basis of personality and affective traits relevant to 
interindividual variation in decision-making styles was investigated employing 
voxel-based morphometry (VBM). This study was also meant to address the 
colinearity of personality constructs on the behavioral and neuroanatomical level 
(section 2.4 and Appendix D). 
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2 Contents of this dissertation 
2.1 Study A: Framing effects on risky decision-making: 
Investigating a causal role for the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex with TMS 
I conducted a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study together with Daniela M. 
Pfabigan and Christian C. Ruff in order to examine the neural mechanisms causally 
underlying the effect of integral emotions and associated affective heuristics on decision-
making. Motivated by an fMRI study of De Martino et al. (2006), which provided evidence 
for the inhibitory role of DLPFC in risky choice framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986), I examined whether the DLPFC is causally linked to the inhibition of the framing 
effect. The framing effect is hypothesized to reflect emotional biases in decision-making 
and describes people’s tendency to react to the same choice problem in different ways 
depending on whether it is presented in terms of losses (loss frame) or gains (gain frame). 
The DLPFC is a brain region well known for its involvement in cognitive control processes 
and emotion regulation (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2000; Phillips, Ladouceur, & Drevets, 
2008). Furthermore, bilateral DLPFC was identified as neural correlate of frame-
inconsistent decisions in recent neuroimaging studies. That is, De Martino et al. (2006) 
found significantly increased BOLD signal for trials in which subjects were able to 
overcome the general behavioral tendencies imposed by the frames. Similar results were 
obtained by Gonzalez et al. (2005) reporting increased DLPFC activation for risky relative 
to sure choices in the positive frame employing the classic Asian disease Problem (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1986). Overcoming a behavioral heuristic seems to require additional 
cognitive resources, and the correlative fMRI results suggest that overcoming frames 
necessitates recruitment of the DLPFC. Based on the hypothesis that the DLPFC is causally 
involved in inhibition of the framing effect, we hypothesized to find increased susceptibility 
to framing due to the temporary disruption of DLPFC activity. 
I employed TMS in order to achieve a temporary “virtual lesion” of DLPFC. 
Immediately following the applied continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS, a TMS 
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protocol leading to the temporary dysfunction of the target brain region) of either unilateral 
DLPFC (left or right [experimental conditions]) or vertex (control condition), the subjects 
had to perform a risky choice framing task adapted from De Martino et al. (2006). The 
decision-making task consisted of repeated choices between a lottery and an expected 
value-equivalent sure option, which was critically framed as a gain or loss. After subjects 
were endowed with varying amounts of money, they had to decide whether to play a lottery 
in order to win or lose the whole endowment amount (with varying probabilities of winning 
[p(win)] and losing [p(lose) = 1- p(win)]) or to take a fraction of the endowment for sure, 
which was either expressed in terms of gains or losses (gain frame or loss frame, 
respectively). 
Against expectations, the current results do not support the hypothesis of a causal 
role of DLPFC in inhibition of the framing effect. Although neuroimaging studies suggested 
a substantial role of DLPFC in framing, we could not confirm the functional relevance of 
the DLPFC for inhibition of the framing effect due to unilateral disruption of either left or 
right DLPFC in a financial risky choice framing task. No effect of left or right DLPFC 
activity disruption on the susceptibility to framing was observed. That is, preferences 
between stimulation groups did not significantly differ from the control group in the TMS 
session. Detailed statistical analysis of subjects’ choices (employing summary statistics, 
linear and logistic regression analyses) disclosed a stable framing effect across all three 
groups without significant differences between groups. That is, although we find 
significantly more gambling choices in the loss frame relative to gain frame in all groups, 
disruption of DLPFC function did not lead to changes in susceptibility to framing, i.e., we 
did not observe significant changes in behavior as a function of TMS group. Examining 
interactions between TMS and different probability of winning levels and varying 
endowment amounts used in the gambles as well as controlling for various personality 
traits, we did also not find differential effects of unilateral DLPFC TMS on framing 
susceptibility. cTBS did not influence cognitive processing speed either, reflected in no 
reaction time differences between DLPFC and vertex groups. While increased reaction 
times were observed in the loss relative to gain frame, no significant reaction time 
differences between groups were observed.  
Several conclusions and motivations for future studies can be drawn from this TMS 
study. On the one hand, it is possible that the causal role of DLPFC in inhibition of framing 
susceptibility had been overestimated due to the results of previous neuroimaging studies. 
On the other hand, modifications of the TMS approach employed in the current experiment 
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may be necessary in order to be able to draw conclusions on the functional relevance of 
DLPFC for risky choice framing. Based on our results in combination with previous 
neuroimaging studies on the framing effect, future studies should investigate the effects of 
bilateral DLPFC inhibition as well as dual-site TMS of DLPFC and ACC in order to 
identify brain regions causally involved in the generation and inhibition of risky choice 
framing effects. Specifically, based on the involvement of the DLPFC in frame-incongruent 
choices found in previous studies (De Martino et al., 2006; Gonzalez et al., 2005), we 
hypothesized about a causal role of DLPFC in the inhibition of behavioral tendencies 
imposed by frames. Taking into account our results, it may instead be speculated that 
DLPFC implements computations that are correlated with neural processes relevant for 
framing resistance, but these computations do not contribute to framing resistance itself. 
DLPFC activity might be a byproduct of frame-resistant ACC activity without any 
functional relevance for inhibition of the framing effect. In this case, we could define the 
relation between DLPFC and susceptibility to framing as correlational. Functional and 
effective connectivity analyses in combination with concurrent TMS-fMRI studies may be 
suited to test between the correlational versus causal role of DLPFC in framing effects. The 
suggested experimental and methodological modifications would be suited to identify 
framing-relevant neural connectivity patterns and their directions as well as to offer causal 
evidence for the neurobiological substrate of framing effects. Although DLPFC might be 
involved in inhibition of susceptibility to framing, it is possible that bilateral disruption of 
DLPFC via TMS or tDCS electrode montage is needed in order to disrupt the control 
function over framing of the DLPFC as resistance against the frame correlated with bilateral 
DLPFC activity in the study by De Martino et al. (2006). Concurrent TMS-fMRI might be 
suitable to investigate the effect of (bilateral) disruption of DLPFC function on framing-
related neural activation and associated behavioral correlates in more detail. As stated 
above, we may hypothesize that framing susceptibility is regulated by synchronized 
activation of a network of brain regions involved in cognitive control processes. De Martino 
and colleagues’ study (2006) suggests the ACC as candidate region of this network in 
addition to the DLPFC. Dual-site TMS (O’Shea, Taylor, & Rushworth, 2008) may be 
required for simultaneous interruption of DLPFC and ACC in order to change subjects’ 
susceptibility to framing; partial disruption of the network might engage compensatory 
processes, resulting in stable behavior. Although the anatomical properties of the ACC 
require the use of a double-cone coil, which reduces the precision of the stimulation of the 
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target area, previous studies have suggested that effective TMS of ACC may be made 
possible by means of this coil type (Hayward et al., 2007).  
Further technical issues should also find attention when considering our 
experimental results. We cannot rule out that our procedure was compromised by distance-
dependent TMS effects and that cTBS effects were weakened by the location of the scalp-
distant DLPFC target, as rapid decline in magnetic field strength with distance of the 
targeted cortical sites from scalp surface weakens actual TMS effects (Stokes et al., 2005). 
Although coil position was administered according to current technical guidelines (Rossi, 
Hallett, Rossini, Pascual-Leone, & Safety of TMS Consensus Group, 2009) and precisely 
controlled via our neuronavigation device, it is possible that changes in coil position relative 
to the gyrus may be necessary in order to optimize the magnitude of cortical stimulation. 
Coil position and head-coil angle may have to be changed to yield optimal cTBS 
application. Future studies may test such technical modifications to investigate whether 
DLPFC functioning can be interrupted more profoundly and whether this affects resistance 
to framing effects. 
More generally, we have to point to the fundamental issue concerning the 
interpretation of null results. Although we did not find evidence for the causal role of 
DLPFC in inhibition of risky choice framing effects, we are not able to strongly conclude 
on the functional relevance of this brain region for framing effects. That is, our 
experimental design might not have been sensitive enough to detect the undoubtedly small 
effects of our experimental manipulation found for the difference in framing effects 
between control and experimental groups (difference in framing effects between vertex and 
left or right TMS group: d  =  0.004 and d = 0.047, respectively). However, in the case of 
such weak effects as found in this study, it seems reasonable to conclude that previous 
studies may have overestimated the role of the DLPFC in overcoming framing 
susceptibility, and that right DLPFC is presumably not the main neural locus at which 
framing-related neural processes are causally implemented.  
2.2 Study B: Anticipatory anxiety disrupts neural valuation 
during risky choice 
This study, a conjoint research endeavor with Jan B. Engelmann, Ernst Fehr, and 
Christian  C. Ruff, was conducted in order to examine the effects of incidental anticipatory 
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anxiety on risky decision-making and the associated neurofunctional correlates. The 
experiment was particularly designed to investigate the gap between psychological and 
economic theories on the interaction between incidental anticipatory anxiety and risky 
decision-making. We gathered behavioral, electrophysiological, and neural information in 
order to examine the influence of experimentally induced incidental anxiety on economic 
valuation under risk.  
A main concern of this study was the employment of an improved emotion 
induction technique as the validity of emotion induction techniques used in previous studies 
is questionable with respect to the intensity, quality, and temporal properties of the induced 
emotion. That is, emotion induction techniques such as the cold pressor task (Porcelli & 
Delgado, 2009) or watching emotional movie clips (Lerner et al., 2004) require the affective 
manipulation to take place prior to the decision-making task instead of an “online” affective 
manipulation during the decision-making situation. The majority of previous investigations 
on the effects of incidental negative affective states such as stress on risk-taking employed 
the cold pressor task (e.g., Porcelli & Delgado, 2009; Porcelli, Lewis, & Delgado, 2012), 
which, for technical reasons, implies a between-subjects design. We therefore chose the 
induction of well-defined anticipatory anxiety via the translational threat-of-shock (TOS) 
technique (Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013; Schmitz & Grillon, 2012). Using 
the TOS paradigm, which creates a high incidental anxiety (“threat”) condition and a low 
(or no) incidental anxiety (“safe”) condition for each subject, we were able to investigate 
within-subject effects, i.e., individual changes in risk-taking due to the affective 
manipulation. By using a TOS paradigm we were able to investigate the effects of 
anticipatory anxiety on a trial-by-trial basis and elicit repeated, but transient emotional 
responses to threat, whereas, for instance, a cold pressor task relies on a single stressful 
event delivered to the subjects before the experimental task. Furthermore, the additional 
recording of skin conductance responses (SCRs) was chosen as a monitoring and validation 
tool of the affective manipulation, as the analysis of SCRs provides an index of the efficacy 
of anticipatory anxiety induction by the TOS manipulation. Therefore, we created a hybrid 
fMRI design, that is, the subjects’ affective states were manipulated on a block-wise basis 
by means of the TOS manipulation, while they completed a risky choice task, which was 
based on an event-related trial design, in an fMRI environment. 
In order to examine the effects of incidental anticipatory anxiety on individuals’ 
choices and associated subjective value processing, we employed an economic paradigm 
that is well-established in behavioral economics. We adapted a mixed gamble task, which 
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has been used in previous functional neuroimaging studies (Minati, Grisoli, Franceschetti, 
et al., 2012; Minati, Grisoli, Seth, & Critchley, 2012; Tom et al., 2007) to assess changes in 
the behavioral and neural correlates of economic valuation due to the affective 
manipulation. Subjects repeatedly chose between an equiprobable lottery option, which 
comprised a gain and a loss outcome, and a sure option. The outcome of the sure option was 
fixed to a value of zero for all trials. Using this task, we were able to observe potential 
changes in subjective value processing and loss aversion, as mixed gambles are commonly 
used to assess loss aversion in decision-making under risk. Thus, we compared behavioral 
and neural decision-making parameters in the threat versus safe context. Furthermore, we 
were interested whether anticipatory anxiety would lead to connectivity changes in a 
putative neural valuation network and how these potential changes would relate to changes 
in behavioral preferences. We therefore employed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analysis (Friston et al., 1997) to investigate changes in neural connectivity due to 
anticipatory anxiety.  
The analysis of behavioral and neurofunctional data revealed the following picture: 
Electrophysiological, neurofunctional and reaction time data provided clear evidence for the 
successful induction of anticipatory anxiety in our participants. We found increased SCRs 
during threat relative to safe blocks, which serves as evidence for increased emotional 
arousal during threat phases relative to safe phases. Furthermore, we found peak SCRs to 
actual strong electrical stimulation, which increased significantly compared to SCRs to 
weak electrical stimulation. In line with this, the efficacy of the TOS paradigm was also 
reflected on the neural level as activation of a putative “pain matrix” (Casey, 1999; Tracey 
& Mantyh, 2007) was observed in response to strong relative to weak electrical stimulation. 
In addition, in the threat condition participants decided faster which option to take than in 
the safe condition. Although observable behavior (i.e., choices made by subjects) and 
decision-making parameters such as the loss aversion coefficient, λ, and prospective utility 
remained stable across affective contexts, we found a clear change in neural valuation 
signals. First, during threat trials, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex [VMPFC] and the 
ventral striatum [VS] showed significant reductions in coding of expected subjective value 
(ESV, the neural correlate of prospective utility) of the risky option. Second, functional 
coupling between the brain’s valuation network comprising regions such as VMPFC and 
VS decreased during incidental anxiety. Third, while choices could be predicted from 
activity in VMPFC during safe trials, prediction of choices from VMPFC activity was not 
possible during threat trials. Fourth, we observed reduction in VMPFC and VS baseline 
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activity during threat relative to safe trials. In contrast to the activation pattern of VMPFC 
and VS, the anterior insula showed a clear increase in coding the negative ESV of the risky 
choice option during high incidental anxiety. Furthermore, insula activity predicted choices 
during threat, but not safe trials.  
These patterns of results shows that incidental anxiety can lead to a shift in the focus 
of neural valuation from possible positive consequences to anticipated negative 
consequences of the choice options. These neural effects of incidental anxiety can evidently 
arise in the absence of changes in overt behavior. Our results may have important clinical 
implications, as they show that maladaptive anxiety as observed in pathological states can 
change the focus of neural valuation from hedonic value towards anticipated negative 
consequences. Our findings thereby suggest a possible pathway for the development of 
chronic desensitization of reward systems and a maladaptive focus on negative cognitions 
in the context of psychiatric disorders such as anxiety and affective disorders (e.g., 
Berghorst et al., 2013; Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006; Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & 
Fava, 2008).  
Furthermore, these findings are generally in line with previous studies on the 
distinct roles of VMPFC, VS and insula in decision-making showing positive versus 
negative value coding in VS and VMPFC versus insula, respectively (e.g., Kim, Shimojo, & 
O’Doherty, 2011). Both the diminished value sensitivity in VMPFC and decreased 
communication between VMPFC and striatal structures under anticipatory anxiety are 
consistent with previous rodent studies demonstrating impaired value encoding and reward 
learning under stress (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). Notably, the shift in value coding between 
affective contexts was not accompanied by changes in economic preferences. Our results 
therefore demonstrate that different neural value coding mechanisms can be associated with 
the same behavioral outcome. This finding seems particularly relevant in regard to the 
multiple systems theory of decision-making stating that different valuation systems guide 
choice depending on the properties of the decision-making situation (Rangel et al., 2008). 
The hypothesis of a change in decision-making system under anxiety is corroborated by 
previous studies (Schwabe, Tegenthoff, Höffken, & Wolf, 2012) reporting increased 
habitual instead of goal-directed responding and reduced value sensitivity in medial 
prefrontal cortex under induced (hormonal) stress. Since the VMPFC is commonly 
considered as a value integration region (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010), it may 
be speculated that neural valuation processes in VMPFC, indicated by the positive ESV 
signal in safe trials, broke down under anticipatory anxiety and compensatory mechanisms, 
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e.g., heuristics and increased habitual responding, were employed. In line with our findings, 
Gold and colleagues (2014) reported stable behaviors across affective contexts (threat 
versus safe condition) accompanied by compensatory neural processing, that is, increased 
connectivity of medial prefrontal cortex and VMPFC with amygdala under threat. 
2.3 Study C: The neural circuitry of emotion-induced 
distortions of trust 
With a similar experimental approach, a joint research project with Jan B. Engelmann, 
Christian C. Ruff, and Ernst Fehr sought to identify the interaction of incidental anxiety 
with social decision-making. We were interested in changes in interpersonal trust behavior 
due to incidental anxiety. Trust is defined as the willingness to take a social risk of helping 
or collaborating with another person despite the possibility of non-reciprocation. In 
behavioral economics, a trust game is supposed to mimic a sequential economic exchange 
in the absence of contract reinforcement institutions (Berg et al., 1995). In a standard 
behavioral trust game two players are anonymously paired and assigned the roles of 
“trustor” and “trustee”. Both trustor and trustee are endowed with the same amount of 
money. At a first stage, the trustor decides which proportion of the original endowment he 
is willing to send to the trustee. Importantly, the amount the trustee receives is a multiple of 
the amount the trustor decided to give to the trustee. Upon receiving the, for instance, 
tripled amount sent by the trustor, it is the trustee’s turn to decide to what extent he wants to 
reciprocate or take financial advantage of the experienced trust. Thus, the trustor faces two 
different types of risk: On the one hand, he faces a financial risk due to the possibility to 
lose money. On the other hand, the trust game comprises a social risk, as the trustee’s 
response is not predictable to and controllable by the trustor.  
In order to specify the impact of incidental anxiety on choice behavior that is 
specific to social decision-making, a well matched control task comprising a non-social 
instead of a social risk was included into the experiment. That is, in this control risk game a 
random mechanism (computer algorithm) rather than a social interaction partner was the 
source of risk. Whereas a classical trust game is a “one shot” game, that is, each player 
takes a single decision, an fMRI experiment requires multiple repetitions of such decisions. 
We thus developed an fMRI-compatible trust game where the trustor repeatedly faces social 
risks and completes the same number of matched non-social risks. Trustee responses used 
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in the fMRI experiment were collected in prior experimental sessions employing the 
strategy method. 
We again chose a hybrid fMRI design in order to test the effect of incidental 
anticipatory anxiety (modeled in block-wise fashion) on trusting and non-social control 
choices (modeled in event-related fashion). As in the previously described study (section 
2.2 and Appendix B), anticipatory anxiety was induced via the TOS manipulation and it 
was examined whether an anxious state would lead to changes in transfer rates from trustor 
to trustee, which served as the experimental measure of interpersonal trust.  
It was conjectured that incidental anticipatory anxiety would influence trust-specific 
computations, i.e., the evaluation of the trustee’s trustworthiness, and therefore lead to a 
reduced transfer rate in the threat condition compared to the safe (i.e., no threat) condition. 
These behavioral changes in trust due to incidental anxiety are hypothesized to be based on 
the modulation of neural responses in regions involved in social cognition, including 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) (Mitchell, 
Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Furthermore, we expected the 
amygdala and insula, regions known for their influence on emotional processing (Lindquist, 
Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), to be involved in the influence of incidental 
anxiety on trust decisions. VS and VMPFC, which have repeatedly been shown to be 
implicated in reward processing (Levy & Glimcher, 2011, 2012; Schultz, Dayan, & 
Montague, 1997; Sescousse, Caldú, Segura, & Dreher, 2013), were additional regions of 
major interest. Furthermore, we hypothesized that incidental anxiety would impact neural 
networks involved in emotion- (social) cognition interactions, leading to changed 
connectivity patterns between the network components. Thus, functional connectivity 
analyses were conducted in order to investigate the effect of incidental anticipatory anxiety 
on the valuation network as well as on emotion processing and regulation brain networks. 
We hypothesized that the regulation network might comprise dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) 
(Buhle et al., 2013; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; Shackman et al., 2011; Wager, 
Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008).  
On the behavioral level, we find that anticipatory anxiety reduces mean transfer 
rates, which were chosen as the behavioral index of trust, and mean reaction times in both 
the social and non-social decision-making context.  
The neuroimaging results provide information about the neural mechanisms 
underlying the suppression of participants’ propensity to trust under incidental anxiety. 
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First, comparing neural activity patterns for trust versus non-social (NS) control conditions, 
we found that TPJ, DMPFC and VMPFC were preferentially engaged during trust decisions 
in the safe condition (TrustSafe > NS ControlSafe). Second, incidental anticipatory anxiety led 
to a trust-specific breakdown of this activation pattern in the left TPJ, which was not 
observed for the control condition [assessed via the interaction: 
(TrustSafe  >  TrustThreat)  >  (NS  ControlSafe > NS ControlThreat)]. Similarly, both VMPFC 
and VS show reduced trust-specific activity during threat. Third, functional connectivity 
analysis revealed significant connectivity between TPJ and amygdala during trust taking in 
the safe condition, whereas incidental anxiety was associated with a complete disruption of 
this connectivity. Neither did we find significant TPJ-amygdala during safe NS control 
trials, nor did incidental anxiety lead to a significant breakdown of TPJ-amygdala 
connectivity during those trials. Moreover, a trust-specific link between mean transfer rates 
and functional connectivity patterns in the safe context was found, which was not observed 
during the NS control task. That is, significantly stronger positive correlations between 
mean transfer levels and functional connectivity between TPJ and right amygdala, DMPFC, 
DLPFC, bilateral VLPFC, superior temporal sulcus (STS), and intraparietal sulcus in the 
trust compared to the control task were found. Connectivity strength of TPJ with these 
neural structures predicted mean trust levels during safe trials. However, incidental anxiety 
caused a breakdown of the association between mean trust taking and functional 
connectivity strength of TPJ specifically with posterior STS. Whereas TPJ connectivity 
with posterior STS predicted behavioral trust taking during the safe condition, no significant 
correlation between mean trust level and TPJ-posterior STS connectivity during threat was 
observed. As TPJ has repeatedly been implicated in representing and interpreting others’ 
mental states and behaviors (Mitchell, 2009; Morishima, Schunk, Bruhin, Ruff, & Fehr, 
2012; Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010), our results suggest that 
enhanced connectivity between TPJ and regions important for social cognition (DMPFC, 
STS), emotion processing (amygdala) and cognitive control (VLPFC, DLPFC) supports 
individuals’ trust taking. Incidental anticipatory anxiety appears to suppress these neural 
mechanisms by reducing the activation level in TPJ, reducing the connectivity between TPJ 
and amygdala, and disrupting the association between TPJ connectivity patterns and mean 
trust taking. Last, we identified a domain-general network of regions that show changes in 
choice-related neural activity. During threat compared to safe trials, we observed the 
suppression of neural activity in bilateral posterior DLPFC, left amygdala, posterior 
paracentral lobule, and in left VLPFC and VMPFC. Significant enhancement of activity 
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during decision-making under incidental anticipatory was found in thalamus and 
cerebellum.  
These results provide potentially important insights into the neural circuitry that 
enables people to trust. The findings suggest that anticipatory anxiety weakens neural 
mechanisms important for the representation of social factors involved in interpersonal 
decision-making and transfer of these representations to emotion and cognitive control 
regions during decision-making. These changes eventually lead to a decrease in trust taking.  
2.4 Study D: Impulsivity, sensation seeking and negative 
emotionality relate to distinct morphometric brain 
features 
Together with Jan B. Engelmann, Ernst Fehr, and Christian C. Ruff, I investigated the 
neuroanatomical substrates of stable affective and personality traits predisposing towards 
interindividual differences in decision-making styles. Taking into account the numerous 
studies conducted on the neurobiology of those traits, we were especially interested in an 
improved assessment of personality in order to be able to conclude about variance in brain 
structure that is uniquely explained by variation in one personality feature and not 
confounded by other constructs. We applied a comprehensive set of personality 
questionnaires covering traits and characteristics identified to be associated with 
interindividual variation in decision-making style and were particularly interested in 
potential colinearity between the single personality constructs assessed. We scrutinized the 
battery of psychological questionnaires to factor analysis in order to directly address the 
possible colinearity of the personality features of interest. We then combined the resulting 
factor scores, which indicate the subjects’ position in the personality dimension identified 
by the factor analysis, with subjects’ anatomical brain information collected in the realm of 
two other studies presented in this thesis (Study B and Study C, n = 80). The factor analysis 
identified three factors, confirming a crucial distinction between impulsivity and risk-taking 
(factor 1), negative emotionality (factor 2) and sensation seeking (factor 3), which have 
been shown to influence daily decision-making (Manning et al., 2014; Miu, Heilman, & 
Houser, 2008). Following, we employed voxel-based morphometry (VBM; Ashburner, 
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2007) in order to identify systematic relationships between interindividual variations in 
brain anatomy and the personality and affective characteristics identified via FA.  
Taken together, the investigation on the neuroanatomical correlates of personality 
characteristics leading to differences in individual decision-making revealed unique brain 
morphometric correlates of impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality. The 
VBM analysis confirmed a substantial distinction between impulsivity and sensation 
seeking: Increased impulsivity and sensation seeking were uniquely associated with reduced 
grey matter (GM) volume in medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), respectively. Moreover, negative emotionality showed a negative 
relationship with GM volume in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior 
parietal cortex, which seems congruent with reported changes in fronto-parietal networks in 
depressive patients reported by Schutter et al. (2002). No significant positive associations 
between the identified personality factors and the neuroanatomical regions of interest were 
obtained.  
In conclusion, our study elucidates the neurobiological basis of personality traits 
that modify individual decision-making and suggests that nonclinical individual differences 
in brain morphometry may constitute a neurobiological predisposition for impulsivity, 
sensation seeking, and negative emotionality, which may modify decision-making 
dependent on contextual and cognitive demands (Morishima et al., 2012). More 
specifically, by simultaneously assessing several of these personality traits and accounting 
for their shared variance in the analysis, we were able to distinguish two commonly 
confounded concepts, impulsivity, and sensation seeking, on the behavioral and neural 
level. These findings also suggest that neurobiological information may be usefully 
employed in psychiatric research, since aberrant personality features and their modifying 
influence on decision-making are a common symptom of psychiatric disorders. This 
distinction could be especially important in the domain of diagnostics and treatment of 
addiction. It has been shown that impulsivity can be a risk factor for the development of a 
stimulant dependency, whereas increased sensation seeking seemed to be a consequence of 
the stimulant addiction (Ersche et al., 2010). Our investigation thus informs psychiatric 
research and might lead to new impulses for the diagnostics of clinical disorders. 
Furthermore, the current study suggests that research on the relation between brain structure 
and personality traits clearly benefits from an approach that explicitly measures the 
colinearity and conceptual overlap of competing personality constructs.  
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3 General Discussion 
In the following sections, I will summarize the results of the conducted studies and draw 
conclusions regarding the effects of emotional factors on decision-making derived from the 
presented studies. Furthermore, I will formulate questions arising from this dissertation and 
directions for future research. 
The presented studies are intended to contribute to the rising field of research on the 
modulatory influence of emotion on decision-making. Different methodological approaches 
such as fMRI, VBM and TMS were employed in order to gain a comprehensive overview 
of the modulation of human decision-making by different emotion-related factors on the 
behavioral, neuroanatomical and neurofunctional level. The conducted studies add to the 
knowledge of the modulatory role of emotion on decision-making and emphasize the highly 
task- and context-dependent effects of emotion on decision-making. That is, the interaction 
between emotional factors and decision-making appears to be highly dependent on the 
quality of the emotional response elicited and the characteristics of the decision-making 
situation at hand (see also Lerner et al., 2015; Phelps et al., 2014).  
The conducted TMS study (section 2.1 and Appendix A) was intended to identify 
the role of the DLPFC in resistance to risky choice framing effects. The framing effect has 
been described as an emotional bias in decision-making (Cassotti et al., 2012; De Martino et 
al., 2006; Xu et al., 2013) and further evidence for its emotional basis has been confirmed in 
a recent study (Stanton, Reeck, Huettel, & LaBar, 2014). Although previous neuroimaging 
studies (De Martino et al., 2006; Gonzalez et al., 2005) reported correlative evidence for the 
role of DLPFC in framing, we did not find changes in choice and preference as a function 
of temporary unilateral DLPFC activity disruption. Thus, we cannot confirm the functional 
relevance of unilateral DLPFC in inhibition of framing susceptibility. I assume that DLPFC 
may implement computations that are correlated with neural processes relevant for framing 
resistance, but these computations do not contribute to framing resistance itself. Although 
both DLPFC and ACC are key structures of a neural network of cognitive control (e.g., 
Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009), the ACC, a structure known for its involvement in 
conflict monitoring and emotional processing (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Bush, 
Luu, & Posner, 2000; Shackman et al., 2011), might be the fundamental neural component 
in the implementation of framing resistance, i.e., the suppression of affective biases elicited 
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by decision frames and emotional reactions to these frames. Methodological modifications 
such as bilateral TMS of DLPFC, dual site TMS of DLPFC and ACC and bilateral or dual 
site tDCS routines should be employed to enable strong conclusions about the causal 
mechanisms leading to framing effects in risky choice. Our result constricts the possible 
neurobiological basis of resistance to the framing effect by showing that at least unilateral 
DLPFC disruption is not sufficient to change the influence of integral emotion on decision-
making. As our findings do not allow a conclusion about the role of DLPFC, future studies 
should employ methodological changes as described above to reach stronger conclusions 
regarding the correlational versus causal involvement of DLPFC in framing. 
Considering the effects of incidental anxiety on non-social (section 2.2 and 
Appendix B) and social decision-making (section 2.3 and Appendix C), a differentiated 
picture appears, pointing to task- and social context-dependent effects of anticipatory 
anxiety on the behavioral and neural correlates of human economic preference. That is, the 
study on the effects of anticipatory anxiety on behavioral and neural economic value 
processing in mixed gambles, which did not contain an explicit social dimension as choices 
taken did not imply consequences for other nor were they dependent on other people’s 
choices, revealed decreased neural value coding accompanied by stable behavioral 
preferences under threat, i.e., task-unrelated anticipatory anxiety. This observation might be 
interpreted as reduced hedonic capacity, i.e., decreased reward responsiveness, in a state of 
anxiety (Berghorst et al., 2013; Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006). Although we found changes in 
neural valuation, no changes in behavioral preferences due to incidental anticipatory anxiety 
were found. In line with findings by Gold and colleagues (2014), who report stable goal-
directed behavior combined with changed neural activity and connectivity patterns under 
threat relative to safety using experimental procedures similar to ours, our results may bear 
clinical implications. Specifically, although neural correlates of valuation and expected 
subjective value in persons suffering from psychiatric conditions can change, the persons 
concerned can show non-deviant preferences at early (i.e., prodromal) stages. Still, their 
hedonic capacity could be impacted, potentially reflected in decreased neural reward 
responsiveness (however, see Bogdan & Pizzagalli (2006) reporting observable behavioral 
changes in reward responsiveness due to acute anxiety). Reduced hedonic capacity is 
regularly observed in several psychiatric disorders such as depression, which is often 
characterized by pathological anhedonia, the reduced ability to experience pleasure 
(Treadway & Zald, 2011). During the progressive course of a psychiatric disease such as 
anxiety or depression, neural valuation processes can completely deteriorate to the point 
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where observable behavior also breaks down (for review, see Sharp, Monterosso, & 
Montague, 2012) and we can observe neural and behavioral changes due to maladaptive 
emotional and psychiatric conditions. A still open question is how exactly the behavioral 
stability is perpetuated during these prodromal stages. Future studies should investigate 
whether and under which conditions the effect of anxiety on behavior is compensated for by 
functional connectivity adaptation as suggested by our study and Gold et al. (2014). 
Moreover, it should be explored which other potential mechanisms – apart from changes in 
functional connectivity  – may lead to the dissociation between behavioral and neural 
valuation in anxious states. It needs to be systematically investigated how blunted neural 
reward responsiveness is translated into behavior. Might we, for example, expect decreased 
or increased risk-taking in people suffering from anxiety disorders? Inconsistent results 
have been reported. Giorgetta et al. (2012) and Grecucci et al. (2013) observed decreased 
risk-taking in anxious subjects, whereas Kashdan and colleagues (2006) found increased 
risk-taking in socially anxious subjects. Montoya et al. (2014) found increased risk-taking 
after cortisol administration, a procedure mimicking stress and anxious responses. The 
authors hypothesized that this increase in risk-taking might be attributed to the organism 
trying to compensate the hypoactive state of the reward system under stress by increased 
risk-taking. 
In contrast to the study on the effects of incidental anticipatory anxiety on non-
social decision-making, we did find changes in interpersonal trust and associated neural 
correlates due to incidental anticipatory anxiety (section 2.3 and Appendix C). Specifically, 
we observed that decreases in trusting behavior due to anxiety correlated with changes in 
social cognition-specific and valuation brain networks. On the behavioral level, incidental 
anxiety also decreased transfer rates in a matched non-social control risk game to a similar 
extent as in the trust game. However, the neural circuitry underlying these behavioral 
changes due to anxiety significantly differed between the trust and control condition. 
During trust choices, left TPJ, a region known for its involvement in social cognition (e.g., 
Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004), was active in the safe context, but 
broke down under threat. During risky decisions, no significant activation of TPJ in the safe 
or threat context was observed. Furthermore, a neural network typically involved in social 
cognition (e.g., Samson et al., 2004; Saxe, 2006) consisting of left TPJ, amygdala, DMPFC 
and VMPFC  showed significantly greater connectivity during decision-making in trust 
relative to control trials in the safe condition. Under threat, we observed a trust-specific 
breakdown of these connectivity patterns. In addition, brain-behavior relationships, that is, 
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transfer rates correlating with connectivity strength between TPJ and posterior STS, 
observed under safe conditions broke down under threat. The posterior STS is a region 
essential for inferences concerning other people’s intentions (Saxe, 2006; Saxe, Xiao, 
Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004), a core component of social cognition (for review, see 
Amodio & Frith, 2006). We might speculate that acute anxiety impacts the neural 
representation of others’ intentional actions and the adequate interpretation of social 
context, thus leading to changes in social interaction behavior. The results from this study 
inform us about the fundamental role of incidental emotions in social decision-making and 
suggest that the integration of incidental emotion in economic models of decision-making 
could improve the predictive power of these models (Lerner et al., 2015; Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2003).  
Furthermore, comparing the results of Studies B and C investigating the effect of 
incidental anticipatory anxiety on non-social versus social decision-making, respectively, I 
conclude that the carryover effects of incidental anxiety on choice and judgment appear to 
be highly specific, depending on both the quality of the emotion induced and the decision-
making task characteristics (for review, see Phelps et al., 2014). While neural changes (i.e., 
decreased neural sensitivity to economic value) accompanied by stable behavioral 
preferences were found in (non-social) mixed gambles under incidental anxiety (section 2.2 
and Appendix B), we observed both behavioral and neural changes in the trust game and 
control risk game under threat (section 2.3 and Appendix C). Taking into account the 
experimental designs employed in the two studies, we might hypothesize that the impact of 
emotion on decision-making is dependent on task complexity. This conjecture is based on 
the fact that the trust game and adapted risk game are characterized by increased complexity 
compared to the mixed gambles, which comprise equiprobability lotteries that are relatively 
simple from a cognitive point of view. Hence, we might speculate that, on the one hand, the 
effects of emotion on decision-making are highly dependent on the cognitive task load 
(Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & Derakshan, 2013; Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, 
& Bauer, 2012). On the other hand, we should ask for specific interactions of emotion with 
social versus non-social decision-making contexts, as neural networks impacted by these 
distinct contexts have been suggested to differ (V. Lee & Harris, 2013; Ruff & Fehr, 2014), 
which is also demonstrated in our study. In line with this, early behavioral studies 
demonstrated stronger effects of mood on social decision-making when tasks were 
demanding and complex (Forgas, 1995). Thus, stronger emotional effects on decision-
making seem to occur for more elaborate interactions in social contexts. Harlé et al. (2012) 
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hypothesized that socially more complex choice situations may be more susceptible to 
emotional influences than non-social and less complex tasks. That is, those kinds of 
decision-making situations draw on more behavioral cognitive resources and underlying 
neural processing capacities and hence should be prone to interference by parallel 
processes. Considering the results of the current studies, a complex picture, which needs 
differentiation, appears. On the one hand, incidental anxiety did not interfere with 
observable behavior in a simple risky decision-making task (section 2.2 and Study B), 
which is to some degree consistent with the hypothesis of Harlé et al. (2012) that affect 
infusion onto decision-making processes is more likely for cognitively complex tasks. On 
the other hand, in Study C, we found that social and non-social decision-making are equally 
susceptible to incidental emotional interference. That is, transfer rates in trust and risk game 
decreased to similar degrees in the threat relative to safe context. Importantly, the two tasks 
were well matched regarding cognitive complexity. Not the social or non-social 
characteristic of the decision-making situation determined the strength of the emotion-
cognition interaction; rather the complexity of the task seemed to make our subjects’ 
decision-making more or less susceptible to emotional influence.  
Furthermore, an important distinction between revealed preferences and associated 
neural correlates was revealed by Study B: We demonstrated that the brain’s value coding 
changes between safe and threat emotional contexts, with a focus on negative value coding 
during anxiety, whereas observed behavior (i.e., choices) were constant across emotional 
contexts. This finding is generally congruent with multiple systems theories of decision-
making stating that different valuation systems can guide choice depending on the 
properties of the decision-making situation (Rangel et al., 2008). Changes in neural 
valuation processes due to negative affective states are also reported by Schwabe et al. 
(2012). They reported that hormonally induced stress can lead to a change from goal-
directed to habitual decision control and reduced value sensitivity in medial prefrontal 
cortex. During anticipatory anxiety, the same behavioral choices may have been based on 
goal-directed negative value computations in the insula (rather than positive value 
computations in the VMPFC and VS), possibly in conjunction with compensatory 
mechanisms such as heuristics and increased habitual responding. In either case, the 
reduction of value coding in the VMPFC and VS during anxiety is suggested to indicate a 
decrease in the positive value of the available choice options.  
In addition, our data add to the interesting discussion on the instantiation of social 
versus non-social valuation in the brain (Ruff & Fehr, 2014). We found distinct brain 
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networks to be involved in social versus non-social valuation processes (Study C). Whereas 
social valuation was modulated by social cognition-related brain structures (e.g., left TPJ, 
pSTS) and general valuation brain regions (VMPFC, DLPFC, VLPFC), non-social choices 
were computed in general valuation brain regions without prominent computation of value 
in social cognition-specific brain regions, which we instead observed for trust decisions.  
Although our data do not allow a firm conclusion on the neural architecture of social 
versus non-social value processing, based on these results we may conceptualize the 
instantiation of social valuation in the brain according to the extended common currency 
schema (Ruff & Fehr, 2014). According to this schema, identical neural processes 
determine the motivational relevance for social and non-social decision objects. 
Specifically, a general neural valuation network is assumed to integrate input from brain 
regions relevant for social and non-social choice in order to compute specific social or non-
social value signals, respectively, entering the neural utility computation. It is predicted that 
social and non-social neural value signals are processed in the same valuation brain regions. 
Depending on the actual “value domain”, functional connectivity patterns with distinct 
brain regions or networks (e.g., social cognition circuitry during social choice) will vary. 
Alternatively, the authors propose the social-valuation-specific schema, which presumes 
that social values are processed in specifically dedicated neural networks. According to this 
schema, different neurons are proposed to process social versus non-social factors. Social 
and non-social neural value signals are implemented via distinct spatial patterns of brain 
activity. Importantly, the underlying computations in social and non-social value processing 
follow similar principles. 
Our study highlights social cognition-relevant brain structures as neural correlates of 
the behaviorally observed breakdown of trust during anxiety in combination with general 
valuation specific brain regions during trust decisions. The observed domain-general effects 
of incidental anxiety on decision-making and valuation relevant brain regions such as 
VMPFC, VLPFC, and DLPFC might also support the extended common currency schema. 
However, we cannot finally conclude on the mechanisms underlying the observed changes: 
Does the affective manipulation impact a “general value-representation circuit” and – 
depending on choice domain – specific functional connectivity patterns? Alternatively, does 
anticipatory anxiety impact on a distinct “social value-representation circuit” versus a “non-
social value-representation circuit” in social versus non-social choice contexts, 
respectively? Future studies specifically designed to disentangle social versus non-social 
valuation and decision-making in the brain may employ the above described taxonomy. 
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Furthermore, distinct effects of emotional factors on social and non-social decision-making 
should be considered in order to gain a systematic understanding of the complex 
interactions between emotions, decision-making and choice context.  
Furthermore, we should take notice of the different samples used in the two studies. 
While a male sample was used for the non-social decision-making task, a mixed gender 
sample was used for the social decision-making task. We might speculate that gender 
differences are important in determining the effect of emotion on decision-making (Fehr-
Duda, Epper, Bruhin, & Schubert, 2011; Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009). Fehr-Duda et 
al. (2011), for instance, reported that incidental good mood was significantly correlated with 
probability weighting in women. That is, females in a better than normal mood tend to 
weight probabilities relatively more optimistically. Men, though, appear immunized against 
effects of incidental mood on decision-making by applying a mechanical decision criterion 
such as the maximization of expected value. We might tentatively speculate about 
“spontaneous” decision-making instead of employing mechanistic decision rules in the trust 
game study. Therefore, future studies may tackle the issues implied by sample 
characteristics. At this point, we should be hesitant concerning the generalizability of our 
results as effects might be significantly driven by our sample characteristics. 
In conclusion, the conducted fMRI studies offer empirical evidence for the diverse 
and highly specific influences of emotional factors on decision-making. I found that 
dynamic emotional factors systematically modulate neurofunctional correlates of human 
decision-making. Our results thus support the call for the integration of incidental emotional 
factors into economic models of decision-making. The finding of decreased trusting 
behavior in a state of incidental anticipatory anxiety in the fMRI study is congruent with 
psychological perspectives on emotional influences on decision-making. For example, the 
ATF (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) predicts decreased trust in an anxious state due to an 
appraisal of an uncertain existential threat, leading to risk-avoidant behavior in order to 
reduce this uncertainty. Future research needs to decide about an adequate model explaining 
the manifold and diverse effects of emotion on decision-making. At this point we can state 
that valence-grounded approaches are a parsimonious, but too simple way to explain the 
effects of emotion on decision-making. Previous studies presented behavioral data that was 
more consistent with the ATF by Lerner and Keltner (2001). Neuroimaging data can enrich 
this research and help reveal the manifold, but consistent effects of emotion on choice and 
preference. As stated above, the investigation of the neural organization of social versus 
non-social value processing, especially in combination with emotional influences, is another 
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very interesting topic. Taking Ruff and Fehr’s schemas (2014) as a conceptual framework 
seems appropriate in order to examine the neural representation of social concepts and 
understand healthy interactive behavior as well as deviations and maladaptive behavior in 
psychopathology. To the best of our knowledge, the sparse number of studies on the 
interaction of emotion and decision-making used correlative measures. In order to identify 
causal mechanisms underlying these interactions and distinguish them from purely 
correlated activity not causally linked to the behavior in question, future studies need to 
apply combined brain stimulation and neuroimaging techniques such as concurrent TMS-
fMRI in order to observe the effects of the interruption of putative “social networks”. 
However, this approach is limited by the subcortical localization of brain structures 
fundamentally involved in emotion and reward processing, so that TMS application will be 
restricted to cortical regions such as DLPFC and to the observation of network effects on 
subcortical structures (e.g., striatum or amygdala) via fMRI.  
Finally, our interest in the neurobiology of personality and affective traits relevant 
for decision-making led to the design of a VBM study in order to investigate the 
neuroanatomical correlates of these traits. This study elucidates the neurobiological basis of 
personality traits that modify individual decision-making. By simultaneously assessing 
several of these personality and affective traits and accounting for their shared variance in 
the analysis, we were able to distinguish two commonly confounded concepts, impulsivity 
and sensation seeking, on the behavioral and neural level. While we found that higher 
impulsivity and risk-taking were associated with smaller mOFC GM volume, a negative 
relationship between sensation seeking and ACC GM volume was observed. This 
distinction might be especially important in the diagnostics and treatment of psychiatric 
disorders such as addiction. That is, it has been shown that impulsivity could be a risk factor 
for the development of a stimulant dependency, whereas increased sensation seeking 
seemed to be a consequence of the stimulant addiction (Ersche et al., 2010). In addition, we 
identify the neuroanatomical correlate of negative emotionality, that is, higher negative 
emotionality scores were correlated with smaller regional DLPFC and inferior parietal GM 
volume. Negative emotionality has repeatedly been shown to be associated with psychiatric 
disorders such as depression, alcohol dependence and borderline personality disorder 
(Boschloo et al., 2013; Ruocco, Amirthavasagam, Choi-Kain, & McMain, 2013). Hence, 
our investigation informs psychiatric research and might lead to impulses for the 
diagnostics of clinical disorders by supporting the identification of endophenotypes of 
psychiatric disorders, therefore advancing dimensional psychiatric diagnostics. Of course, 
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the generalization of our results to psychiatric cases needs to be taken with caution, as our 
subjects were mentally healthy persons from a student pool. However, as healthy and 
pathological personality traits build a continuum (e.g., Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), it is 
essential to understand neurobiological mechanisms underlying those traits in healthy 
samples to gain a systematic understanding of “normal” neuroanatomy-personality 
associations and deviations in psychopathology with the goal to improve psychiatric 
diagnostics and treatment. At a more general level, our investigation suggests that research 
on the relation between brain structure and stable traits clearly benefits from an approach 
that explicitly measures the colinearity and conceptual overlap of competing personality 
constructs.  
To put it in a nutshell, we found diverse evidence for the neurofunctional and 
neuroanatomical representation of incidental emotional effects on decision-making, 
contradicting the economic dogma of the inferior role of incidental emotion in decision-
making. In order to extend the knowledge presented in this thesis and systematize affective 
influences on choice and preferences in the behavioral and neural domain, I propose to use 
the emotion-imbued choice (EIC) model by Lerner et al. (2015), a general framework of 
emotional influences on decision-making. This model advances the integration of both 
rational choice theory and findings on integral and incidental emotional influences on 
decision-making in order to develop empirically valid and naturalistic economic models of 
human decision-making. The model comprises components consistent with normative 
models of decision-making. That is, each option’s expected utility of a choice at hand 
(including the assessment of expected emotions associated with each outcome) is assessed 
separately. The resulting utilities are then combined with choice characteristics (e.g., 
probabilities, time delays) as well as decision maker characteristics (e.g., risk preferences) 
to form an overall evaluation of each option. Importantly, emotion enters the model in two 
ways: Each outcome’s utility is also assessed in regard to one’s expected emotional 
response to that outcome (see above). These predicted emotions are compatible with 
rational choice theory and contribute to utility calculation as rational factors. However, the 
second type of emotion, namely emotions that are felt at the time of decision-making, is 
incompatible with rational choice theory. It is assumed that there are distinct sources of 
these current emotions: (1) Characteristics of the choice options can influence the decision-
maker’s current emotional state. (2) Expected emotions may not only directly impact 
outcome evaluation, but also impact the current emotional state. (3) Evaluation of the 
choice situation may elicit emotional responses such as frustration, which leads to changes 
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in current emotional state. (4) Incidental emotions such as baseline or dispositional anxiety, 
mood or weather impact the decision maker’s current feelings in addition to the above 
described integral factors (1-3). These current feelings, in turn, influence the evaluation of 
the choice inputs. Depending on the emotional state, different computations dominate the 
decision-making process (e.g., heuristic versus analytic processing activated motivational 
goals, or choice dimensions focused on). The EIC model is based on the central tenets of 
the ATF, and it seems well suited to guide future research on the neurobiological and 
behavioral mechanisms underlying emotional influences on choice and judgment.  
Future research should employ this general framework in order to develop an 
adequate model, which synthesizes assumptions of rational choice theory and emotional 
factors to explain human decision-making. I hypothesize that this integration will improve 
the predictive power of economic models of choice and increase their applicability in 
contexts such as politics, consumer choice, and domains like psychiatric research. 
Together, the findings presented in this thesis provide empirical evidence for the 
modulation of decision-making by incidental and integral emotional sources on the 
behavioral and neurobiological level calling for the consistent integration of emotion into 
economic theories of decision-making. 
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A.1 Abstract 
Contrary to assumptions of standard economic theories, human decision-making is 
commonly influenced by contextual factors and systematic cognitive biases. Description 
invariance, a hallmark of normative decision-making theory, can be violated, for instance, 
by the framing effect: Different, but logically equivalent descriptions of the same choice set 
lead to differing preferences. Whereas a positively framed risky prospect elicits risk 
aversion, a negatively framed prospect of the same choice set is associated with risk-
seeking, leading to enhanced reflection effects.  
Since previous neuroimaging studies identified the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) as a neural correlate of the inhibition of the framing effect, we sought to probe for 
the causal role of DLPFC in susceptibility to framing by means of repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Although the previous studies suggested a substantial role of 
DLPFC in framing, the current study could not confirm its functional relevance for 
inhibition of financial risky choice framing effects using unilateral disruption of either left 
or right DLPFC. It might be that the causal role of DLPFC in inhibition of framing 
susceptibility has been overestimated due to results of previous correlative neuroimaging 
studies. In order to yield firm conclusions on the functional relevance of DLPFC for 
framing effects, methodological modifications and experimental approaches for future 
studies are discussed. 
A.2 Introduction 
Changes in risk preferences due to cognitive biases are a common observation in 
psychological research and behavioral economics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
The dependence of risk preferences on the description of a risky choice problem is 
called the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) and represents a major violation of 
description invariance, a major axiom of rational choice theory: According to rational 
choice theory equivalent descriptions of the same choice problem should lead to identical 
preferences. However, humans actually tend to behave risk-averse when risky prospects are 
presented in a positive frame, whereas increased risk-seeking is observed when the same 
options are embedded in a negative context. For instance, financial decisions are 
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substantially influenced by their description as a loss or gain relative to a reference point, 
which often is the status quo (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) explains the framing effect by the specific properties of the value function, 
which is concave for gains and convex for losses (implying diminishing sensitivity for both 
value domains), and the reference point established by the frame. Due to the form of the 
value function, decision-makers oftener opt for a sure option evaluated as a gain rather than 
choosing a risky option of equal expected value. Conversely, they tend to prefer the risky 
option over a sure option of equal expected value, which is perceived as a loss.  
From a psychological perspective, emotions are thought to play a key role in the 
framing effect. In particular, dual process theories (De Neys, 2006; Evans, 2003; Sloman, 
1996) offer an explanation for this decision-making bias by proposing the dominance of an 
intuitive/affective system (System 1) over a cognitive/executive system (System 2) 
(Cassotti et al., 2012; Kahneman & Frederick, 2007). The dominance of System 1, which is 
characterized by rapid and automatic operations, leads to the employment of affective 
heuristics causing susceptibility to framing. The computationally demanding and slow 
operations of System 2, however, are assumed to be able to override the affective heuristic-
based responses generated by System 1. Thus, according to dual process theories, 
susceptibility to framing is hypothesized to be caused by the dominance of System 1, 
whereas overcoming the behavioral tendencies imposed by frames is characterized by the 
dominance of System 2 over System 1.  
This “affective heuristics hypothesis” of framing has been supported by recent 
neuroimaging studies. While increased amygdala activation was observed for frame-
congruent decisions (choices made according to the behavioral tendency imposed by the 
frame), frame-incongruent decisions (choices made against the behavioral heuristics 
imposed by the frame) were correlated with increased activation in DLPFC and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). This activation 
pattern was interpreted as empirical evidence for an emotion-driven framing effect, which 
can be overcome by the implementation of cognitive control of these behavioral tendencies 
via DLPFC and ACC (De Martino et al., 2006; Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, & Just, 2005). 
This interpretation is clearly in line with the well-established role of these brain regions in 
the implementation and maintenance of top-down cognitive control over behavior and 
decision-making (Coutlee & Huettel, 2012; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). Both right and left DLPFC have been observed to be involved in 
computations relevant to those functions (Fecteau et al., 2007; Figner et al., 2010; Hare, 
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Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Knoch et al., 2006). However, direct causal evidence for the role 
of dorsolateral prefrontal brain structures in resistance to framing is missing until date, since 
the aforementioned neuroimaging studies offer solely correlational evidence for the 
involvement of the DLPFC in resistance to framing. While functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) identifies correlational links between brain activity and behavior, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows establishing a causal link between brain 
function and behavior. Using fMRI, we cannot conclude whether a brain region is pivotal in 
the generation of a specific behavior or merely coactivated by a neural network causally 
involved in the given behavior. Specifically, DLPFC may implement computations that are 
correlated with resistance to frames, but that do not contribute to framing resistance itself. A 
hypothesis about a brain region’s causal relevance for a behavioral manifestation – like the 
framing effect – provided by correlative tools such as fMRI can be complemented by TMS. 
Given the involvement of the DLPFC in frame-incongruent decisions found by De 
Martino and colleagues (2006), we hypothesized that temporary disruption of DLPFC 
functioning will lead to changes in susceptibility to framing. Specifically, taking into 
account the involvement of bilateral DLPFC in frame-incongruent choices reported by De 
Martino et al. (2006), we tested whether temporary perturbation of DLPFC functioning 
would cause increased frame-congruent decisions due to the reduction of cognitive control 
over this automatic behavioral tendency. To this end, we employed a TMS-compatible risky 
framing task similar to that used by De Martino et al. (2006) after participants had 
undergone continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS; Huang et al., 2009; Huang, Edwards, 
Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005). cTBS is thought to interrupt cortical activity in targeted 
brain regions for up to 20 minutes (Huang et al., 2009, 2005) after stimulation, and was 
applied to either the left or right DLPFC (treatment conditions) or to subject's vertex 
(control condition). Importantly, subjects were randomly assigned to the three experimental 
conditions. Because of the well-known individual differences in susceptibility to the 
framing effect (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002), each participant completed the 
same risky decision-making task twice, once with and once without cTBS, in order to get 
within-subject measurements of the TMS effect on framing susceptibility relative to a 
purely behavioral baseline measurement. 
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A.3 Methods 
Participants. 67 (36 females; 18 - 35 years, mean age [std] = 23.08 years [3.54]) right-
handed adults participated in the experiment. In total, 4 of these participants had to be 
excluded due to technical issues (n = 2) during the experiment or previous experience with 
the behavioral task (n = 2). All subjects gave written informed consent to the experimental 
procedure. Their eligibility for participation in a TMS study was carefully assessed, that is, 
subjects with a history of neurologic or psychiatric diseases (assessed via a pre-
experimental questionnaire) were excluded from the study. Subsequently, subjects were 
randomly and evenly assigned to the three experimental conditions, resulting in a final 
group size of n = 21 for left and right DLPFC as well as the vertex group. The study was 
approved by the ethics committee of the Canton Zürich. 
Experimental Timeline. The study consisted of two sessions scheduled for separate 
days. The first appointment served to conduct the TMS experiment, which aimed at 
investigating the neurobiological substrates of the framing effect. The second appointment, 
conducted approx. 14 days later, entailed a purely behavioral session without TMS 
treatment. During this second session, the participants completed the same behavioral 
financial risky choice framing task as in the TMS experiment, in order to derive a baseline 
estimate of the individual framing effect and to enable within-subject comparisons. In order 
to reduce consistency or memory effects, the paradigm was modified for the second session 
(see section Behavioral task).  
Instruction and Questionnaire phase. Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were 
informed about the experimental procedure and read detailed information about the 
experimental task. Five practice trials ensured that the participants understood the 
behavioral task and were familiar with the visual displays (see section “Behavioral task”). 
Additionally, participants were asked to complete a series of psychological questionnaires, 
which covered a broad range of personality dimensions. The purpose of this questionnaire 
battery was to investigate the potential influence of personality characteristics on 
susceptibility to framing. To this end, participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the NEO-FFI (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 1993) for assessment of personality characteristics such as neuroticism, 
extraversion and openness, and the Need for Cognition Scale (Bless, Wänke, Bohner, 
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Fellhauer, & Schwarz, 1994; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which measures dispositional 
differences in the intensity of cognitive processing and has been found to correlate with the 
interindividually varying degree of susceptibility to framing manipulations (Smith & Levin, 
1996).  
TMS procedure. Before the experiment, anatomical magnetic resonance brain 
images were obtained for each subject. These high-resolution T1-weighted 3D-TFE images 
were acquired using a 3T whole-body MR Scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The 
Netherlands) at the SNS laboratory of the University of Zürich (TR: 7500 ms; TE = 3.5 ms; 
FA = 8°; FOV 250 × 250 mm; voxel size 1.04 × 1.04 × 0.6 mm; 301 sagittal slices). 
Sites for TMS application were based on the study by De Martino et al. (2006). 
They observed increased DLPFC activation when subjects resisted the behavioral tendency 
imposed by a gain or loss frame. That is, enhanced bilateral DLPFC activation was 
observed when subjects chose the lottery in the gain frame and the sure option in loss frame 
([SLF + LGF] > [SGF + LLF]). In the present experiment, TMS was either applied to 
participants’ left or right DLPFC coordinates from this study (left PFC: x = -48, y = 18, 
z  =  24; right PFC: x = 56, y = 18, z = 28 [MNI space], Figure A-1) or over the subject’s 
vertex, which was defined as the conjunction point of the left and right central fissures in 
the interhemispheric fissure of each subject’s individual brain. 
 
Figure A-1: TMS sites. cTBS was either applied to participants’ left or right DLPFC coordinates (left 
DPFC: x = -48, y = 18, z = 24; right DPFC: x = 56, y = 18, z = 28 [MNI space]), left and right panel, 
respectively. In the control condition, stimulation was applied over the subject’s vertex, which was 
defined as the conjunction point of the left and right central fissures in the interhemispheric fissure of 
each subject’s individual brain (not shown/graphically displayed here). 
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To determine the left and right stimulation site for each subject, his anatomical scan was 
normalized into MNI space using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). 
The individual target coordinates for TMS were determined in the normalized scan and 
backprojected from MNI into subject space applying inverse normalization. These 
individual coordinates were then marked on the participant’s structural image using 
Brainsight (Rogue Research Inc., Montreal, Canada) frameless stereotactic neuronavigation. 
The vertex was determined based on each participant’s individual neuroanatomy (see exact 
procedure above) and marked on each subject’s T1 scan.  
In order to determine subjects’ individual active motor threshold (AMT), 
stimulation of the left M1 was carried out over the optimal location for stimulation of the 
right first dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle. We used a 70 mm-figure of eight-coil placed 
tangentially over the participant’s right primary motor cortex with 45° backwards and 
laterally over the hot-spot of the left hand FDI in order to stimulate M1. To obtain active 
AMTs, used in cTBS for safety reasons, muscle force was generated by participants 
squeezing forefinger and thumb to activate their FDI muscle at approximately 25 % of 
maximum force. The AMT was thus measured during 25% of the maximum voluntary 
contraction of the FDI muscle, and was defined as the lowest stimulator output that elicited 
a visible motor twitch in the FDI muscle and motor evoked potentials of at least 200 µV in 
at least in 5 out of 10 trials. In particular, a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (The Magstim 
Company Ltd, Whitland, U.K.) was used to stimulate cortical regions. MEPs were 
registered using surface electrodes placed over participants’ left FDI. cTBS was applied at 
an intensity of 80% AMT using approved protocols (Huang et al., 2005; Katayama & 
Rothwell, 2007). We delivered cTBS with the same Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (The 
Magstim Company Ltd, Whitland, U.K.) and a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil also used for 
AMT measurements. The cTBS protocol consisted of 40 s continuous triplets of 50 Hz that 
repeat every 200 ms. In total, 600 pulses were delivered. Coil control was performed with 
Brainsight, based on the individually prepared T1-weighted structural scans. For left and 
right prefrontal cortex (PFC) stimulation, the coil was positioned with the handle pointing in 
an upward vertical orientation, at a tangential position to the participant’s head. For the 
control condition, the coil was placed over the vertex with the handle pointing in a posterior 
direction parallel to the midline. Throughout all three conditions, the appropriate coil 
position in relation to the subject’s head was constantly monitored by the neuronavigation 
system. 
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TMS parameters. The group-averaged AMT (± standard error of the mean [SEM]) 
were 51.4 ± 2.1 %, 44.7 ± 1.5 and 45.4 ± 1.3 and 44 ± 6.8 % of the maximum stimulator 
output (MSO) in the vertex, left group and right TMS group, respectively. cTBS intensities 
(± SEM) were therefore 40 ± 1.4 % and 36 ± 1.3 %, 36.1 ± 1.1 of the MSO in vertex, left 
and right TMS group, respectively. 
Behavioral paradigm. The framing task was conducted in Matlab R2012a (The 
MathWorks Inc, Natick, Massachusetts, USA) using Cogent 2000 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk). All experimental stimuli were presented on a computer 
monitor against a black background.   
Each trial started with an endowment phase, during which an endowment (E) for the 
respective trial was presented on the screen for 1.5 s. This endowment transferred a specific 
number of points to the participant. Subjects were instructed that these points would be used 
for the subsequent choices and that the points gained in four choices randomly drawn after 
the experiment would be converted into CHF at a fixed rate (15 points = 1 CHF in the TMS 
session, 40 points = 1 CHF in the behavioral session). These payments were real so that the 
participants’ choices were fully incentive compatible. 
The endowment phase was followed by the decision stage lasting a maximum of 4 s. 
In this phase, the subjects were asked to decide between two available options. They had to 
choose either to play a lottery (L) with varying probabilities of winning the whole 
endowment [P(WIN)] or to take a fraction of the endowment for sure (S). For each target 
trial the expected values of the L and S options were equivalent, that is, E*P(WIN) = S. 
Importantly, S was either framed as a gain (“KEEP”, gain frame [GF]) or a loss (“LOSE”, 
loss frame [LF]). The probabilities of winning the whole endowment amount were 0.2, 0.4, 
0.6, and 0.8. Each of these values was combined with 14 different endowment levels: 25, 
35, 45, 50, 60, 70, 75, 85, 95, 100, 110, 120, 125, and 130 points. Each of these 
combinations was shown in the GF as well as LF, resulting in a total of 112 target trials 
(comprising 56 GF and 56 LF trials). To monitor subjects’ attention to the task and to divert 
attention from the equivalence of expected outcomes of L and S in target trials, we also 
included two types of catch trials. These mainly differed from the target trials by a marked 
inequivalence of expected outcome of L and S (E*P(WIN) ≠ S). Whereas no 
mathematically preferable option existed for the target trials, a non-ambiguously preferable 
option was given in the catch trials. In catch trials of type 1 (Catch_1), the probabilities of 
winning the whole endowment were 0.05 and 0.95. In this kind of trial type, the sure 
amount was calculated as S = E*0.5. The set-up of Catch_1 trials resulted in lottery-
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weighted or sure option-weighted trials for trials with a probability of winning the whole 
endowment of 0.05 or 0.95, respectively. The probabilities of catch trials of type 2 
(Catch_2) were 0.4 and 0.6 and the sure amount was always calculated as S = E*0.9. Thus, 
in this kind of trial, the sure option was mathematically always preferable. Seven different 
endowment levels were used for the catch trials: 20, 30, 40, 90, 105, 115, and 135 points. 
Equivalent to the target trials, each [E, P(WIN)] catch trial combination was shown in both 
frames, leading to a total of 56 catch trials (28 Catch_1 trials, 28 Catch_2 trials). Target and 
catch trials were presented in a pseudorandom order, with the restriction that maximally 4 
trials of the same trial type were sequentially presented. Subjects were allowed a maximum 
reaction time of 4 s. Immediately after choosing the preferred option via the left or right 
arrow key (preferred option on right screen half: right arrow press requested, preferred 
option on left screen half: left arrow press requested), a fixation cross was presented for 2 s 
(ITI) (see Figure A-2 for trial setup). 
At the beginning of the TMS session, the spatial locations of S and L option (left or 
right half of the screen) were pseudorandomly determined across participants and kept 
constant across the whole experimental session. Notably, during the second session, the two 
options were presented in reverse order, while other aspects of the experiment were kept 
constant. 
 
Figure A-2: Trial sequence. Each trial started with a central fixation cross displayed, followed by the 
endowment stage. During this stage, varying amounts of endowments were presented to the participants 
during this stage. Next, the decision screen was presented (exact display duration dependent on the 
participants’ response latencies). Subjects had to decide between a lottery (L) and sure (S) option. They 
could either take a fraction of the initial endowment for sure (S) or play a lottery with varying 
probabilities of winning the whole initial endowment (L). L was represented by a pie chart depicting the 
probabilities of losing and winning the whole endowment. Importantly, S was framed either as a gain 
(“KEEP in the gain frame) or as a loss (“LOSE in the loss frame). Immediately after subjects had chosen 
their preferred option, their choice was visually confirmed by means of a green circle, which was 
displayed below the chosen option. 
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Payment routine. To incentivize behavior and promote subjects' deliberate decision-
making, the final payout was determined based on each subject’s decisions made during the 
two experimental sessions. That is, for each session, four decisions were randomly chosen 
and implemented for real. The resulting sum was added to the fixed participation fee (100 
CHF) and paid out at the end of the second session. In order to avoid feedback effects, 
subjects were informed about their total earnings in both sessions after completion of the 
second session.  
Behavioral data analysis. Data analysis was performed with Matlab R2012a (The 
MathWorks Inc, Natick, Massachusetts, USA) and STATA 12 (StataCorp LP, College 
Station, Texas, USA). 
Consistent with the literature, the framing effect (FE) was calculated as the 
difference in lottery choices between LF and GF (FE = LLF - LGF). Responses that were 
congruent with the behavioral tendency imposed by the frame (LLF, SGF) were labeled as 
frame-congruent, whereas responses indicating resistance to the frame (SLF, LGF) were 
named frame-incongruent. 
In order to investigate the effects of TMS on decision-making, two different types of 
regression analysis were performed. First, we conducted linear regression analysis of 
gambling frequencies (i.e., proportion of trials in which L was chosen) to investigate the 
effects of different experimental factors (e.g., TMS group, frame type (LF, GF), probability 
of winning level) on subjects’ choices. Second, in order to perform an analysis with 
increased sensitivity to single responses, we performed multiple logistic regression analysis 
of single-trial choice data. The regression model always contained TMS group (left PFC, 
right PFC, and vertex) and frame type as independent variables. Different logistic 
regressions modeled the influence of probability of winning level, endowment amount and 
personality characteristics as well as their interactions on choices.  
A.4 Results 
Catch trials 
As a very first step, we examined whether subjects exerted continuous engagement with the 
task. For this purpose, we analyzed Catch_1 and Catch_2 trials. This analysis confirmed 
that subjects spent continuous attention to the task in both the TMS and Post-TMS sessions. 
In Catch_1 trials, participants in all treatment conditions showed higher gambling rates in 
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lottery- weighted than in sure option-weighted trials (see Figure A-3 for mean gambling 
rates). These results were confirmed by a logistic regression of probability of lottery versus 
sure option response, which revealed significantly increased probability of gambling in 
lottery-weighted trials across all three groups (Table A-1). Groups were equally accurate in 
their choices, as no significant TMS group × weight (lottery-/sure option-weighted) 
interaction was found.  
 
Figure A-3: Analysis of Catch_1 trials: Subjects spent continued attention to the task. A: Shown are 
gambling rates for lottery-weighted Catch_1 trials in the TMS session. The high-gambling rates for 
lottery-weighted Catch_1 trials confirmed subjects’ continued attention to the task during the TMS 
session, as they mostly chose the lottery option, which had the higher expected outcome in this kind of 
trial. B: Shown are gambling rates for sure option-weighted Catch_1 trials, i.e., trials in which the sure 
option had the higher expected value, in the TMS session. Subjects indeed preferred the sure option in 
Catch_1, which led to low gambling rates for Catch_1 trials in the TMS session. C: Gambling rates for 
lottery-weighted Catch_1 trials in the Post-TMS session. High-gambling rates for lottery-weighted 
Catch_1 trials were also found in the Post-TMS session. D: Shown are gambling rates for sure option-
weighted Catch_1 trials in the Post-TMS session. Low gambling rates for Catch_1 trials were also 
observed in the Post-TMS session. These results evidenced participants’ attention to the task during the 
Post-TMS session. Error bars: SEM 
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Table A-1: Continuous attention spent to the task reflected by choice behavior in Catch_1 trials 
 Variables TMS session Post-TMS session 
Response Left PFC 1.203 -0.438 
  (0.653) (0.675) 
 Right PFC 1.357* -0.252 
  (0.73) (0.827) 
 Weight (L, S) 6.949*** 5.851*** 
  (0.653) (0.777) 
 Left PFC × weight (L, S) -0.166 0.42 
  (0.95) (1.138) 
 Right PFC × weight (L, S) -1.174 -0.27 
  (1.016) (1.165) 
 Constant -4.277*** -2.996*** 
  (0.584) (0.505) 
Note: Logistic regression of Catch_1 trial responses Subjects spent continuous attention to the task since 
significantly higher probability of gambling was found in lottery (L)- compared to sure option (S)-
weighted trials. Subjects were highly accurate in noticing the imbalanced expected outcomes of L versus 
S in Catch_1 trials in both TMS and Post-TMS session. Shown are regression coefficients and robust 
standard errors (SE; in parentheses) clustered by subject. Note: coding scheme: S = 0, L = 1. (Vertex 
group: baseline). ***  p  < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The Catch_2 trials had the main purpose of distracting participants from the 
equivalence of expected outcomes of the target trials. The analysis of these sure option-
weighted trials confirmed the participants’ attention to the task by revealing low gambling 
rates in both LF and GF across all TMS groups (for mean gambling rates see Figure A-4). 
Nevertheless, a logistic regression analysis on gambling responses in Catch_2 trials 
revealed a significant framing effect in the TMS session. That is, despite the superiority of 
the sure option in those trials, subjects’ were still susceptible to the behavioral tendency 
imposed by the frame. However, in the Post-TMS session, no significant framing effect was 
found (Table A-2). 
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Figure A-4: Gambling rates for sure option-weighted Catch_2 trials in TMS session (A) and Post-TMS 
session (B). Subjects were able to notice the dominance of the sure option in Catch_2 trials, reflected in 
low gambling rates for those trials. Error bars: SEM 
Table A-2: Continuous attention spent to the task reflected in low gambling rates in Catch_2 trials 
 Variables TMS session Post-TMS session 
Response Left PFC -0.323 0.452 
  (0.453) (0.488) 
 Right PFC 0.107 0.001 
  (0.588) (0.825) 
 Frame 0.885*** 0.883 
  (0.311) (0.586) 
 Frame × Left PFC 0.452 -0.521 
  (0.574) (0.695) 
 Frame × Right PFC -0.107 -0.154 
  (0.549) (0.719) 
 Constant -2.672*** -3.346*** 
  (0.349) (0.38) 
Note: Logistic regression of choices in Catch_2 trials. Catch_2 trials had the main purpose of distracting 
subjects from the expected outcome equivalence of the target trials. In these trials, S (S = 0.9*E) was 
always preferable to L (L = 0.4 and 0.6*E). Although subjects mostly preferred the lottery, the effect of 
framing on decision-making, was still observable at least in the TMS session. In particular, whereas a 
significant framing effect was found in the TMS session, no significantly increased probability to choose 
L in the LF compared to GF was found in the Post-TMS session. Shown are regression coefficients and 
robust SE (in parentheses) clustered by subject.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Target trials 
To investigate the modulation of the framing effect by cTBS of right or left DLPFC, we 
tested for differences in the susceptibility to framing during the target trials (characterized 
by equivalent expected value for the S and L options) between the three TMS groups in the 
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TMS and the Post-TMS session. Visual inspection of mean gambling rates in TMS and 
Post-TMS session did not reveal prominent differences between TMS groups (Figure A-5).  
 
Figure A-5: Mean target trial gambling rates in LF and GF for each TMS group during the TMS and Post 
TMS session. A: Mean gambling rates (SEM) in TMS session: Left PFC: LF = 0.53 (0.05), 
GF  =  0.4  (0.05); Right PFC: LF = 0.52 (0.04), GF = 0.41 (0.04); Vertex: LF = 0.52 (0.03), GF = 0.42 
(0.05); B: Mean gambling rates in LF and GF for each TMS group in the Post-TMS session: Left PFC: 
LF = 0.48 (0.05), GF = 0.37 (0.04); Right PFC: LF = 0.48 (0.04), GF = 0.45 (0.05); Vertex: 
LF  =  0.45  (0.05), GF = 0.4 (0.05) 
This observation was statistically verified by linear regression of participants’ gambling 
rates on frame type and TMS group in TMS and Post-TMS session. This analysis revealed a 
significant framing effect in the TMS session, i.e., significantly higher gambling rates in LF 
relative to GF. However, we did not observe a significant effect of TMS group on gambling 
behavior, nor did this analysis reveal a significant interaction effect between frame type and 
TMS group. The linear regression analysis of gambling rates in the Post-TMS session, 
which was supposed to serve as a baseline measurement of framing effects, failed to show 
susceptibility to framing. Gambling rates in LF were numerically increased compared to the 
GF during the Post-TMS session, but these effects failed to reach statistical significance 
(Table A-3). This may possibly reflect learning or memory effects from the prior TMS 
session.  
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Table A-3: No effect of cTBS of right or left DLPFC on framing susceptibility 
Variables TMS session Post-TMS session 
Left PFC -0.0148 -0.0288 
 (0.0662) (0.0673) 
Right PFC -0.02 0.0536 
 (0.061) (0.0673) 
Frame 0.101*** 0.0616 
 (0.0378) (0.0673) 
Frame × Left PFC 0.0142 0.0498 
 (0.0603) (0.0952) 
Frame × Right PFC 0.0122 -0.0366 
 (0.0566) (0.0952) 
Constant 0.424*** 0.396*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0476) 
Note: Linear regression of gambling rates in target trials. Subjects showed significantly increased 
gambling in LF relative to GF, reflecting successful induction of risky choice framing effect. No 
significant TMS group differences or interaction between frame type and TMS group were found. Coding 
scheme: Frame type: GF = 0, LF = 1; vertex group served as baseline. Shown are regression coefficients 
and robust SE (in parentheses) clustered by subject. ***  p  < 0.01, **  p  <  0.05,  * p  <  0.1 
In order to examine participants’ gambling behavior with a measure more sensitive to 
individual responses, logistic regression of responses (lottery or safe option chosen) were 
performed for the TMS and Post-TMS session. This model comprised the subjects’ 
responses (L and S) as dependent variable as well as TMS group (left PFC, right PFC, and 
vertex), and frame type (LF, GF) as independent variables as well as their interactions. For 
the TMS session, the analysis revealed a significant effect of frame type on choice. That is, 
the probability of choosing the lottery over the safe option was increased in LF relative to 
GF. We observed neither an influence of TMS group on responses nor significant 
interactions between TMS group and frame type. 
The same logistic regression was conducted on the Post-TMS session data and 
confirmed the result of the linear regression. That is, no significant effects of TMS group 
(i.e., stimulation site in first session) and no interaction between frame type and TMS group 
were found in the second session (Table A-4).  
Based on these findings, we discarded the Post-TMS as baseline measurement of 
subjects’ susceptibility to framing. In the following analyses, we therefore selectively 
considered the TMS session. 
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Table A-4: Confirmation of no effect of cTBS of DLPFC on framing susceptibility via logistic regression 
 Variables TMS session Post-TMS session 
Response Left PFC -0.062 -0.12 
  (0.268) (0.288) 
 Right PFC -0.0839 0.224 
  (0.246) (0.28) 
 Frame 0.408*** 0.254 
  (0.152) (0.186) 
 Frame × Left PFC 0.057 0.199 
  (0.242) (0.23) 
 Frame × Right PFC 0.0508 -0.156 
  (0.228) (0.196) 
 Constant -0.309 -0.421** 
  (0.191) (0.214) 
Note: Logistic regression of responses (L, S) in target trials. Although responses differed significantly as 
a function of frame type, no effect of TMS or interaction between frame and TMS group was found in the 
TMS session. No significant effects were found in the Post-TMS session. Note: Coding scheme: S = 0, L 
= 1; Frame: GF = 0, LF = 1. Vertex group: baseline. Shown are regression coefficients and robust SE (in 
parentheses) clustered by subject. *** p  < 0.01,  **  p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
In order to investigate whether a potential TMS effect on susceptibility to framing 
was obscured by different effects of the TMS stimulation on the four probability of winning 
levels, we investigated gambling rates in both LF and GF as a function of winning 
probability (for a summary of mean gambling rates per probability of winning level see 
Figure A-6). No significant probability of winning-dependent response differences between 
experimental groups were found by visual inspection of these plots. In order to statistically 
confirm this observation, we conducted a linear regression analysis of framing effects 
(i.e.,  LLF – LGF) for each probability of winning level with TMS groups as predictor 
variables. These analyses did not reveal any differences in gambling rates per probability of 
winning between groups in the TMS session (Table A-5)  
A  Framing effects on risky decision-making: Investigating a causal role for the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex with TMS 
74 
 
Figure A-6: Gambling rates per probability of winning level in LF and GF in (A) vertex group, (B) left 
PFC group and (C) right PFC group in the TMS session. Error bars: SEM 
Table A-5: Influence of TMS on framing effect as a function of probability of winning level in the TMS 
session 
 (LF-GF)0.2 (LF-GF)0.4 (LF-GF)0.6 (LF-GF)0.8 
Right PFC 0.0717 -0.0353 0.0354 -0.0233 
 (0.0749) (0.0642) (0.0746) (0.09) 
Left PFC -0.029 -0.058 0.0323 0.111 
 (0.0749) (0.0642) (0.0746) (0.09) 
Constant 0.0385 0.109** 0.115** 0.140** 
 (0.0529) (0.0454) (0.0527) (0.0637) 
Note: We conducted linear regressions of framing effects, which were calculated as the difference in 
gambling rates between frames (LLF-LGF), on probability of winning level and TMS group in the TMS 
session. No group differences in the degree of framing for each probability level of winning were 
observed. Vertex group gamble rates served as baseline. Shown are regression coefficients and robust SE 
(in parentheses) clustered by subject. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p  <  0.1 
In order to examine the finding of no TMS effect on the framing effect with a 
single-response sensitive method, we performed a logistic regression of responses (L, S) on 
probability of winning level, frame type and TMS group. Significant effects of probability 
of winning and interaction effects of frame type and probability of winning on gambling 
probability were observed. The probability of gambling was significantly decreased at a 
probability of winning level of 0.4 relative to 0.2 (baseline). Furthermore, the interaction 
between frame type and probability of winning level of 0.4 and 0.8 reflected framing effects 
at these probability levels. Most notably, no effects of TMS on participants’ choices were 
found, nor did any TMS-relevant interaction reach significance (Table A-6). In other words, 
even when considering a potential differential effect of DLPFC-TMS on probability 
perception and associated interactions with frame type, we were not able to confirm a 
significant impact of disruption of DLPFC activity on susceptibility to framing.  
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Table A-6: No differential effects of cTBS on probability of winning perception in TMS session 
confirmed by means of logistic regression 
 Variables TMS session 
Response Left PFC -0.0148 
  (0.439) 
 Right PFC -0.166 
  (0.392) 
 Frame 0.154 
  (0.2) 
 Prob_0.4 -0.810*** 
  (0.143) 
 Prob_0.6 -0.526* 
  (0.29) 
 Prob_0.8 -0.524 
  (0.392) 
 Left PFC × Prob_0.4 0.16 
  (0.226) 
 Left PFC × Prob_0.6 0.029 
  (0.43) 
 Left PFC × Prob_0.8 -0.395 
  (0.605) 
 Right PFC × Prob_0.4 0.135 
  (0.229) 
 Right PFC × Prob_0.6 0.0364 
  (0.476) 
 Right PFC × Prob_0.8 0.149 
  (0.601) 
 Frame × Prob_0.4 0.311** 
  (0.157) 
 Frame × Prob_0.6 0.31 
  (0.252) 
 Frame × Prob_0.8 0.416** 
  (0.165) 
 Left PFC × Frame -0.12 
  (0.303) 
 Right PFC × Frame 0.291 
  (0.284) 
 Left PFC × Frame × Prob_0.4 -0.114 
  (0.207) 
 Left PFC × Frame × Prob_0.6 0.23 
  (0.328) 
 Left PFC × Frame × Prob_0.8 0.601 
  (0.382) 
 Right PFC × Frame × Prob_0.4 -0.422 
  (0.244) 
 Right PFC × Frame × Prob_0.6 -0.143 
  (0.336) 
 Right PFC × Frame × Prob_0.8 -0.391 
  (0.296) 
 Constant 0.152 
  (0.303) 
Note: Logistic regression of response (L, S) on TMS group (Left PFC, Right PFC, Vertex [baseline 
group]), frame type, dummy-coded probability of winning levels with 0.2 probability of winning as 
baseline and interactions between those terms. No effect of TMS group was found; neither did any TMS-
relevant interaction reach significance. Note: Coding scheme as described before. Shown are regression 
coefficients and robust SE (in parentheses) clustered by subject. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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As a broad range of endowment amounts was used in the present study, we 
investigated whether TMS might have interacted with the endowment amount, thus leading 
to a change in framing effects between groups dependent on endowment level. For this 
reason, we performed a logistic regression of gambling probability comprising dummy 
variables for the TMS group and frame type as well as endowment amounts and interactions 
between those terms as predictor variables (Table A-7). For the TMS session, the significant 
effect of frame type on gambling behavior, i.e., the framing effect was again confirmed. No 
significant influences of TMS, endowment amount or significant interactions between these 
terms were observed. That is, neither did endowment amount per se lead to differences in 
susceptibility to framing, nor did we observe differential effects of TMS and interactions 
between those terms on susceptibility to framing.  
Table A-7: No significant interaction effect between cTBS and endowment amount on gambling 
behavior 
 Variables TMS session 
Response Left PFC -0.0504 
  (0.32) 
 Right PFC -0.006 
  (0.302) 
 Frame 0.611*** 
  (0.235) 
 Endowment -0.001 
  (0.002) 
 Endowment × Frame -0.0025 
  (0.0022) 
 Left PFC × Endowment -0.00014 
  (0.003) 
 Right PFC × Endowment -0.001 
  (0.0027) 
 Left PFC × Frame -0.131 
  (0.361) 
 Right PFC × Frame -0.274 
  (0.311) 
 Left PFC × Endowment × Frame 0.00234 
  (0.004) 
 Right PFC × Endowment × Frame 0.004 
  (0.0028) 
 Constant -0.212 
  (0.23) 
Note: Logistic regression of responses (L, S) on the effect of TMS group, frame type and endowment 
level. A significant influence of frame type on gambling probability, that is, significantly increased 
probability of choosing L in LF relative to GF, was observed. However, neither endowment amount per 
se nor any interaction related to endowment and TMS group significantly influenced participants’ 
choices. Note: Coding scheme as described above, endowment: original amounts used. Shown are 
regression coefficients and robust SE (in parentheses) clustered by subject. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
*  p  < 0.1 
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As previous studies revealed that personality traits influence individual 
susceptibility to framing (e.g., Levin et al., 2002), a further logistic regression model was 
set up in order to control for the influence of personality on the framing effect (summary 
statistics of questionnaires see Table A-8). It was observed that neuroticism was 
significantly associated with decreased probability of gambling. In addition, a negative 
relationship between conscientiousness and gambling probability was observed at trend 
level. However, controlling for the influence of different personality indices did also not 
reveal significant differences in framing susceptibility of the three TMS groups (Table A-9). 
In other words, even when we assumed that the role of DLPFC in framing susceptibility 
was obscured by personality traits and thus controlled for personality variables, we did not 
find differential effects of DLPFC-TMS on the framing effect.  
Table A-8: Summary questionnaire scores 
Questionnaire Mean SD 
STAI-X1 32.72 5.77 
STAI-X2 36.33 7.89 
NC 32.8 23.03 
NEO-N 18.59 7.79 
NEO-E 29.6 6.89 
NEO-O 32.95 6.71 
NEO-A 31.84 5.91 
NEO-C 30.71 6.8 
BIS-11 61.44 8.47 
Note: Shown are mean and standard deviation (SD). STAI-X1 and –X2: State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory, 
NC: Need for cognition scale; NEO-FFI subscales: N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O = Openness, A = 
agreeableness, C = conscientiousness, BIS-11 = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale  
  
7
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Table A-9: Controlling for the influence of personality on the framing effect 
 Variables            
Response Frame 0.408*** 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 0.409*** 0.461*** 0.464*** 
  (0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.155) 
 Left PFC -0.062 -0.0576 -0.0265 -0.0617 -0.123 -0.0867 -0.101 -0.0707 -0.0857 0.0129 -0.0247 
  (0.268) (0.25) (0.275) (0.269) (0.262) (0.268) (0.272) (0.267) (0.275) (0.264) (0.242) 
 Right PFC -0.0839 -0.0826 -0.0643 -0.0842 -0.121 -0.0844 -0.107 -0.073 -0.105 -0.0362 -0.0455 
  (0.246) (0.248) (0.245) (0.255) (0.24) (0.247) (0.25) (0.247) (0.248) (0.239) (0.24) 
 Left PFC × Frame 0.057 0.061 0.0565 0.057 0.0564 0.0573 0.0575 0.0578 0.057 0.00489 0.0139 
  (0.242) (0.244) (0.242) (0.242) (0.243) (0.243) (0.243) (0.242) (0.242) (0.243) (0.248) 
 Right PFC × Frame 0.0508 0.0528 0.0503 0.0508 0.0512 0.0514 0.0515 0.0513 0.051 -0.000672 0.00259 
  (0.228) (0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) (0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) (0.231) 
 NEO-N  -0.0192**         -0.0251*** 
   (0.00837)         (0.00961) 
 NEO-E   -0.00837        -0.0266 
    (0.0114)        (0.0165) 
 NEO-O    -9.59-05       0.00297 
     (0.0122)       (0.0152) 
 NEO-A     0.0224      0.0334** 
      (0.0149)      (0.0156) 
 NEO-C      -0.0170*     -0.0112 
       (0.00925)     (0.0149) 
 STAI-X1       -0.0142    -0.00454 
        (0.0175)    (0.0221) 
 STAI-X2        -0.00801   -0.000264 
         (0.0114)   (0.0156) 
 BIS-11         0.00737  0.00162 
          (0.00969)  (0.0153) 
 NC          -0.004 -0.00248 
           (0.00299) (0.00502) 
 Constant -0.309 0.0452 -0.0796 -0.306 -0.991** 0.222 0.177 -0.0188 -0.747 -0.249 0.215 
  (0.191) (0.253) (0.366) (0.455) (0.493) (0.333) (0.632) (0.483) (0.596) (0.205) (1.627) 
Note: For questionnaire abbreviations, see Table 7. Increased neuroticism scores lead to significantly decreased probability of lottery choices. Shown are regression 
coefficients and robust SE (in parentheses) clustered by subject. ***  p < 0.01, **  p < 0.05, *  p <  0.1 
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Reaction time data 
As cTBS may have affected cognitive processing speed in a more pronounced fashion than 
actual preferences, we investigated the effects of cTBS on reaction times (for mean reaction 
times, see Figure A-7). A linear regression on reaction times with TMS group, frame type 
and interaction between these terms as predictor variables identified a significantly faster 
mean reaction time in the GF relative to LF. No significant TMS group or interaction 
effects were observed in the TMS session (Table A-10). 
 
Figure A-7: Reaction times in LF and GF in the three treatment groups in the TMS session. Apparently, 
subjects took their decisions faster in the GF relative to LF. This pattern seemed to be true for all TMS 
groups.  
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Table A-10: Significantly faster reaction times in GF relative to LF, no effect of TMS on reaction time 
Variables 
Reaction times 
(TMS session) 
Frame 83.41*** 
 (24.93) 
Left PFC -14.75 
 (129.4) 
Right PFC 35.82 
 (139.7) 
Frame × Left PFC -4.804 
 (41.03) 
Frame × Right PFC -9.712 
 (36.87) 
Constant 1931*** 
 (101.5) 
Note: A linear regression analysis confirmed slower reaction times in LF relative to GF were observed. 
Note: Coding scheme: GF = 0, LF = 1. Vertex group: baseline. Shown are regression coefficients and 
robust SE (in parentheses). *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05¸* p < 0.1 
In conclusion, we did not find evidence for the causal role of DLPFC in inhibition of the 
framing effect. cTBS of left or right DLPFC did not cause changes in preferences or 
response latencies since no TMS group differences of these parameters were found. 
Considering mean response data (via linear regression) as well as single responses (by 
means of logistic regression) did not reveal any differential effects of right or left DLPFC-
TMS on susceptibility to framing. This absence of a TMS effect even held when taking into 
account potentially distinct effects of TMS on choice behavior dependent on probability 
perception, endowment amount and the moderating effects of personality. 
A.5 Discussion 
The current study investigated the causal role of the DLPFC in the framing effect, which 
describes a fundamental violation of the description invariance axiom of rational choice 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). The DLPFC has been shown to be involved in 
the implementation of cognitive control of behavior in previous studies (MacDonald et al., 
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2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Petrides, 2000). In particular, a recent neuroimaging study 
(De Martino et al., 2006) identified bilateral DLPFC as neural correlate of frame-
incongruent decisions. De Martino et al. (2006) found significantly increased BOLD signal 
in trials, in which subjects were able to overcome the general behavioral tendencies 
imposed by the frames. Similar results were obtained by Gonzalez et al. (2005) who found 
increased DLPFC activation for risky relative to sure choices in the positive frame 
employing the classic Asian disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Overcoming a 
behavioral heuristic seems to require additional cognitive resources, and the fMRI results 
suggested that this resistance to framing might necessitate recruitment of the DLPFC. Based 
on this correlational fMRI evidence for the involvement of the DLPFC in frame-
incongruent choices (De Martino et al., 2006; Gonzalez et al., 2005) we hypothesized a 
causal role of DLPFC in inhibition of behavioral tendencies imposed by frames. Thus, the 
main purpose of the current study was to test this conjecture, by probing whether the 
DLPFC indeed is causally involved in inhibition of susceptibility to framing. cTBS was 
applied to the left or right DLPFC in the treatment groups and to the vertex in the control 
condition in order to investigate the effect of temporary DLPFC impairment on the framing 
effect. However, our DLPFC interference did not induce behavioral changes. That is, no 
effect of left or right DLPFC activity disruption on the susceptibility to framing was 
observed. Preferences between stimulation groups did not significantly differ from the 
control group in the TMS session. Logistic regression analyses revealed a stable framing 
effect across all three groups without significant group differences. cTBS did not lead to 
changes in probability of winning perception employed in the gambles. No interaction 
between cTBS and endowment amount was found. Controlling for various personality traits 
did also not reveal differential effects of unilateral cTBS of DLPFC on framing 
susceptibility. Furthermore, cTBS did not influence cognitive processing speed, as we did 
not find reaction time differences between DLPFC and vertex groups. Whereas increased 
reaction times were observed during the LF relative to GF across groups, no significant 
reaction time differences between groups were observed.  
Taking into account these null results, we cannot draw a firm conclusion on the 
functional relevance of DLPFC for framing resistance. However, different hypothesis about 
the neural basis of resistance to framing and associated motivations for future studies can be 
drawn from our study. 
First, based on the results by De Martino et al. (2006) it might be speculated that 
ACC - instead of DLPFC - is the brain structure with functional (i.e., causal) relevance for 
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framing resistance. In this scenario, computations in DLPFC might merely be correlated 
with ACC activation without any functional contribution to framing-related processing 
itself. In order to test this conjecture, we should apply cTBS to the ACC region identified 
by De Martino et. al (2006) followed by a framing task and observe whether a “virtual 
lesion” of ACC leads to changes in susceptibility to framing.  
Second, we might hypothesize that framing susceptibility is regulated by 
synchronized activation of a network of brain regions (including the ACC as core 
component and DLPFC) involved in cognitive control processes. Transient disruption of 
one network component may be compensated by other functional components. That is, 
partial disruption of the putative ACC-DLPFC network might engage compensatory 
processes resulting in stable behavior, which might be an explanation for the current 
findings. Hence, we may speculate that unilateral DLPFC disruption is compensated by 
intact contralateral DLPFC and/or ACC activity. That is, bilateral disruption of DLPFC (for 
instance, via dual-site TMS (O’Shea, Taylor, & Rushworth, 2008)) or transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) electrode montage might be needed in order to disrupt the 
framing-related control function of DLPFC and induce behavioral changes. This hypothesis 
is supported by De Martino et al. (2006) who report that resistance against the frame is 
correlated with bilateral DLPFC activity. Furthermore, the simultaneous disruption of both 
DLPFC and ACC might be necessary in order to induce changes in framing susceptibility. 
Therefore, in order to distinguish the role of DLPFC from ACC in resistance to framing, 
dual-site TMS (O’Shea et al., 2008) might be required for simultaneous interruption of 
bilateral DLPFC as well as simultaneous inhibition of DLPFC and ACC. In this way, we 
may be able to investigate whether bilateral DLPFC is a mere coactivation of ACC-related 
framing resistance. Furthermore, functional and effective connectivity analyses in 
combination with concurrent TMS-fMRI may be particularly suited to test between the 
correlational versus causal role of DLPFC (and ACC) in framing susceptibility. This 
approach would be appropriate in order to identify framing-relevant neural connectivity 
patterns and TMS-induced changes on the functional and behavioral level, thus providing 
causal evidence for the neurobiological substrate of the framing effect and its inhibition. 
Importantly, the anatomical properties of the ACC require the use of a double-cone coil, 
which reduces the precision of the stimulation of the target area. However, previous studies 
have suggested that effective TMS of ACC may be made possible by means of this coil type 
(Hayward et al., 2007). 
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The purely behavioral Post-TMS session was conducted in order to yield a baseline 
measurement of the framing effect to calculate within-subject effects. Against our 
expectations, no consistent framing effect was found in the Post-TMS session. Although 
temporary stable framing effects were revealed in the behavioral pilot experiments we 
conducted, the temporal delay between the two framing tasks significantly differed between 
the pilot and actual TMS experiment. Whereas the two pilot sessions were separated by a 
break of approx. 15 minutes, during which subjects completed a questionnaire battery, TMS 
and Post-TMS session in the actual experiment were separated by approx. 14 days. 
Intermediate- to long-term learning and consolidation effects might have taken effect 
between TMS and Post-TMS session, diminishing the power of the framing manipulation. 
Future studies interested in within-subject effects should apply a different temporal 
schedule and align TMS and behavioral session closer to each other in order to avoid the 
repetition effects observed in the present study. Taking into account that the maximal 
disruptive effect of cTBS lasts for approximately 20 to 30 minutes (Huang et al., 2005), 
temporal delays of TMS and non-TMS session between 60 to 90 minutes seem feasible. 
Given that shorter delays between sessions seem to avoid repetition effects, future studies 
can randomize the order of TMS and behavioral session in order to provide full 
experimental randomization. 
Further technical issues should find attention when considering our experimental 
results. We cannot rule out that our procedure was compromised by distance-dependent 
TMS effects. We cannot foreclose cTBS effects being weakened by the location of the 
scalp-distant DLPFC target, as rapid decline in magnetic field strength with distance of 
targeted cortical sites from scalp surface weakens actual TMS effects (Stokes et al., 2005). 
Although coil position was administered according to current technical guidelines (Rossi, 
Hallett, Rossini, Pascual-Leone, & Safety of TMS Consensus Group, 2009) and precisely 
controlled via our neuronavigation device, it is possible that changes in coil position relative 
to the gyrus may be necessary in order to optimize the magnitude of cortical stimulation. 
Coil position and head-coil angle may have to be changed to yield optimal cTBS 
application. Future studies may test such technical modifications to investigate whether 
DLPFC functioning can be more profoundly interrupted and whether this affects resistance 
to framing effects. 
More generally, we have to point to the general issue concerning the interpretation 
of null results. Although we did not find evidence for the causal role of DLPFC in inhibition 
of the framing effect, we are not able to strongly conclude that DLPFC is not causally 
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involved in framing effect-related computations, as our experimental design might not have 
been sensitive enough to detect the effects of our experimental manipulation. For instance, 
it might be argued that in order to yield significant group differences, more subjects might 
be needed. However, exceedingly small effect sizes for the difference in framing effects 
between vertex and left or right TMS group (d = 0.004 and d = 0.047, respectively) were 
found, which seems to refute the power argument. In case of such weak effects, it is fair to 
nevertheless conclude that previous studies may have overestimated the role of the DLPFC 
in overcoming framing susceptibility, and that unilateral DLPFC is presumably not the main 
neural locus at which framing-related neural processes are causally implemented.  
To recapitulate, the current TMS investigation did not reveal a causal role of 
unilateral DLPFC in inhibition of the framing effect as disruption of neither left nor right 
DLPFC led to significant changes in susceptibility to framing relative to the control 
condition. Further studies should employ methodological modifications of our experimental 
design described above in order to clarify the neurobiological mechanism underlying the 
generation and inhibition of the framing effect. 
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B.1 Abstract 
Incidental negative emotions unrelated to the current task - such as background anxiety - 
can strongly influence decisions. This is most evident in psychiatric disorders associated 
with generalized emotional disturbances. However, the neural mechanisms by which 
incidental emotions may affect choices remain poorly understood. Here we study the effects 
of incidental anxiety on human risky decision-making, focusing on both behavioral 
preferences and their underlying neural processes. Although observable choices remained 
stable across affective contexts with high and low incidental anxiety, we found a clear 
change in neural valuation signals: During high incidental anxiety, activity in ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum showed a marked reduction in (1) neural coding of the 
expected subjective value (ESV) of risky options, (2) prediction of observed choices, (3) 
functional coupling with other areas of the valuation system, and (4) baseline activity. At 
the same time, activity in the anterior insula showed an increase in coding the negative ESV 
of risky lotteries, and this neural activity predicted whether the risky lotteries would be 
rejected. This pattern of results suggests that incidental anxiety can shift the focus of neural 
valuation from possible positive consequences to anticipated negative consequences of 
choice options. Moreover, our findings show that these changes in neural value coding can 
occur in the absence of changes in overt behavior. This suggest a possible pathway by 
which background anxiety may lead to the development of chronic reward desensitization 
and a maladaptive focus on negative cognitions, as prevalent in affective and anxiety 
disorders. 
B.2 Introduction 
Behavior is strongly guided by integral emotions that provide affective information about 
which behavioral options should be pursued or avoided (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). How 
such goal-directed valuation of choice options is instantiated in the human brain is 
increasingly understood (Rangel et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2012; Levallois et al., 2012; 
Rushworth et al., 2012) and it is commonly assumed that dysfunctions of these goal-
directed neural valuation processes may account for behavioral pathologies in psychiatric 
diseases (Sharp et al., 2012). However, emotions can also guide behavior more indirectly, 
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for instance when incidental background emotions (e.g., general or dispositional anxiety) 
influence decisions despite not being relevant for the task at hand. Such effects of incidental 
emotions on decision-making can be strongly detrimental, as evident in psychiatric 
disorders such as anxiety disorders (Maner et al., 2007; Giorgetta et al., 2012; Grecucci et 
al., 2013), depression (Harle et al., 2010; Engelmann et al., 2013), or mania (Minassian et 
al., 2004). Despite their obvious importance, not much is known about the neural 
mechanisms by which incidental emotions such as anxiety can affect behavioral choices 
(Knutson et al., 2008; Harlé et al., 2012). 
The lack of knowledge about neural mechanisms for interactions of incidental 
emotions and choices appears somewhat surprising, given the substantial overlap in the 
neural circuits involved in decision-making and the processing of affective states. For 
instance, most core structures of the brain’s putative valuation network - encompassing the 
VMPFC, VS, insula and amygdala (Hsu et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Preuschoff et 
al., 2008; Levy and Glimcher, 2012) - are also substantially involved in processing anxiety 
(Hartley and Phelps, 2012). It is therefore likely that incidental affective and task-related 
signals computed in these same areas may interact, thereby providing a neural substrate for 
immediate influences of background emotions on neural valuation during choice. Moreover, 
persisting incidental affective states may shape processing in these neural structures via 
neural plasticity, thereby possibly leading to chronic influences on neural computations 
involved in value-based choice (Paulus and Yu, 2012; Huys et al., 2013). 
Here, we investigate with behavioral, electrophysiological, and neural data how 
experimentally-induced anticipatory anxiety impacts on risky decision-making. We chose to 
induce anticipatory anxiety with a threat-of-shock technique (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012) 
that has been successfully used in previous studies (e.g., Robinson et al., 2011). In this 
approach, anticipatory anxiety is induced as a physiological and affective response to an 
ongoing threat of painful stimulation that is temporally unpredictable and incidental to the 
task (Robinson et al., 2013b). Using this paradigm during fMRI and electrophysiological 
recording, we thus manipulated our participants’ affective state while they completed a set 
of risky choices involving monetary gains and losses. This allowed us to investigate effects 
of anticipatory anxiety on individual decision-making and underlying neural activity. 
Importantly, due to our within-subject design, we could adequately control for potentially 
confounding variables known to influence risk attitude, such as sociodemographic, trait and 
genetic factors (Dreher et al., 2009; Capra et al., 2013).  
B  Anticipatory anxiety disrupts neural valuation during risky choice 
91 
We find that incidental anxiety can fundamentally change the mechanisms of value-
coding during risky choice in the absence of overt behavioral changes. During anticipatory 
anxiety, neural coding of subjective value in VMPFC and VS was decreased but neural 
coding of negative subjective value in anterior insula was increased, thereby suggesting a 
shift in value-coding from predicted positive consequences toward a focus on possible 
negative outcomes. This change in neural value coding was clearly linked to observed 
behavior, as choices during safe trials could be predicted from BOLD signals in the 
VMPFC and VS (but not insula) whereas choices under threat could be predicted from the 
insula (but not VMPFC and VS). 
B.3 Materials and methods 
Subjects 
43 right-handed male subjects (mean age [SEM] = 22.56 [1.42]) without a history of 
psychiatric or neurologic disorder participated in the study. In total, 10 subjects had to be 
excluded due to technical and image acquisition problems (excessive head movement: n = 
1, scanner crash = 3, sequence problem: n = 1) or non-compliance with the task (n = 5, 
estimation of behavioral models did not converge due to choice patterns that showed too 
little consistency, which is a common observation (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). This left a 
total of 33 subjects that were included in all subsequent analyses. Written informed consent 
was obtained from all subjects and all procedures were approved by the ethics committee of 
the canton of Zurich, Switzerland. 
Experimental timeline 
Approximately one week before the experiment, participants were invited to the lab for an 
“endowment” session in which they were paid for completing a psychological questionnaire 
battery chosen to assess a comprehensive range of personality characteristics. This battery 
comprised the DOSPERT (Weber et al., 2002) to assess domain specific risk attitude, the 
BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995) to assess impulsivity, the NEO-FFI (Borkenau and Ostendorf, 
1993) to measure personality characteristics, the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983) to assess 
anxiety symptoms and the BDI (Hautzinger et al., 1995) to measure depressive symptom 
severity. The participation fee for this session was a CHF 50 (ca. US$ 58 at time of testing) 
credit voucher. Importantly, it was stressed to the subjects that the money earned during the 
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endowment session would be their starting balance for the economic games played out in 
the second session, to avoid excessive risk-taking in that session due to the well-
documented house-money effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).  
During the second session, fMRI and electrodermal activity were recorded during a 
risky-decision making task (see section “Decision-making task”). The task was preceded by 
a short training session and an individual stimulation thresholding procedure (see section 
“Emotion induction technique”). The whole session lasted a total of 120 minutes (including 
subject preparation, scanning time and post-experimental debriefing) and was remunerated 
with an additional show-up fee of CHF 50. 
Experimental Procedures and Task  
Emotion induction technique. Anticipatory anxiety was induced by giving participants 
advance information about impending but temporally unpredictable electric stimulation in 
two distinct contexts. In the threatening context (”threat trials” triggering anticipatory 
anxiety), the stimulation was painful, whereas in the matched safe context (“safe trials”), 
the stimulation was just noticeable but not painful. To this end, we administered electrical 
stimulation with two DS5 Isolated Bipolar Constant Current Stimulators (Digitimer Ltd., 
Welwyn Garden City, UK) and custom-made fMRI-compatible 5 mm ring electrodes. Two 
of these electrodes were positioned above the first and fourth dorsal interossei muscles of 
the left dorsal hand, respectively, to provide two separate locations for strong and weak 
stimulation intensities. This was implemented to avoid desensitization or carry-over effects 
between both contexts. The intensities employed for stimulation were individually 
calibrated before the scanning session with a well-established procedure (e.g., Singer et al., 
2004). For this purpose, electrical pulses of different intensities were repeatedly given in a 
randomized order and participants rated each pulse on a visual analogue scale ranging from 
0 (not painful at all/hardly perceptible) to 10 (unbearably painful) in steps of 1. Stimulus 
intensities corresponding to an individual rating of 1 and 8 were chosen for the weak versus 
strong experimental treatments, respectively. In order to control for sensitization or 
desensitization, subjects had to rerate both low- and high-stimulation intensity after each 
fMRI run and stimulus intensity was set for each run to the rerated values of 1 and 8, 
respectively.  
During each fMRI run, stimulation could occur at unpredictable time points during 
decision-making periods, thus creating threat or safe periods during which participants were 
expecting strong versus weak electrical stimulation, respectively. The two affective contexts 
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were presented in a blocked fashion. During each block, participants made four risky 
decisions as outlined in detail below. In order to augment the efficacy of anticipatory 
anxiety induction, the number and time points of electrical stimulation events throughout 
both threat and safe blocks were determined to be completely unpredictable for subjects. 
For this purpose, the number of stimulation events was determined for each block by 
random draw from a gamma distribution (shape parameter = 1; scale parameter = 1). The 
exact timing of these stimulation events was then determined at random time points 
between the offset of the cue display and onset of the resting screen, as determined by 
drawing from a uniform distribution with the constraint that successive electrical shocks 
were separated by at least 0.2 s. 
The emotion induction was conducted in a within-subject design: Each subject took 
decisions in both affective contexts and therefore could serve as his own control. This has 
significant advantages over a between-subject design, where the effects of affective context 
could be confounded by individual differences in variables that are known to influence risk 
attitude, such as sociodemographic, personality and genetic factors (Dreher et al., 2009; 
Capra et al., 2013). On the flip side, the within-subject design chosen here comes with the 
small risk that participants may make their choices based on memory when confronted with 
a specific lottery for a second time, in a different affective context. This conjecture appears 
highly unlikely, as subjects would need to remember their choices for 280 trials that were 
presented in random order. We nevertheless took care to inspect our data for such effects, 
by conducting regression analyses to test whether reaction times were different for lotteries 
that were presented for the first or the second time (such differences would be expected if 
participants responded from memory, which requires less deliberation). No such effects 
were revealed by these analyses (see section “Results”), suggesting that participants 
employed the same strategies to evaluate the first and second presentation of each lottery.  
All visual and tactile stimuli were presented and recorded with Cogent 2000 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) implemented in MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc, 
Natick, Massachusetts). 
Decision-making task. The fMRI experiment consisted of 7 runs (each with 472 
seconds average duration) during which participants made risky decisions in the threat and 
safe contexts. Each of these runs (see Figure B-1a, timeline) comprised 5 threat blocks with 
strong stimulation intensity and 5 safe blocks with weak stimulation intensity. These blocks 
lasted 43 seconds on average and were pseudorandomly interleaved so that not more than 2 
blocks of the same affective valence would follow each other. The single experimental 
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blocks were interleaved with resting blocks of 6 seconds duration to allow sustained 
hemodynamic activity to return to baseline. 
During each block, 4 decision-making trials were presented to the participants. On 
each trial, participants had to choose between taking part in a lottery with two equiprobable 
(50/50) options and a sure outcome. In 5 of the 7 functional runs, we employed mixed 
gambles in which the lottery led with 50% probability to a win of amount x1 and with 50% 
probability to a loss of amount x2. The sure outcome was always a zero change in income 
(see Figure B-1b, gamble composition). The relationship between gain and loss amounts 
was chosen to encourage a reasonable amount of risk taking. Previous research indicates 
that participants overweight losses relative to gains in a multiplicative fashion (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). We therefore employed prospect theory to parameterize general risk-
taking and this overweighting (see section “Behavioral data analysis”) and to inform the 
analysis of neural valuation processes. All imaging analyses were performed based on the 5 
mixed gamble runs.  
In order to facilitate parameter estimation for the behavioral choice models, we also 
included 2 additional functional runs composed of gain-only and loss-only gambles. These 
“pure gamble” runs were presented in random positions within the sequence of mixed-
gamble runs and included an equal number of gain only (20) and loss only trials (20) within 
each run. Pure gambles differed from mixed gambles in that lottery outcomes were now 
either both positive (50% probability to win amount x1 or x2) or both negative (50% 
probability to lose amount x1 or x2). Lottery amounts in the gain-only domain varied 
between 0 and 30 (in steps of 10) for x1 and 20 and 45 (in steps of 5) for x2. Lotteries in the 
loss-only domain varied between 0 and -30 for x1 (in steps of 10) and -20 and -45 (in steps 
of 5) for x2. The sure outcome was always a non-zero amount generated by calculating a 
certainty equivalent corresponding to different levels of risk aversion for each pure lottery. 
In order to capture different degrees of risk aversion, five different degrees of risk aversion 
were assumed for both the gain domain and loss domain; each of these parameter values 
was employed for the calculation of the certainty equivalent for four different lotteries in 
both the threat and safe context. The certainty equivalent (CE) was calculated as follows:  
(Equation 1) CEGain = (0.5 x1
α + 0.5x2
α)1/α and 
(Equation 2)                    CELoss = (0.5 x1
β + 0.5x2
β)1/β 
where α and β capture the degree of risk aversion in the gain domain and loss domain of the 
value function, respectively. The following values of α and β were used in order to create 
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CEs: α = β = [0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.3] (see detailed description in the section “Behavioral data 
analysis”). 
 
Figure B-1: Hybrid fMRI-Design. (a) The top row illustrates the timing of different blocks and the 
bottom row the timing of the gambles. Blocks that were threatening (strong stimulation) or safe (weak 
stimulation) were randomly interleaved (two of ten blocks per run are shown). The type of block was 
indicated by the screen color (blue or green), which was constant throughout the block. At the beginning 
of each block, a cue (STRONG or WEAK) was displayed, followed by delivery of a "reminder shock" 
(dark or light red arrow, respectively, following the cue display). After a jittered ITI (empty screen), the 
beginning of a gamble was signaled by a fixation cross, followed by the gamble screen. Subjects were 
instructed to choose their preferred option (lottery or sure outcome) as fast and accurately as possible via 
button press. Each block comprised 4 gambles and was followed by a REST period. Electrical stimulation 
was delivered randomly and unpredictably during the whole block (indicated by the varying positions of 
dark red [strong stimulation] or light red [weak stimulation] arrows, the only stimulation-free phases were 
the rest periods). (b): Possible gains and losses for mixed gambles. Gain and loss values were sampled 
from the gain-loss matrix depicted on the left (columns: gains; rows: losses). Each of the resulting 
combinations was shown once in the safe and once in the threat condition. For this purpose, the lottery 
with the corresponding outcomes was shown on one side of the screen, whereas the corresponding safe 
outcome was shown on the other (see right panel for example screen). The presentation sides for lottery 
option and sure option outcomes were counterbalanced across participants. 
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Payment schedule. Seven choices were randomly drawn and played out after the 
experiment (one per functional run). Their mean outcome (which could be negative or 
positive) was added to the CHF 100 show-up fee for both sessions in order to determine the 
participants’ final payoff.  
fMRI data acquisition. Functional magnetic resonance images (fMRI) were 
collected using a 3T Philips Achieva whole-body magnetic resonance scanner (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips sensitivity-
encoded (SENSE) head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T1-weighted 
transversal images (0.75 mm slice thickness). For functional imaging, T2* images were 
obtained using a SENSE T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence (Pruessmann et al., 
1999) with an acceleration factor of 2.0. The sequence consisted of 33 axial slices covering 
the whole brain (slice thickness = 3mm, inter-slice gap = 0.75 mm, ascending sequential 
acquisition, flip angle = 78°, repetition time = 1750 ms, echo time = 30 ms, field of view = 
240 mm, matrix size = 80 × 80). To optimize functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex 
and the medial temporal lobes, we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at -20° 
relative to the AC-PC line (Deichmann et al., 2003). 
Psychophysiological measures. In order to confirm efficacy of the threat-of-shock 
treatment, we acquired skin conductance responses (SCRs) using a PowerLab 4/25T 
amplifier with a GSR Amp (ML116) unit and a pair of MR-compatible finger electrodes 
(MLT117F). The electrodes were attached to the participants' left index and ring finger 
using conducting gel and dedicated Velcro. Recordings were performed with Lab Chart 5 
software, with the recording range set to 40 µS and using initial baseline correction 
(“subject zeroing”) to subtract the participant's absolute level of electrodermal activity from 
all recordings (devices and software from ADInstruments Pty, Ltd., Bella Vista, Australia). 
Each participant’s SCRs were initially smoothed with a running average over 500 samples 
(0.5 s) to reduce scanner-induced noise. Data were then resampled from 1 KHz to 1 Hz and 
subsequently z-transformed. In line with previously established methods (Bach et al., 2009; 
Choi et al., 2012), we estimated mean SCRs during the decision periods of both affective 
conditions with multiple linear regression analysis, as implemented in Analysis of 
Functional NeuroImages (AFNI; Cox, 1996). The statistical model contained a total of 6 
regressors that reflected onset times of choices under expectancy of strong and weak 
electrical shocks, cue times indicating the onset of a block, and delivery times of strong and 
weak electrical shocks. Average responses to each trial type were estimated via 
deconvolution from event onset to 16 s post onset using 17 cubic spline basis functions. 
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Baseline drifts of the SCR were modeled with constant linear and quadratic terms included 
for each run. For these analyses, SCR data sets of two subjects had to be excluded due to 
acquisition problems. 
Behavioral data analysis. Behavioral data were analyzed using R (www.r-
project.org) and Stata (StataCorp LP, College Station, Texas, USA). As a first step, reaction 
times (RTs) and gambling rates (percentage of trials where lotteries were chosen) were 
compared between the threat and safe contexts. Moreover, we inspected the data for 
adaptation and order effects by means of a regression model (with robust standard errors 
clustered by subject). This model regressed trial-wise reaction times on variables 
representing each choice’s presentation order (first versus second presentation in the 
experiment), affective context (threat vs safe), gain and loss amount, the experimental trial 
(1 to 280, to account for learning effects), and all two-way interactions of these variables. 
In a second step, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; e.g., Bruhin et al., 2010) was 
used to derive subject-specific prospective utilities U(x) of each lottery x with outcomes x1 
and x2. The lottery in each trial was formalized as: 
(Equation 3)  x = (x1, p1; x2, p2) 
where pi is the probability of obtaining outcome xi, i ∈ {1, 2}, and p1+p2=1. In order to 
calculate subject-specific values of the lottery, we fitted the value function to of prospect 
theory determine the value v(xi) for each outcome xi:  
(Equation 4)    v(xi) =  
xi
α if xi ≥ 0 
-λ (-xi)
β if xi < 0 
where α quantifies risk aversion in the win-domain, β quantifies risk aversion in the loss-
domain, and λ quantifies overweighting of losses relative to gains. We allowed risk 
preferences to vary between the threat and safe conditions by defining: 
(Equation 5)   α = (1 - τ) × αS + τ × αT 
(Equation 6)   β = (1 - τ) × βS + τ × βT 
(Equation 7)   λ = (1 - τ) × λS + τ × λT 
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where  
(Equation 8)    τ =  
1 if threat trial 
0 if safe trial 
and subscript S denotes parameters for safe trials, whereas subscript T denotes parameters 
during threat trials. The prospective utility of a gamble, U(x), is defined as 
(Equation 9)  U(x) = [p1 × v(x1)] + [p2 × v(x2)] 
where we ignore the nonlinear probability weighting typically present in prospect theory 
models because we restricted p1 = p2 = 0.5.  
To determine the probability p of choosing the lottery (LO) over the sure option 
(SO), we employed a form of the logit probabilistic choice rule that allows for noise in 
option selection via the free parameter μ: 
(Equation 10)  p (LO, SO) = 1/[1+ (e-μ(U(LO) - U(SO)))] 
fMRI data analysis. Preprocessing and statistical analyses of functional data were 
performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). 
All functional volumes were realigned to the first volume using b-spline interpolation and 
subsequently unwarped using fieldmaps estimated by SPM to remove residual movement-
related variance due to susceptibility-by-movement interactions (Andersson et al., 2001). To 
improve coregistration, bias-corrected and coregistered anatomical and mean EPI images 
were created using the New Segment toolbox in SPM. The forward deformation fields 
created in the context of the nonlinear normalization of individual gray matter tissue 
probability maps were then employed to normalize the functional timeseries to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 template. Finally, functional data underwent spatial 
smoothing using an isotropic 6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
Statistical analyses were carried out using the general linear model (Friston et al., 
1994). Regressors of interest were modeled using canonical hemodynamic response 
functions temporally aligned with the onset of the events of interest. Time and dispersion 
derivatives were added in order to account for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel 
variation in response peak and dispersion (Henson et al., 2002). Neural processes triggered 
by lottery presentation per se (averaging over all different lotteries) were modeled with two 
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regressors (trials in safe context, trials in threat context). Neural valuation processes on each 
trial were modeled with two parametric regressors (one for threat trials and one for safe 
trials) that coded each lottery’s neural expected subjective value (ESV; e.g. Levy et al., 
2010), as also done in other studies of mixed gambles (Minati et al., 2012a, 2012b; Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2013). ESV was defined for each gamble as the neural representation of the 
behaviorally measured U(x) (see section “Behavioral data analysis”) and was assumed to 
linearly correlate with U(x) (Levy et al., 2010). As the SO was 0 for all mixed gamble trials, 
it was omitted from the GLM. The value regressors in the GLM spanned for each trial the 
decision period from the onset of the decision screen until the subject’s choice, as indicated 
via button press. Estimation of the behavioral model revealed that the loss aversion 
coefficients λT and λS were not significantly different from each other. In a similar vein, no 
significant deviations from 1 were found for the risk aversion parameters αS, αT, βS, and βT 
(see section “Results”). We therefore employed the individual mean loss aversion 
coefficient λ = (λT + λS)/2 as subject-specific input to derive the predicted neural valuation 
processes for each trial. Note, however, that inclusion of the estimated loss aversion 
coefficients in the T and S condition, λT and λS, instead of the average of the two conditions, 
did not lead to significantly different fMRI results. Additional regressors added to the first-
level GLM corresponded to the cues at the beginning of the blocks, actual electrical 
stimulation at weak and strong intensities, and trials where participants omitted responses. 
Main effects and interactions of affective context and decision-making were computed with 
linear contrasts of the first-level parameter estimates, resulting in one contrast estimate for 
each of these effects in each participant. 
Statistical inference was performed with second-level random-effects comparisons 
of the first-level contrasts representing the trial onset and ESV regressors for the threat and 
safe context. We tested our hypotheses about changes in neural valuation due to 
anticipatory anxiety in regions of interest (ROIs) previously shown to be involved in neural 
valuation and emotion processing. These regions comprised VMPFC (Levy and Glimcher, 
2011; Winecoff et al., 2013), VS (Tom et al., 2007; Bartra et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 
2013a), insula (Robinson et al., 2013a), and amygdala (Jenison et al., 2011; Fossati, 2012). 
Bilateral masks for amygdala and insula were taken from the WFU PickAtlas 
(http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas). For VMPFC and VS, which are anatomically 
less distinctively defined, we employed MNI coordinates and extent estimations from the 
published literature. Coordinates for the VMPFC mask (right VMPFC: x = 4.27, y = 35.18, 
z = 11.82; left VMPFC: x = -7.29, y = 38, z = -10.57; spheres with 12 mm radius) were 
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taken from a meta-analysis of neural valuation processes (Levy and Glimcher, 2012). 
Bilateral coordinates for the ventral striatum (VS; bilateral inferior VS (nucleus 
accumbens): x = ±9, y = 9, z = -8; superior ventral striatum (ventral caudate): x = ±10, y = 
15, z = 0; spheres with 6 mm radius) were taken from a study employing connectivity-based 
parcellation of the striatum (Di Martino et al., 2008), which has also been used for this 
purpose by other studies (Kelly et al., 2009). These eight regions were then combined into a 
simple ROI mask using WFU PickAtlas “Union” function. All analyses of value-related 
responses were restricted to this inclusive mask with the statistical threshold set at 
p  <  0.001, uncorrected, in line with the threshold commonly used in a priori defined 
hypothesis tests of value-related responses in these regions (Plassmann et al., 2010; Kang et 
al., 2011; Litt et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012). Additionally, we ran 
exploratory whole-brain analyses with a statistical threshold of p < 0.05 family-wise error 
(FWE) corrected for the full brain.  
Trial-by-trial regression analysis of the relationship between ROI signal and 
subjective value. To confirm the results of the SPM analyses with independent data, we 
examined the link between subjective values and neural activity in analyses of the trial-by-
trial time course data extracted from the VMPFC, VS and insula. We employed the leave-
one-subject-out (LOSO) cross-validation procedure (Esterman et al., 2010), in which 
regions for extraction of each subject’s data are defined by a GLM analysis of value 
responses in the other N-1 subjects. This procedure ensures that ROI analyses are 
performed on new data that are independent of those used for ROI definition, thereby 
avoiding circular inference (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) and allowing within-sample 
replication in an independent dataset.  
Specifically, activation time courses were extracted from spherical volumes of 
interest (VOI) centered on the activation foci from each LOSO GLM within the VMPFC 
(12 mm radius), VS (6 mm radius) and insula (12 mm radius). Data were spatially averaged 
over the sphere and were temporally downsampled to one value for each trial, by averaging 
over 4 images within the period of 3.5 to 10.5 seconds post-trial onset. This ensured that the 
data summarized the delayed and dispersed hemodynamic response reflecting choice-
relevant computations (RTs ranged from 0.48 to 6.16 seconds post-stimulus onset). Spatial 
and temporal averaging and correction for session and movement confounds was 
implemented using the VOI toolbox in SPM8. 
As a first step, we examined whether trial-by-trial activity within our regions of interest 
encodes subjective value differentially during the presence of threat relative to no threat. To 
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this end, we regressed trial-by-trial signal changes in our ROIs on subjective value, threat, 
and their interaction, using the following model: 
(Equation 11) Signalti = β1 * SVti + β2 * Tti + β3 * (SVti * Tti) + β4 * Xti + e  
where for each for subject i on trial t, Signal is the regional signal within a given ROI, SV 
reflects the subjective value, T is a dummy variable that encodes the presence of threat and 
X reflects a vector of subject-specific confounding variables that include age, trait anxiety, 
the emotional stability subscale of the NEO-FFI, and trial number to control for temporal 
variation in the signal.  
Prediction of choices from activation time courses in VOIs. To demonstrate the link 
between brain activity in each region of interest and the overt economic choices, we 
performed prediction analyses of choices based on neural signals (Kuhnen and Knutson, 
2005; Berns et al., 2008). These analyses were conducted to investigate whether neural 
signals from independently-defined regions in VMPFC, VS, and insula predict overt choice, 
and how this predictive relationship changes with affective context (threat vs. safe). To this 
end, we conducted logistic regression of mixed-gamble acceptance on neural signals 
(extracted from subject-specific regions using the identical LOSO approach as described 
above), affective context (threat, safe), and their interaction using the following model: 
(Equation 12) Choiceti = β1 * Signalti + β2 * Tti + β3 * Signalti * T + β4 * Xti + e 
where for each subject i on trial t, Choice is a dummy variable that reflects the acceptance 
of mixed gambles, Signal is the regional signal within a given ROI, T is a dummy variable 
that codes the presence of threat, and X reflects a vector of subject-specific confounding 
variables that include age, trait anxiety, the emotional stability subscale of the NEO-FFI, 
and trial number to control for temporal variation in the signal.  
For both regression models, we first conducted analyses of all trials to test how 
affective context interacts with subjective values (Equation 11; ordinary least squares) or 
regional BOLD signals (Equation 12; Logit). To further characterize these interactions, we 
then conducted follow-up analyses of only threat trials and only safe trials, using a simpler 
model that did not include the affective-context factor and its interaction. The parameters of 
all regression models were estimated using robust and clustered standard errors that correct 
for heteroscedasticity and correlated responses from each subject using the Huber-White 
method implemented in the robcov function of the Regression Modeling Strategies (RMS) 
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package in R. Statistical inference on the estimated parameters was performed at a one-
tailed p < 0.05, given the clear hypotheses in these confirmatory analyses.  
Psychophysiological interaction analysis. To test whether the induction of 
anticipatory anxiety caused changes in the functional connectivity within the valuation 
network (VMPFC, VS; insula, amygdala) and with regions outside this network, we 
conducted psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses using a generalized form of 
context-dependent psychophysiological interaction analysis (McLaren et al., 2012). PPI 
regressors were added to the same statistical model as described above (but omitting 
parametric modulators). Seed regions for PPI analysis were defined as spheres with 3 mm 
radius centered on peak voxels of activation found in the ESV-related contrasts of the GLM 
analysis. To obtain an estimate of neural activity within the seed region, the first temporal 
eigenvariate of a principle component analysis (PCA) of the BOLD signal in all voxels of 
the seed region was extracted and deconvolved (Gitelman et al., 2003). A new GLM was 
then estimated for each subject that included the original design matrix and the following 
additional regressors: the deconvolved time course from the seed region and two 
psychological interaction regressors (risky decisions in the threat condition and the safe 
condition). These regressors were created by multiplying the neural activity in the seed 
region during the relevant decisions with the regressors corresponding to the decision-
related activity in the two contexts (condition-specific on- and offset times convolved with 
the canonical HRF). PPI contrast maps for each subject were entered into a second level 
random-effects group analysis using the same inference procedures as for the GLM 
analyses described above. 
Please note that these PPI analyses were conducted on the residuals of the original 
GLM model; this ensures that any changes in functional coupling are estimated after the 
average activity elicited by each decision type has been modeled. Changes in PPI coupling 
therefore cannot be confounded by changes in overall signal during both conditions. 
Moreover, to ensure that changes in noise/signal variability during the two affective 
contexts cannot confound the PPI analyses, we also compared the signal-to-noise (SNR) 
ratio within the VMPFC, VS, and insula during threat and safe blocks. To this end, we 
extracted the filtered signal timeseries from a 12 mm sphere centered on our activation 
peaks within the VMPFC and insula and from a 6 mm peak centered on our activation peak 
in VS, for the time periods corresponding to the threat and safe blocks. We then calculated 
SNR (defined as the absolute condition-specific mean / the condition-specific standard 
deviation) during safe and threat blocks and compared them statistically. This did not reveal 
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any SNR differences between safe and threat blocks in VMPFC (T(32) = 0.291, p  = 0.773), 
VS (T(32)  = 1.182, p = 0.246), and insula (T(32) = 0.475, p = 0.638), even after controlling 
for confounding factors, such as age and trait anxiety (VMPFC: affective context coefficient 
estimate: -0.008, T = -0.30, p = 0.769; VS: affective context coefficient estimate: -0.033, T 
= -1.20, p = 0.236; insula: affective context coefficient estimate: -0.020, T = -0.48, p = 
0.632). This demonstrates that any change in PPI coupling between both affective contexts 
is not confounded by differences in overall signal or noise levels and therefore most likely 
reflects changes in functional coupling. 
B.4 Results 
Threat of shock induces anticipatory anxiety 
Analysis of the SCR, behavioral, and neuroimaging data confirmed that our threat-of-shock 
manipulation was indeed successful in inducing anticipatory anxiety. 
 First, mean SCRs during decision trials in threat periods were increased relative to 
safe decision trials. A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction) with factors time (0-16 s following trial onset, averaged across 1-sec bins) and 
affective context (threat vs. safe) revealed significant main effects for both affective context 
(F(1,30) = 82.180, p < 0.0001) and time (F(16,30) = 3.245, p < 0.019), as well as a significant 
interaction of affective context and time (F(1,16) = 31.15, p < 0.001). These SCR increases 
lasted for the full trial (from 1 until 16 seconds after each trial onset), as indicated by 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise t-tests contrasting SCR responses during threat and safe trials 
(all T(30) = 9.07, all p < 0.0001). Thus, the ongoing threat of painful shocks had a 
physiologically arousing impact on our participants during performance of the choice 
paradigm.  
Second, SCR increases for threat contexts were also evident during time periods 
when electrical stimulation was actually administered. ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction) of the SCR data following stimulus administration also revealed highly 
significant main effects of affective context F(1,30) = 48.2, p < 0.0001) and time 
(F(16,30)  =  15.826, p < 0.0001), as well as a significant interaction of affective context and 
time (F(1,16) = 16.3, p < 0.0001). These SCR increases for strong relative to weak stimulation 
were evident from 3 until 16 seconds after the onset of the electric stimulus (all T(30) = 6.94, 
all  p  < 0.001). This confirms that the strong stimulation itself – on top of the expectation 
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of this stimulation throughout the block – led to strong physiological arousal in our 
participants (Figure B-2a). 
Third, the arousing impact of the anticipatory anxiety during threat contexts was 
also confirmed by the choice reaction time (RT) data (Figure B-2b). A regression of RTs on 
the independent variables affective context (threat versus safe) and choice (LO and SO) 
revealed significant effects for both affective context (T(32) = -3.01, p = 0.005) and choice 
(T(32) = -4.24, p < 0.001), but no interaction (T(32) = -0.11, p = 0.91). Participants were faster 
to respond when choosing LO than SO, and importantly also for choices in the threat versus 
safe context. The latter result demonstrates the effectiveness of our emotional manipulation 
on overt behavior (Robinson et al., 2013b).  
Finally, the affective efficiency of the painful electric stimulation during threat 
contexts was also confirmed by the fMRI data. When contrasting neural responses to the 
strong stimulation during threat blocks with those to the weak stimulation in safe blocks, we 
observed activation of a putative pain matrix (Tracey and Mantyh, 2007; Leknes and 
Tracey, 2008) including bilateral insula, bilateral supplementary motor area, cerebellum, 
and right anterior/mid-cingulate cortex (p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE-corrected; Figure 
B-2c).  
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Figure B-2: Evidence for efficacy of the threat-of-shock paradigm in inducing anticipatory anxiety. (a): 
SCR changes due to threat-of-shock manipulation. The plots show mean (+/- SEM.) SCRs during choices 
under threat-of-shock (left panel) and during the experience of the electrical shocks (right panel). 
Significantly increased SCRs were observed for choices during anticipation of strong compared to weak 
stimulation, and following strong versus weak stimulation. This demonstrates the psychological and 
physiological efficacy of the threat-of-shock manipulation. (b): Influence of choice and threat-of-shock 
manipulation on reaction times. RTs were decreased under anticipatory anxiety and for choices of the 
lottery option. (c): Neural correlates of strong versus weak electrical stimulation. Strong compared to 
weak stimulation intensity led to activation of the “pain matrix” including bilateral insula, anterior and 
mid cingulate cortices, right somatosensory cortex and cerebellum (p < 0.05, FWE-corrected). Mean (+/- 
SEM) beta estimates extracted from middle cingulate cortex (x = 14, y = -33, z = 46, left panel) and from 
right insula (x = 41, y = -1, z = -5) showed signal increase during strong electrical stimulation and no 
signal increase during weak stimulation. These activation patterns due to strong versus weak electrical 
stimulation demonstrate the physiological effectiveness of the threat-of-shock manipulation. 
***  p  <  0.001, ** p < 0.01 
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Anticipatory anxiety does not affect revealed preferences  
The analysis of the choice data showed that anticipatory anxiety did not change overt 
preferences, as measured with different indices. First, gambling rates did not differ 
significantly between threat and safe trials (T(32) = 0.05, p = 0.96; Figure B-3a). Subjects 
were in fact highly consistent in their decisions between threat and safe trials: When 
specific gambles were offered in both contexts, the same option was chosen in 89% of cases 
(Figure B-3b). Second, when preferences were modeled via Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(CPT), we found mild degrees of loss aversion that did not differ between the threat and 
safe contexts (Figure B-3c), as confirmed via t-test of the difference between λS and  λT  
(λS [SEM] = 1.291 [0.05] and λT [SEM] = 1.29 [0.05]; mean (λS - λT) [SEM] = -0.0007 
[0.0085]), (T(32) = 0.08, p = 0.93). Finally, we tested whether the curvature for gains and 
losses was changed during threat of shocks compared to the safe contexts. We did not 
observe any significant differences between both contexts for alpha (αT [SEM]: 0.933 
[0.0118], αS [SEM]: 0.934 [0.0126], T(32) = -0.5052, p = 0.617) and beta (βT [SEM]: 1.077 
[0.0144], βS [SEM]: 1.078 [0.0134], T(32) = 0.2189, p = 0.8281). Across participants, the 
small changes in loss aversion and risk attitude due to affective context appeared to be 
normally distributed (as confirmed by Lilliefors test for normality (Lilliefors, 1967) with λ: 
D = 0.14, p = 0.13; Figure B-3d; α: D = 0.12, p = 0.29; and β: D = 0.12, p = 0.27). Thus, 
any changes in loss aversion and risk attitude due to anticipatory anxiety were not 
significantly different from zero and normally distributed across participants; it is therefore 
unlikely that different participants reacted in a different manner to the affective 
manipulation.  
The similar choice behavior in the two affective contexts raises the question whether 
participants may have responded from memory when each lottery was presented for the 
second time in a different affective context. Such memory effects are generally unlikely, as 
participants would have to remember their responses across 280 trials, and as the 
presentation order across affective contexts was fully balanced. Nevertheless, we explicitly 
tested whether participants pondered their choices in a similar fashion for first and second 
presentations of lotteries within each context, by means of regression models that included 
the order of presentation of identical gambles (first vs. second presentation), affective 
context (threat vs. safe), the experimental trial (1 to 280), gain and loss amounts, as well as 
relevant two-way interaction terms. Importantly, RTs during first vs second presentations 
were not significantly different (Order coefficient: -14.438, T = -0.13, p = 0.895) and were 
similarly affected by affective context (Affective Context * Order coefficient: 40.4184, 
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T  =  1.41, p = 0.159), possible gains (Gains * Order coefficient: -1.809, T = -0.70, 
p  =  0.481) and possible losses (Losses * Order coefficient: -0.148, T= -0.04, p = 0.966). 
These results suggest that participants did not respond from memory for the second 
presentations of the lotteries but rather actively evaluated all lotteries. This conclusion is 
further backed up by our finding of robust value signals in the BOLD data (see below).  
 
Figure B-3: Effects of the threat-of-shock manipulation on choices. (a): Gambling rates (mean +/- SEM) 
did not differ for the two affective contexts. (b): Histogram of participants’ consistency rates (match of 
responses [in %] for the identical choices across the affective contexts). Participants chose the same 
options on average in 89% (+/- 11% SEM) of all gambles that were repeated across contexts. (c): Average 
(+/- SEM) loss aversion parameter λ across both contexts. Both threat and safe trials led to similar 
degrees of loss aversion. (d): Histogram of the participants’ changes in loss aversion due to the affective 
manipulation. The changes were not different from zero and normally distributed (mean (λS - λT) [SEM] = 
-0.0007 [0.0085]). Thus, the analysis of different behavioral parameters revealed the stability of choice 
across affective contexts. 
Anticipatory anxiety shifts the focus of neural valuation from positive ESV to negative 
ESV coding 
Even though anticipatory anxiety did not change overt behavior, it may nevertheless have 
affected the way the brain valued the choice options during decision-making. Initial analysis 
confirmed our expectation that, when pooling across threat and safe trials, ESV correlated 
positively with activity in the VMPFC (x = 2, y = 47, z = -8, T = 3.34) and the VS (sub-
region 1: x1 = 3, y1= 11, z1 = -8, T = 3.59; sub-region 2: x2 = -5, y2 = 12, z2 = -5, T = 3.42). 
However, when directly comparing neural correlates of ESV between threat and safe trials, 
we found that anticipatory anxiety led to a significant disruption of ESV coding in both 
VMPFC (x= -3, y = 39, z = -5, T = 3.59; Figure B-4a and c) and VS (x = 6, y = 6, z = -6; 
T  = 3.24; Figure B-4a and d). To characterize this interaction effect, we investigated 
parametric correlations between BOLD and ESV during threat and safe trials separately. 
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Both the VMPFC and VS coded ESV during safe trials (VMPFC: x = -3, y = 40, z = -8, 
T  =  3.87; VS: x = 6, y = 6, z = -6, T = 4.56) but not during threat trials (no significant 
ESV-related activity was found in those regions). Moreover, a conjunction analysis of the 
ESV contrast images during threat and safe trials did not reveal any activity in these 
regions. 
A very different pattern of results was observed in right anterior insula, where ESV 
coding also differed between both affective contexts (x = 39, y = 0, z = 0; T = 3.25; Figure 
B-4b and e). Separate analyses of neural signals during both contexts revealed that ESV was 
not significantly correlated with BOLD signals during safe trials (no voxel was found), but 
was instead negatively correlated with BOLD signals during threat trials (left insula cluster 
1: x = -30, y = 21, z = 13, T = 3.48; left insula cluster 2: x = -40, y = 20, z = 4, T  =  3.38; 
right insula: x = 39, y = -12, z = -6, T = 3.44). Again, a conjunction analysis of the ESV 
contrast images during threat and safe trials did not reveal any activity in this area. Thus, 
during anticipatory anxiety, the insula increased its activity for smaller U(x) and therefore 
larger potentially negative outcomes. Anticipatory anxiety therefore led to a qualitatively 
distinct style of neural value coding, by disrupting positive value coding in the VMPFC and 
the VS while simultaneously enhancing negative value coding in the anterior insula.  
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Figure B-4: Changes in the correlation of regional BOLD signals with subjective values due to threat-of-
shock (interaction contrast ESVS > ESVT). Such changes were observed in (a) VMPFC (x = -3, y = 39, z 
= -5), and VS (x = 6, y = 6, z = -6) as well as (b) insula (x = 39, y = 0, z = 0). Voxels in blue show 
positive correlation with subjective value during safe trials, voxels in red show negative correlations with 
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SV during threat trials, and voxels in yellow show a significant interaction. (c-e) ROI analyses confirm 
the pattern of interactions found in the SPM analyses. To avoid circularity, a LOSO approach was 
employed to extract beta weights from independent ROIs (see text for details). The plots show the 
average trial-by-trial relationship (lines +/- SEM as shaded area) between regional activity and subjective 
value, as estimated in regression analyses of these betas (see main text). For both VMPFC (c) and VS (d), 
positive correlations between subjective value and BOLD activity were present in safe trials, but were 
significantly weaker (and in fact absent) during threat trials. In contrast, the insula (e) showed no 
correlation with subjective value during safe trials, but significantly stronger negative value coding 
(increasing activity for decreasing expected subjective value) during threat trials. These findings suggest 
that anticipatory anxiety caused a distinct style of neural value coding, by disrupting positive value 
coding in the VMPFC and the VS and simultaneously enhancing negative value coding in the anterior 
insula. All imaging results are displayed at p < 0.005 for display purposes. The shaded error bars reflect 
robust and clustered SEM.  
Anticipatory anxiety changes trial-by-trial relationship between neural signal in ROIs 
and economic choice 
The fMRI results described above identified regions in the VMPFC, VS, and insula where 
neural activity correlated with different aspects of subjective values during the two affective 
contexts (positive ESVs during safe trials and negative ESVs during threat trials). As a next 
step, we corroborated that the change in neural coding in these regions between both 
contexts is tightly linked to behavior. For this analysis, we extracted the neural activity for 
each trial from the ROIs in the VMPFC, VS, and insula and regressed the choice outcomes 
for each trial on the activity in each region, the affective context, and the interaction of both 
variables (see section “Methods and materials”). Prior to this analysis, we ensured that the 
ROI data could replicate the results of the SPM analysis, by performing a regression of 
neural activity in each region on subjective values, affective context, and their interaction. 
Importantly, the ROIs for both analyses were similarly defined using the well-established 
leave-one-subject-out approach (Esterman et al., 2010), which avoids circularity and 
enabled us to perform this prediction analysis with independent data (see section “Methods 
and materials”).  
The independent ROI analysis clearly confirmed the results of the SPM analysis. As 
illustrated in Figure B-4, all regions showed a negative change in value coding from the 
safe to the threat context, as indicated by a significant interaction between subjective value 
and threat [VMPFC: interaction coefficient = -0.0071, T = -2.70, p = 0.0035;  
VS: interaction coefficient = -0.0046, T = -1.99, p = 0.0231; insula: interaction coefficient = 
-0.0077, T = -2.01, p = 0.0221]. Importantly, the pattern of this interaction was different for 
the insula compared to the ventral striatum and the VMPFC (Figure B-4): Whereas the 
signal in VMPFC and VS tracked ESVs during the safe condition and was suppressed under 
conditions of threat (VMPFC: ESVS coefficient = 0.0057, T = 2.77, p = 0.0028; 
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ESVT  coefficient = -0.0014, T = -0.77, p = 0.2201; VS: ESVS coefficient = 0.0050, 
T  =  3.95, p < 0.0001, ESVT coefficient = 0.0004, T = 0.25, p = 0.4028), activity in the 
insula did not track value during safe trials but coded negative subjective value during the 
threat condition (insula: ESVS coefficient = 0.0024, T = 0.86, p = 0.194; ESVT coefficient = 
-0.0052, T = -1.98, p = 0.0239]. These results from the independent ROIs thus fully confirm 
the relationship between subjective values and regional signal in VMPFC, VS and insula. 
Next, we tested whether trial-by-trial signal changes within our ROIs in the 
valuation network directly map onto actual economic decisions. We predicted that the trial-
by-trial signal within these independent regions not only reflects subjective values, but can 
also directly predict observed choices. In line with all previous results, we expected that 
decision outcomes in the absence of threat should be predicted by only the VMPFC and VS 
signal, but in the presence of threat only by insula activity. In line with this prediction, we 
found significant interactions between neural signal and threat for VMPFC (interaction 
coefficient = -0.246, Wald Z = -2.54, p = 0.0056) and insula (interaction coefficient = 
-0.1162, Wald Z = -1.71, p = 0.044). As illustrated in Figure B-5a, VMPFC neural signals 
predicted choice only during safe trials (safe coefficient = 0.1876, Wald Z = 3.35, 
p  =  0.0004) but not during threat trials (threat coefficient = -0.0550, Wald Z = -0.79, 
p  =  0.2161), whereas the opposite pattern was obtained in the insula (safe 
coefficient  =  0.0302, Wald Z = 0.69, p = 0.24475; threat coefficient = -0.089,  
Wald Z = -1.84; p = 0.033). The corresponding interaction in the ventral striatum was 
weaker and non-significant (interaction coefficient = -0.125, Wald Z = -0.82, p = 0.206), 
perhaps due to greater noise in the signals extracted from this small region. Nevertheless, in 
analogy to the VMPFC and again, consistent with our hypothesis, neural signals in the VS 
predicted choices during safe trials (safe coefficient = 0.2189, Wald Z = 2.60, p = 0.0047) 
but not during threat trials (threat coefficient = 0.0909, Wald Z = 0.95, p = 0.17095, 
Figure  B-5a). Taken together, these regression analyses therefore establish that the 
different patterns of neural ESV coding in the two affective contexts are both clearly linked 
to choice behavior. Moreover, all our results on neural valuation signals show that 
participants did compute subjective values for all choices, even though these computations 
were implemented in different cortical areas depending on affective context. The presence 
of these context-dependent value computations makes it very unlikely that participants 
responded from memory on the 50% of trials where gambles were presented a second time. 
B  Anticipatory anxiety disrupts neural valuation during risky choice 
112 
Negative baseline shifts in VMPFC during anticipatory anxiety   
What mechanism may underlie the breakdown of positive value-coding under anticipatory 
anxiety? One possibility is that in the threat context, processing of lottery values in the VS 
and VMPFC may interact with the negative emotional value associated with the anticipated 
uncomfortable stimulation (Talmi et al., 2009; Winecoff et al., 2013). Given the salience of 
anticipatory anxiety relative to lottery outcomes, the processing of the aversive emotional 
event can be expected to overshadow value coding with respect to probabilistic financial 
gains. If this were the case, then BOLD signals in the VS and VMPFC should be lower on 
average for threat compared to safe trials, pooled across all possible financial outcomes. We 
tested this conjecture by contrasting task-related activity in threat versus safe trials, 
independent of correlations with trial-wise ESV. Consistent with our conjecture, threat trials 
were associated with decreased task-related activations in VMPFC (x = -8, y = 35, z = -2; 
T  = 5.58; Figure B-5b), amygdala (x = 29, y = 3, z = -29; T = 4.56) and insula (x = 45, 
y  =  0, z = 1; T = 3.64, x = -45, y = -3, z = -2; T = 4.45). These observations confirm that 
anticipatory anxiety due to the impending strong stimulation can decrease the overall 
activation of valuation brain regions (Talmi et al., 2009). This may reduce the excitability of 
these brain regions for coding the positive values of probabilistic financial gains, as 
suggested by the observed breakdown of positive ESV coding in the threatening context. 
 
Figure B-5: (a) Results from logistic regressions predicting choice based on regional activity in VMPFC, 
VS, and insula. Both VMPFC and VS predict choice only during safe trials, but not during threat trials. In 
contrast, the insula shows the opposite pattern of predicting choice (negatively) only during threat trials, 
but not during safe trials. (b) Decreases in average VMPFC BOLD signals during choices due to threat-
of-shock (TSafe > TThreat). Anticipation of strong electrical stimulation led to general BOLD signal 
reduction in VMPFC (x = -8, y = 35, z = -2) pooled across all ESV levels. Anticipatory anxiety led to 
decreases in overall activity for valuation brain regions during choice, possibly due to the inherent 
negative value of the impending strong stimulation. The bar plot shows mean regression coefficients 
extracted from a 12 mm sphere around the VMPFC activation peak to illustrate the pattern of suppressed 
activity during choices in the threat vs safe context. The imaging results are displayed at p < 0.005 for 
display purposes. Error bars reflect SEM. 
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Anticipatory anxiety decreases functional connectivity in the valuation network 
If anticipatory anxiety disrupts the neural processing of possible financial outcomes during 
choice, then this may not only affect activity in single brain areas but also functional 
communication within the connected network of value-related brain areas. Thus, we 
hypothesized that the VMPFC may show reduced functional connectivity with other value-
related brain regions during anticipatory anxiety. We formally tested this conjecture with 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses of context-dependent changes in functional 
connectivity of the VMPFC (seeded at x = -3, y = 39, z = -5, Figure B-6a) between threat 
and safe contexts. This revealed that threat contexts indeed lead to significantly decreased 
functional coupling of the VMPFC with two other key value-related brain areas: the VS 
(x = -6, y = 14, z = -11, T = 3.64, Figure B-6b and c) and the insula (x = -38, y = 17, z = -8, 
T = 4.9; Figure B-6b and d). This confirms that anticipatory anxiety disrupted positive ESV 
coding both at the level of local activity within areas of the value network, but also at the 
level of functional integration between these brain regions.   
We also tested the hypothesis that anticipatory anxiety may change functional 
communication between valuation areas and regions outside the classic valuation system, 
which may possibly be involved in action selection irrespective of affective context. For 
this purpose, we conducted PPI analyses based on seed regions in VS (at x = 6, y = 6,  
z = -6), the insula (at x = 39, y = 0, z = 0), and the dorsolateral PFC (seeded at the DLPFC 
peak voxel in the neurosynth automated meta-analysis for the term cognitive control: 
x  =  50, y = 36, z = 24). However, we did not find any reduction in functional connectivity 
between our areas of interest and other regions outside the classic valuation system. The 
unchanged functional involvement of cognitive control areas such as the DLPFC may 
perhaps reflect that neurons in the VMPFC and insula not only compute values but also 
encode signals used for flexible choice and action selection (Paulus et al., 2005; Hunt et al., 
2014; Strait et al., 2014). In any case, our results confirms that anticipatory anxiety during 
the threatening context disrupted positive ESV coding both at the level of local activity 
within areas of the value network, but also at the level of functional integration between 
these brain regions. 
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Figure B-6: Changes in functional connectivity within the valuation network during anticipatory anxiety. 
Threat-of-shock led to decreased connectivity between (a) the seed region in VMPFC (x = -3, y = 39, 
y  =  -5); and both VS (x = -6, y = 14, z = -11, T = 3.64; Figure B-6b and c) and insula (x = -38, y = 17, z 
= -8, T = 4.9; Figure B-6b and d). Thus, anticipatory anxiety disrupted the functional integration of the 
brain’s valuation network. Error bars reflect SEM. All results are displayed at p < 0.005 for display 
purposes. Error bars reflect SEM. 
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B.5 Discussion 
This study investigated how incidental anxiety can affect value-based decisions under risk. 
Purely behavioral effects of background emotions on choice are well-documented in the 
clinical and psychology literature (Maner et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2012; Giorgetta et al., 
2012; Grecucci et al., 2013) but have been less prominently investigated from the 
perspective of underlying neural activity (Pessoa and Pereira, 2013). Here we investigated 
this issue with an experimental threat-of-shock paradigm that allowed us to induce 
anticipatory anxiety in healthy participants while they took risky choices during fMRI. We 
find that this affective manipulation did not change overt choices, but fundamentally altered 
value-coding in the brain: In the safe context, the expected subjective values of the gambles 
were coded positively in the VMPFC and VS. During the threat context, these processes 
collapsed and were replaced by negative value coding in the anterior insula (i.e., increased 
activity for increasingly worse outcomes). In general, our results are congruent with 
previous findings (Kim et al., 2011) that the VS and VMPFC can code subjective value in a 
positive manner, whereas the insula can show negative correlations with subjective values. 
However, our data show that these two types of value representations can be dissociated and 
may depend flexibly on the affective state, with a dominance of positive value coding in the 
VMPFC and VS during neutral states, and a prevalence of negative value coding in the 
insula during negative affective states. This dependence of value coding on affective 
context may not have been evident in previous neuroimaging studies that measured value-
related brain activity in just one affective context (usually neutral; for review, see Levy and 
Glimcher, 2011, 2012; Bartra et al., 2013). However, please note that both the diminished 
value sensitivity in VMPFC and its decreased communication with the striatum under 
anticipatory anxiety are clearly consistent with rodent studies that have demonstrated 
impaired value coding and reward learning under stress (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). 
Strikingly, the shift in value-coding between affective contexts was not 
accompanied by changes in revealed economic preferences, as measured by overt choice 
(only reaction times were affected). Nevertheless, our analyses revealed a tight link between 
neural value signals and behavior in both affective contexts, with neural activity in VMPFC 
and VS predicting choices only for safe trials and neural activity in the insula predicting 
choices only for threat trials. Our results thus demonstrate that the same behavioral outcome 
can be realized through different neural value-coding mechanisms. This finding is generally 
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congruent with multiple-systems theories of decision-making stating that different valuation 
systems can guide choice depending on the properties of the decision-making situation 
(Rangel et al., 2008). That neural valuation processes can change during negative affective 
states is corroborated by findings (Schwabe et al., 2012) that hormonally induced stress can 
lead to a change from goal-directed to habitual decision control and reduced value 
sensitivity in medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings therefore suggest that during anxiety, 
the same behavioral choices may have been brought about by goal-directed negative value 
computations in the insula (rather than positive value computations in the VMPC and VS), 
possibly in conjunction with compensatory mechanisms such as heuristics and increased 
habitual responding. In either case, we speculate that the reduction of value coding in the 
VMPFC and VS during anxiety may indicate a decrease in the positive value of the 
available choice options, even though such speculations need to be taken with caution given 
the problem of reverse inference in neuroimaging studies (Poldrack, 2011).  
The conjecture that anticipatory anxiety may have decreased neural sensitivity for 
the subjective value of the choice-relevant stimuli is congruent with our findings of (1) a 
general negative baseline shift in VMPFC during threat and (2) reduced functional 
connectivity of this area with the insula and the VS. This assumption dovetails with results 
of previous neuroimaging studies on the integration of emotional and economic value 
(Talmi et al., 2009; Park et al., 2011; Winecoff et al., 2013). Specifically, recent findings 
suggest that VMPFC signals track the emotional value of stimuli on the one hand (Winecoff 
et al., 2013) and economic value on the other (Levy and Glimcher, 2012). Moreover, Talmi 
et al. (2009) found decreased value signals in VMPFC for choices comprising a task-
contingent painful stimulus. Here we show that even a fully incidental but highly salient and 
emotionally aversive event – the anticipation of painful electrical stimulation – can 
overshadow neural signals related to economic value computations. This supports the 
notion that emotional and economic value may be processed by the same VMPFC region, 
extending the hypothesis that the VMPFC encodes a standardized economic value signal to 
the domain of emotional value (Montague and Berns, 2002; Rangel and Hare, 2010). 
Moreover, our findings are consistent with suggestions that the VMPFC may compute 
subjective values even for certain task-irrelevant stimuli (Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy et al., 
2011; Kühn and Gallinat, 2012) and that negative affective states (i.e., anxiety or stress) can 
lead to structural and functional changes in the VMPFC (Liston et al., 2006; McEwen, 
2007).  
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However, it could be argued that the diminished VMPFC activity under anticipatory anxiety 
may not reflect changes in neural value processing but rather reduced default-mode network 
(DMN) activity, as DMN activity is commonly observed in the VMPFC. However, this 
alternative explanation appears very unlikely: Inhibitions of DMN-activity would be 
expressed in a whole network of regions comprising the VMPFC, PCC, and TPJ (Buckner 
et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Li et al., 2014), would be accompanied by a 
concomitant increase in fronto-parietal activity (Fox et al., 2005; Sridharan et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2013), and would be more marked in conditions with higher cognitive demand 
and thus longer reaction times (McKiernan et al., 2003). In our task, a negative baseline 
shift was found only in the VMPFC (but not the PCC and TPJ), in the threat context that 
actually led to faster RTs (rather than increased demand indicated by slowed responses). 
The reductions in VMPFC signals found here are therefore more likely to indicate reduced 
positive value coding due to the high negative value of the impending painful stimulation. 
Our results show that the functional changes due to the threat of shock not only 
affected the VMPFC in isolation but also its functional connectivity with other areas. This 
suggests weakened function of an entire valuation network (rather than single regions) 
under anticipatory anxiety. Viewed from this network perspective, the reduction in 
connectivity between VMPFC and insula may indicate a release from inhibition in the 
insula that may have resulted in stronger negative value-coding during threat trials. 
Importantly, the insula showed two distinct types of signals in our study. One of these 
signals appeared related to valuation during threat trials and consisted of a negative baseline 
shift and enhanced negative value coding (Sescousse et al., 2013; Tanaka et al., 2014). The 
other signal was elicited by the painful shocks when these were actually administered, 
reminiscent of the well-reported activity in the so-called pain matrix (Tracey and Mantyh, 
2007; Leknes and Tracey, 2008). We speculate that these two effects may reflect the 
involvement of separate neural populations, for two reasons. First, it is well established that 
the insula contains functionally diverse types of neurons (Chang et al., 2013; Uddin et al., 
2014) that are nevertheless spatially intermingled. This may explain why in our data, the 
activation peaks for both types of signals were spatially separated (5 mm apart). Second, 
pain-processing neurons in the insula usually show positive baseline shifts during the 
anticipation and actual delivery of (predictable) painful shocks (Jones et al., 1992; Apkarian 
et al., 2005; Dalton et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2012). The negative 
baseline shifts found here during the threat blocks (with unpredictable stimulation) are thus 
more likely to reflect valuation processes, in line with findings that insula activity reflects 
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value computations in other contexts (Sescousse et al., 2013; Tanaka et al., 2014) and is 
susceptible to stress during decision-making (Lighthall et al., 2009, 2012). 
Our study may have important implications for neurobiological perspectives on 
maladaptive anxiety and related psychopathology. Transient anxiety states normally carry 
adaptive value since they may increase vigilance and attention to possible negative 
outcomes that should be avoided. This functional anxiety, however, may turn into a 
maladaptive state if anxious behavior is permanently adopted and becomes detached from 
the environment (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). We find that transient anxiety leads to a 
change in neural value coding in the absence of changes in overt behavior. This situation 
may resemble prodromal stages of anxiety disorders where no pathological decision-making 
is evident, as the anxious persons might use compensatory strategies (e.g., increased focus 
on task or calculation) in order to overcome the pathological risk-aversion typical for 
anxiety disorders (Maner et al., 2007; Giorgetta et al., 2012). Our findings suggest that 
during such early stages, a neural focus on negative value might not be accompanied by 
striking behavioral changes. However, the permanent adoption of these strategies might 
lead to gradual deterioration of the neural valuation system and/or compensatory strategies 
until behavioral deviations emerge. Similar mechanisms may be at play in depression, 
where early stages of the illness are associated with decreased hedonic capacity (indicated 
by changes in neural value processing) without observable aberrant decision-making, 
whereas later stages are also often associated with altered value-based decision making 
(Treadway and Zald, 2011; Der-Avakian and Markou, 2012). This may be consistent with 
the assumption that a persistent focus on negative value coding due to the ongoing 
incidental negative affect may ultimately lead to a functional deterioration of the brain’s 
valuation system and therefore changes of overt behavior. Thus, our findings suggest a 
pathway for the transition from adaptive to maladaptive emotional responses, as commonly 
observed in anxiety and affective disorders (Paulus and Yu, 2012).  
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C.1 Summary 
Aversive emotions may be a key source of irrational human decision-making but still little 
is known about the underlying neural circuitry. Here, we show that aversive emotions 
distort trust decisions and cause significant changes in the associated neural circuitry. They 
reduce trust and suppress trust-specific activity in left temporoparietal junction (TPJ). In 
addition, aversive emotions reduce the functional connectivity between TPJ and emotion-
related regions such as the amygdala. We also find that the posterior superior temporal 
sulcus (pSTS) plays a key role in mediating the impact of aversive emotions on brain-
behavior relationships. Functional connectivity of right pSTS with left TPJ not only predicts 
mean trust taking in the absence of negative emotions, but aversive emotions also largely 
remove this association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and behavioral trust. These 
findings may be useful for a better understanding of the neural circuitry of affective 
distortions and may thus help identify the neural bases of psychiatric diseases that are 
associated with emotion-related psychological and behavioral dysfunctions.  
Highlights 
 Aversive emotions are identified as an important causal factor that distorts human 
trust. 
 The behavioral effect of aversive emotions is associated with specific distortions in 
the neural circuitry related to trust taking and emotion-processing.  
 Aversive emotions suppress trust-specific activity in temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
and reduce the functional connectivity between TPJ and amygdala. 
 In the absence of aversive emotions posterior superior temporal sulcus mediates 
brain-behavior relationships but aversive emotions severely distort this mediation. 
C.2 Introduction 
Trust pervades almost every aspect of human social life. It plays a decisive role in families, 
organizations, markets and in the political sphere. Without trust, families fall apart, 
organizations are inefficient, market transactions are costly and political leaders lack public 
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support. Recent research in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics has begun to 
elucidate the determinants and neural correlates of trust (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 
Delgado et al., 2005). However, despite recent progress in understanding the determinants 
of trust (Fehr, 2009) and its distortions in psychiatric disorders (Gromann et al., 2013; King-
Casas et al., 2008), relatively little is known about the impact of our emotions on trust 
taking. Emotions, in particular those with high intensity, can have deleterious effects on our 
decision-making faculties, as hinted at by a multitude of public press reports and recent 
theoretical (Loewenstein, 2000) and experimental accounts (Knutson et al., 2008; Kuhnen 
and Knutson, 2011; Phelps, 2009; Schulreich et al., 2014). It is therefore important to 
understand the behavioral and neural mechanisms by which emotions distort decisions to 
trust. 
While much progress has been made in outlining the neural underpinnings of 
emotional processes on the one hand (Lindquist et al., 2012; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010) and 
of decision-making on the other (Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Rangel and Hare, 2010), the 
effects of emotion on choice have received relatively little attention to date (Kuhnen and 
Knutson, 2011; Phelps, 2009; Schulreich et al., 2014). Theoretical accounts of the influence 
of emotion on choice (Loewenstein, 2000) distinguish between two types of emotions: 
anticipatory emotions, such as the anticipated pleasure from the future consumption of a 
good that reflect how decision-makers expect to feel about the outcomes of their decisions, 
and incidental emotions that occur at the time of the decision, but are unrelated to the choice 
outcomes. Incidental emotions are of particular interest because of their ubiquity in real life 
and because they are prime candidates for emotion-induced behavioral distortions. By 
definition, incidental emotions are unrelated to choice outcomes and, to the extent to which 
they affect behavior, may cause irrational behavioral biases.  
To study the behavioral impact and the underlying neural circuitry of affect-induced 
distortions of trust, we adapted the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) to an imaging context. In 
the trust game, two anonymous players, which we call investor and trustee, sequentially 
send money to each other. In the first stage, the investor faces the choice of whether and 
how much of her endowment to transfer to the trustee. Then the experimenter triples the 
sent amount, before it is transferred to the trustee. The investor’s decision to transfer money 
thus increases the total amount of money that can be distributed among the two players. In 
the second stage, the trustee is informed about the total amount that he received after which 
he can send back part or all of this money. Thus, while the investor’s transfer increases the 
total amount of money available to both parties, the investor also faces the risk of 
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benefitting nothing from the transfer because the trustee is completely free in his back-
transfer decision. Therefore, the decision to transfer money constitutes an act of trust, as the 
investor makes herself vulnerable to the potentially selfish behavior of the trustee (Fehr, 
2009). 
Such trust taking involves both a financial risk due to the possibility of losing the 
invested money, as well as a social risk of being betrayed by an untrustworthy trustee. 
Therefore, to enable clear identification of the impact of incidental emotion on the 
mechanisms involved in the social aspects of trust taking, it is important to include a well-
matched non-social control task. For this reason, our subjects also faced a non-social control 
condition that was identical to the trust condition in every respect except that instead of a 
trustee, a computer made a “back-transfer” that determined the profitability of the investor’s 
“transfer” (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Kosfeld et al., 2005). The profitability of the 
investor’s transfer in the non-social control and trust condition was exactly the same 
because the investors had exactly the same choice options in both conditions and the 
computer sampled the “back-transfer” decisions in the non-social control condition 
according to the probability distribution of back-transfers that was generated by the 
trustees’ decisions in the trust condition (see experimental procedures).  
Subjects made decisions in either trust or non-social control trials within two 
different emotional contexts. They were either under the threat of relatively intense tactile 
stimulation that was somewhat painful (“threat condition”), or they faced the possibility of 
receiving weak tactile stimulation in the “no threat” condition (Figure C-1). A prolonged 
period of aversive affect was established by administering the tactile stimulations at 
unpredictable time points and frequencies for the duration of an entire block. A block 
consisted of several trust or control trials in the threat condition or several trials in the no-
threat condition. This approach has a number of advantages over typical emotion-induction 
techniques that have been employed in previous investigations of the influences of emotion 
on decision-making (Harlé et al., 2012; Lerner et al., 2013). The limitations of standard 
emotion induction procedures have been well-documented in the past (Martin, 1990; 
Westermann et al., 1996) and include susceptibility to demand effects (Buchwald et al., 
1981; Polivy and Doyle, 1980), emotional responses of insufficient intensity (Marston et al., 
1984; Martin, 1990), systematic differences between subjects in susceptibility to the 
induction procedure (Blackburn et al., 1990), as well as a relatively brief time course of the 
effect, the duration of which may vary by subject and may not suffice for experiments 
longer than 10 minutes (Frost and Green, 1982; Isen et al., 1976). The threat-of-shock 
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paradigm employed in the current study has been shown to reliably induce negative affect 
(Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Grillon et al., 1993; Schmitz and Grillon, 2012) and 
addresses the limitations of standard emotion induction procedures as follows: (1) threat of 
shock provides an immediate stimulus of biological significance that triggers an aversive 
and automatic emotional reaction, the intensity of which can be measured throughout the 
experiment using standard psychophysiological techniques; (2) using a blocked threat-of-
shock paradigm reinstates the emotional reaction at every presentation, which can thus be 
maintained for the duration of the entire experiment; (3) threat of shock was administered 
within-subject, therefore allowing each subject to serve as their own control; (4) tactile 
stimulation was administered in both the trust and the non-social control condition, thus 
minimizing demand effects. 
 
Figure C-1: Schematic representation of hybrid fMRI design, trial sequence and timing. (a) Subjects 
faced blocks of trust and non-social control (NSC) trials in random order. During a trust block they 
played 3 trust games with different anonymous partners. During an NSC block they played 3 non-social 
control (NSC) games in which a pre-programmed computer chose “back transfers”. Both during trust and 
NSC blocks subjects expected either strong (“threat”) or weak (“no-threat”) tactile stimulation at 
unpredictable times during the block. (b) Sequence and timing of a trial in a trust block with strong tactile 
stimulation (“threat”). (c) Sequence and timing of a trial in a non-social control block with weak tactile 
stimulation (“no-threat”). At the beginning of each block, a 750-ms visual cue reminded subjects of the 
game type (trust or non-social control) and stimulation intensity (weak or strong) for the current block. 
The “human” icon indicated a trust block, the “computer” icon represented a control block. Two 
additional cues indicated the threat level to the subjects: (i) an actual tactile stimulation (“reminder 
shock”) at the end of the block cue indicated the current block’s stimulation intensity level and (ii) the 
background color informed the subjects throughout the entire block whether they have to expect a strong 
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or weak stimulation (in Figure C-1, e.g., red = strong and green = weak shock, stimulation intensity-color 
association was counterbalanced). After a jittered interstimulus interval of three to nine seconds, the first 
of three trials was presented. In a trust game trial, subjects chose how much of their endowment of 24 
CHF to transfer to a stranger (“How much do you invest in B?”). In a non-social control game trial, 
subjects chose how much of their endowment to invest in an ambiguous lottery that provided a 40-60% 
probability of returning an amount greater than the investment (“How much do you invest in L?”). To 
ensure subjects’ attention, the discrete investment opportunities – in the range between 0 and 24 CHF – 
randomly changed from trial to trial. 
Previous fMRI investigations of emotion (Lindquist et al., 2012) and cognitive control 
strategies through which emotional reactions can be modified (Ochsner et al., 2012) inform 
the neurobiological hypotheses of the current investigation. We conjectured that incidental 
affect modulates trust-specific computations, such as the assessment of the trustee’s 
trustworthiness. Neurally, we expected, therefore, that aversive affect may influence trust 
decisions by specifically modulating responses in regions involved in representing other 
people’s mental states, including temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (Mitchell et al., 2006; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Young et al., 2010). Given our 
manipulation of affective state, we also expected regions known to play a role in emotion 
processing to be involved in the influence of aversive affect on trust decisions. Such regions 
include the amygdala and anterior insula, which have consistently been implicated in 
processing negative emotion (LeDoux, 2007; Wicker et al., 2003), as well as ventral 
striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which have consistently been implicated in 
processing the rewarding aspects of stimuli (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Schultz et al., 
1997). Notably, recent meta-analyses have underlined the importance of interacting 
networks in the production (Lindquist et al., 2012) and regulation of emotions (Ochsner et 
al., 2012). The evidence suggests that the experience and regulation of emotions emerges 
through the interaction of various nodes that include areas involved in visual perception, 
emotion, as well as executive mechanisms, including dorsolateral PFC (Hariri et al., 2003), 
anterior cingulate cortex (Ochsner et al., 2004; Shackman et al., 2011), and ventrolateral 
PFC (Wager et al., 2008). We therefore conducted functional connectivity analyses to 
investigate the impact of aversive affect on interacting networks involved in trust taking.  
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C.3 Results 
Electrophysiological results 
We scanned 41 volunteers while they made trust decisions during the emotionally aversive 
threat condition and during the emotionally neutral no-threat condition. Emotional arousal 
during the threat and no-threat condition was assessed using galvanic skin conductance 
responses (SCR). Mean SCRs were extracted for 17 one-second time bins following trial 
onset using an approach commonly employed in analyses of fMRI data, as outlined in detail 
in experimental procedures. As illustrated in Figures C-2a and C-2b, mean SCR during both 
trust and non-social control trials were significantly greater during the threat condition 
compared to the no-threat condition. This observation was confirmed by three-way repeated 
measures ANOVA of SCRs with the factors time (0-16 seconds post trial onset), choice 
domain (trust, control), and threat (absent, present). We found significant main effects of 
threat [F(1,39) = 141.3, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.784] and time [F(16,624) = 12.12, p < 0.001, 
η2  =  0.237] and a significant interaction between threat and time [F(16,624) = 99.28, 
p  <  0.001, η2 = 0.718], indicating that the impact of threat relative to no threat on SCR 
differed across time. However, we did not obtain significant interactions between threat and 
choice domain [F(1,39) = 0.006, p = 0.938, η2 < 0.001], and between time and choice 
domain [F(16,624) = 0.905, p = 0.56, η2 = 0.023] indicating that threat had similar impacts 
on SCRs for both the trust and non-social control task. To further specify the effects of 
threat on SCR during trust and control trials, we performed follow-up pairwise comparisons 
at each time point, correcting for multiple comparisons across time-bins. Significantly 
enhanced SCR during threat relative to no threat were observed from 2 until 16 seconds 
post trial onset during trust decisions and from 3 until 16 seconds post trial onset during 
non-social control trials (all t(39) > 3.313, all p < 0.002). Taken together, these results 
indicate significantly greater emotional arousal during the threat condition relative to the 
no-threat condition in both choice domains. 
Manipulation Checks 
The emotional arousal illustrated in Figures C-2a and C-2b was clearly experienced as 
aversive by the subjects. In an open-ended questionnaire administered after scanning, 
95.12% of subjects responded that they experienced aversive emotional arousal during 
threat blocks (Figure S1a). The aversive nature of the threat condition was further 
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confirmed by strong activations of central nodes of the brain’s pain matrix during strong 
compared to weak tactile stimulation (Figure S1b) and by the observation of enhanced 
SCRs following strong tactile stimulation compared to weak tactile stimulation 
(Figure  C-2c). 
The above electrophysiological results, in combination with the self-reported 
emotions and the activation of the brain’s pain matrix during and after the shock, indicate 
that subjects experienced the threat of a shock as an aversive and arousing emotional state. 
This state is clearly unrelated to the monetary outcome of trust- and risk-taking, as it does 
not affect the trustee’s or the computer’s decisions. The next question we addressed is 
whether this incidental emotional state distorts subjects’ behavior relative to the no-threat 
control condition. 
Behavioral results 
To identify whether aversive affect had a significant impact on decision-making, we 
computed mean transfer rates and mean reaction times during trust and non-social control 
trials for each emotional context and submitted these data to a two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the factors choice domain (trust, control) and threat (absent, present). 
Aversive affect significantly reduced transfers during both trust and non-social control trials 
in a similar fashion (Figure C-2d), as indicated by significant main effects of choice domain 
[F(1,40) = 20.319, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.337] and threat [F(1,40) = 17.483, p < 0.001, 
η2  =  0.304] but no interaction [F(1,40) = 0.122, p = 0.7, η2 = 0.003]. Moreover, separate 
pairwise comparisons showed that the threat condition significantly reduced mean transfers 
(Figure C-2d) in the trust game [t(40) = -3.4, p < 0.005, mean transfer difference = -1.1 
CHF] and in the non-social control game [t(40) = -3.16, p < 0.005, mean transfer difference 
= -0.93 CHF]. To exclude the possibility that choices were affected by the actual 
experience of shocks, rather than by the ongoing aversive affective context due to shock 
expectation, we ran several multiple regression analyses (Text S1). The regression results 
(Table S1) show that the behavioral results reported above were indeed due to the aversive 
affective context (p < 0.001) generated by the threat of a shock, rather than reflecting the 
effect of actual shock experience immediately before decisions are taken (p = 0.23). 
Aversive affect also led to faster reaction times during both trust- and non-social 
control trials (Figure C-2e). We obtained significant main effects of choice domain 
[F(1,40)  = 6.226, p = 0.017, η2 = 0.135] and threat [F(1,40) = 17.01, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.298] 
but no interaction [F(1,40) < 0.001, p = 0.993, η2 < 0.001]. The main effect of threat is 
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characterized by significantly faster mean reaction times in the threat relative to the no-
threat condition (Figure C-2e) for both the trust game [t(40) = -3.3, p < 0.005, mean RT 
difference = -0.13 s] and the non-social control task [t(40) = -2.5, p < 0.05, mean RT 
difference = -0.13 s].  
Taken together, these behavioral results indicate that aversive affect significantly 
reduced transfer rates and reaction times in both the trust and the nonsocial control task. 
Notably, the absence of a significant interaction between threat and choice domain for a 
whole range of non-neural measures (transfer rates, response latencies, SCR) indicates that 
the impact of aversive affect during trust and nonsocial control trials is similar across 
multiple measurement modalities, indicating that our non-social condition constitutes a 
well-matched control for the trust game. 
 
Figure C-2: Psychophysiological and behavioral results. Aversive affect (threat condition) significantly 
influences emotional arousal, mean transfer rates, and reaction times. The threat of an aversive tactile 
stimulation leads to a strong increase in skin conductance responses (SCR) in (a) the trust game [main 
effect of threat: F(1,39) = 90.74 , p < 0.0001 , η2 = 0.699] and (b) the non-social control game [main 
effect of threat: F(1,39) = 110.95, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.74]. Note that these increases in SCR’s reflect 
generalized arousal during the decision-period [5.5 sec., shown as yellow background in (a) and (b)] due 
to the threat of strong tactile stimulation and are independent of the shock itself. The SCR effect of the 
shock itself is illustrated in (c), which shows the SCR after an actually experienced strong tactile 
stimulation (red line). The actual experience of a weak tactile stimulation leaves SCR almost unchanged 
(green line). (d) In the threat condition (relative to the no-threat condition) subjects transferred 
significantly less to an anonymous stranger in the trust game [t(40) = -3.4, p < 0.005] and invested less 
C  The neural circuitry of emotion-induced distortions of trust 
139 
into an ambiguous lottery in the non-social control game [t(40) = -3.16, p < 0.005]. These results are 
driven by the emotional arousal induced by the threat of a shock and not by the actual experience of 
shocks shortly before choice (Table S1). (e) In the threat condition (relative to the no-threat condition) 
subjects made their decisions significantly faster in both the trust [t(40) = -3.3, p < 0.005] and the control 
[t(40) = -2.5, p < 0.05] game. *** p < 0.005; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
fMRI results 
The main goal of our fMRI analyses was to identify the neural circuitry underlying affect-
induced distortions of trust decisions. We therefore first examined brain activation in the 
ROIs that we conjectured (see our hypotheses in the introductory section) to be 
preferentially engaged during trust decisions. For all these analyses, we employed small-
volume correction at an FWE-corrected threshold of p < 0.05 in truly independent ROIs 
defined with reverse inference maps from relevant search terms on neurosynth.org (Yarkoni 
et al., 2011) (see experimental procedures). As a first step, our analyses confirmed that 
several of the conjectured regions were indeed specifically involved in decisions during 
trust (vs. non-social control) trials when aversive affect was absent. That is, areas in left TPJ 
(-57, -60, 27; k = 247; red region in Figure C-3a), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (-9, 60, 18; 
k = 39; red region in PFC in Figure C-3a), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (9, 32, -12; 
k  = 89) showed significantly greater activation during decision-making in trust relative to 
control trials in the absence of threat (all activations SV FWE-corrected, see also Table 
S2a). We then examined which of the ROIs showed a breakdown of trust-specific activity 
due to aversive affect by computing the following contrast: 
[(TrustNo threat > TrustThreat) > (NS ControlNo threat > NS ControlThreat)]. A region in left TPJ 
indeed showed a significant interaction effect (-60, -54, 19; k = 95, SV FWE-corrected, 
yellow region in Figure C-3a, see also Table S2b). To further characterize this interaction 
effect we examined post hoc the impact of aversive affect in the trust game separately from 
its impact in the non-social control game: the results of the contrast (No Threat > Threat) 
during trust trials shows a suppression of activation for trust decisions within left TPJ (-58,  
-55, 19; k = 103; SV FWE-corrected, Table S2c). During non-social control decisions on 
the other hand, no voxels in our left TPJ ROI showed greater activity during no threat 
relative to threat, even at a very liberal threshold of p < 0.05, uncorrected (see also Figure 
S2a for additional analyses that underline the strength of the interaction effect in left TPJ). 
These results indicate that the interaction effect is based on a selective interference of 
aversive affect with trust-related activity, but not with activity in the nonsocial control 
condition.  
Given our hypothesis that decisions involving trust rely on neural circuitry that 
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mediates the interplay between social cognition and valuation, we also examined the impact 
of aversive affect in other a-priori regions of interest commonly implicated in reward 
processing (vmPFC and ventral striatum) and emotion processing (bilateral amygdala). 
These results show reductions in trust-related activity due to aversive affect in vmPFC and 
ventral striatum (Table S2c). For completeness, we also conducted a whole brain analysis to 
identify potentially important activations outside our a-priori regions of interest. The whole 
brain analysis shows that in the left superior temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate cortex and 
left inferior parietal lobe (Figure S3 and Table S3) aversive affect suppresses brain activity 
only in the trust game but not in the nonsocial control game. However, in these regions we 
do not find a significant interaction effect in the sense that suppression of activity due to 
aversive affect is significantly stronger in the trust relative to the nonsocial control task.  
The network effects of aversive affect during trust decisions 
Recent studies stress the importance of the interplay between cognitive and emotional 
networks (Lindquist et al., 2012). Therefore, we investigated the effects of aversive affect 
on the connectivity between trust-relevant brain regions with Psychophysiological 
Interaction analyses (McLaren et al., 2012). In view of the key role of the temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ) in perspective taking and mentalizing (Van Overwalle, 2009; Young et al., 
2010), the conjecture that these mental operations are important for trust taking, and our 
finding of enhanced activity in this area in the trust compared to the control task (see 
above), we were particularly interested in how aversive affect changes the functional 
connectivity between the TPJ and emotion processing regions, such as the amygdala. ROI 
analysis of the data during the threat-absent condition confirmed that the connectivity 
between the TPJ and a region in left amygdala (-22, -9, -15; p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected,  
k  = 14) is indeed stronger during decisions in the trust relative to the control task (Table 
S4a). Next, we were interested whether the threat-induced connectivity change is larger in 
the trust condition than in the control condition. For this purpose we conducted an 
independent interaction analysis of the connectivities in the trust and the control condition 
via the contrast: [(TrustNo threat > TrustThreat) > (ControlNo threat > ControlThreat)]. This analysis 
revealed threat-induced aversive affect causes a stronger connectivity change between TPJ 
and a region in the amygdala (-26, 0, -23; p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected, k = 29, Figure C-3c 
shown in red) in the trust game compared to the control task (see Table S4b). We performed 
a post-hoc inspection of the significant interaction in left amygdala by investigating the 
effect of threat on connectivity changes for the trust and the non-social control condition 
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separately. We find that aversive affect disrupted functional connectivity specifically during 
trust (compare red vs green bars in Figure C-3d) but not during non-social control decisions. 
A follow-up contrast of No threat > Threat during trust decision confirmed the suppression 
of TPJ-amygdala connectivity during trust decisions (-28, -6, -14; p < 0.05, SV FWE-
corrected, k = 110, Table S4c). In contrast, during decisions in the non-social control task 
no voxels in our left amygdala ROI showed greater connectivity during no threat relative to 
threat, even at a very liberal threshold of p < 0.05, uncorrected (see also Figure S2b for 
additional analyses that underline the strength of the interaction effect in left amygdala). 
Thus, aversive affect not only affected trust-specific overall activation in the TPJ, but also 
led to trust-specific connectivity changes of this area with the amygdala. 
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Figure C-3: The impact of aversive affect on trust-specific activity and connectivity in the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). (a) Preferential involvement of the left temporoparietal junction (-57, -60, 
27; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, region shown in red, k = 247;) as well as the dorsomedial (-9, 60, 18; 
k  = 39; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, region in PFC shown in red) and ventromedial PFC (9, 32, -12; 
k  =  89; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, not shown) in trust decisions when aversive affect is absent (see 
Table S2a). Importantly, the threat of a shock reduced activation in left TPJ (relative to “no threat”) 
significantly more during the trust game compared to the nonsocial control game (-60, -54, 19; p < 0.05, 
SV FWE corrected, k = 95, see Table S2b). Voxels whose activity reflects this interaction effect are 
shown in yellow. (b) Aversive affect significantly suppresses activity in left TPJ only during decisions in 
the trust game (-58, -55, 19; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, k = 103, Table S2c), but not in the non-social 
(NS) control game. (c) The left amygdala shows both significantly greater connectivity with TPJ during 
trust relative to control when aversive affect is absent (-22, -9, -15; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, k = 14, 
Table S4a) and a significant interaction effect (red, -26, 0, -23; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, k = 29, 
Table S4b). (d) The interaction is characterized by a significant suppression of functional connectivity 
between the left TPJ and left amygdala during decisions in the trust game (-28, -6, -14; p < 0.05, SV 
FWE-corrected, k = 110, Table S4c), while no suppression is observed in the non-social control task. The 
follow-up statistical tests were conducted via simple effects contrasts in neuroimaging space testing 
activation (or connectivity) suppression due to aversive affect during trust and non-social control 
decisions separately. Activation patterns illustrated in the bar charts reflect signal (b) and connectivity (d) 
change within a 6 mm sphere around the interaction peak voxel in left TPJ (b) and left amygdala (d). 
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 The above PPI analyses show the average impact of aversive affect on the 
functional connectivity between TPJ and amygdala. However, as we observed strong 
individual differences in the functional connectivity between TPJ and amygdala on the one 
hand, and in mean transfer levels on the other hand, we next asked the question how 
individual differences in functional TPJ connectivity are related to individuals’ mean 
transfer levels in the absence and the presence of aversive affect. For this purpose, we first 
examined whether in our a priori regions of interest the relationship between mean transfers 
and the functional TPJ connectivity is different in the trust game compared to the control 
game (in the absence of threat). In the conjectured ROIs, only the right amygdala [27, 2, 
 -21, k = 48, Table S5] showed such a pattern. In the next step we therefore conducted an 
exploratory whole-brain analysis that identified an extended network of regions (Figure C-4 
and Table S6a) that showed a difference in the relationship between mean transfers and the 
functional TPJ connectivity across trust and control tasks (in the absence of threat). The 
regions in this network comprised dorsomedial PFC [-3, 18, 55, k = 5069], superior 
temporal sulcus extending into angular gyrus [63,-45,6, k = 1076], bilateral ventrolateral 
PFC [left: -50, 23, -8, k = 695; right: 57, 20, 10, k = 544], intraparietal sulcus [46, -58, 45, 
k  = 532] and dorsolateral PFC [50, 12, 37, k = 1464]. In all these regions we observe a 
positive and significantly stronger correlation between mean transfer levels and functional 
TPJ connectivity in the trust compared to the control task (see Figure C-4 and Table S6a). 
Taken together, the above results therefore confirm the conjecture that there is specific 
functional connectivity between the TPJ and amygdala that relates to behavioral trust and 
that this specific relationship between TPJ connectivity and trust extends to a network 
consisting of STS, dmPFC and bilateral vlPFC.  
How does the relationship between functional connectivity patterns in the trust 
network and behavioral trust-taking change if subjects are exposed to aversive affect? To 
answer this question, we examined whether aversive affect caused significant changes in the 
relationship between TPJ connectivity (with its target regions) and mean trust levels in the 
trust game. This analysis showed that aversive affect caused a general breakdown of the 
association between left TPJ connectivity and mean trust taking in the right posterior 
superior temporal sulcus [64, -43, 4, k = 514, Table S6b]. In particular, there is a 
significantly positive relationship between left TPJ connectivity and mean trust levels 
during the no-threat condition (Figure C-4d, green regression line) that vanishes in the 
presence of threat (Figure C-4d, red regression line). Please note that the region in pSTS 
that is affected in this way by aversive emotions significantly overlaps with the region that 
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shows stronger TPJ connectivity in the trust relative to the control task (region shown in 
yellow in Figure C-4). These results suggest that connectivity between left TPJ and its 
target region in pSTS supports general trust taking when distortionary aversive affect is 
absent. However, in the presence of aversive affect the relationship between the 
connectivity pattern in the trust network and behavioral trust taking reverses. Thus, aversive 
affect not only reduces average trust taking, but it also diminishes specific relationships 
between the connectivity patterns in the trust network and behavioral trust taking. Our 
results therefore suggest that the pSTS is a crucial neural node that mediates the breakdown 
of trust in the presence of threat. 
Figure C-4: Trust-specific functional connectivity (a-c) and threat-induced breakdown of connectivity 
(d) between TPJ and a network of target regions. (a-c) Connectivity between left TPJ and its targets 
(shown in red) is positively associated with trust taking (orange regression lines) during the no-threat 
condition in (a) dorsomedial PFC [-3, 18, 55, k = 5069], (b) posterior superior temporal sulcus [63, -45,6, 
k = 1076], (c) bilateral ventrolateral PFC [left: -50, 23, -8, k = 695; right: 57, 20, 10, k = 544]. In contrast, 
mean transfers (i.e. investments) during the non-social (NS) control task (blue regression lines) are 
associated with reduced connectivity strength between TPJ and these regions. In all cases (a-c), the 
correlation between mean transfer and connectivity strength is stronger in the trust game compared to the 
non-social control task (whole brain analysis, p < 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level, see Table S6a). 
The intraparietal sulcus [46, -58, 45, k = 532] and dorsolateral PFC [50, 12, 37, k = 1464] show a similar 
pattern (see Table S6a) but are not shown in the figure. (d) Aversive affect causes a breakdown of the 
association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and mean trust. The correlation between mean trust levels 
and TPJ-pSTS connectivity is stronger in the no threat compared to the threat condition [yellow region, 
64, -43, 4; k = 514; whole brain analysis, p < 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level, see Table S6b]. 
Specifically, there is a positive association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and the mean trust level when 
distortionary aversive affect is absent (green regression line), which is eliminated by threat (red regression 
line). This suggests that connectivity between TPJ and its target region in pSTS supports general trust 
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taking only in the absence of threat. The regression lines in (a-d) predict functional connectivity strength 
as a function of mean transfer levels based on an extended OLS model that estimates both the slope of the 
relationship between mean transfers and functional connectivity in the non-social control task and the 
increase in this relationship in the trust task (relative to the non-social control task). For this purpose we 
extracted the data from 6 mm spheres around interaction peak voxels (see experimental procedures). 
Confidence bounds around regression lines reflect 95% confidence intervals around the model fit. 
The impact of aversive affect on domain-general neural circuitry 
The previous analyses indicate that aversive affect had distinct effects on neural processes 
devoted to decision-making in the trust task relative to the non-social control task. Given 
the similar behavioral impact of aversive affect on trust and control decisions, we further 
addressed whether there are any domain-general effects of aversive affect on the neural 
correlates of decision-making that are independent of choice-domain. We identified a 
domain-general network of regions that show suppression and enhancement in choice-
related neural activity during both the trust and the control task (Table S7). We observed the 
suppression of neural activity in the threat condition (red time course, Figure S4) relative to 
the no threat condition (green time course, Figure S4) in bilateral posterior dlPFC [left: -62, 
-4, 18, k = 1901 and right: 62, -6, 28, k = 1010], left amygdala [-24, -15, -23, k = 552], 
posterior paracentral lobule [4 -36, 69, k = 887], and a large cluster (k = 4082) that includes 
left vlPFC [-48, 41, -8] and vmPFC [-10, 44, -8]. Significant enhancement of activity during 
decision-making under aversive affect was obtained in the thalamus [18, -6, 1, k = 559] and 
cerebellum [-4, -46, -24, k = 849]. Together, these results identify a network of domain-
general regions, whose decision-related activity is significantly impacted by incidental 
aversive affect. 
C.4 Discussion 
Incidental affect is a ubiquitous phenomenon that pervades many aspects of human 
behavior and human social interaction. However, despite its importance our knowledge 
about the behavioral and neural effects of incidental affect is still rather limited. In this 
paper, we investigated the behavioral and neural impact of incidental affect on trust 
decisions. We employed a novel experimental technique to establish aversive affect by 
inducing a prolonged expectation for unpredictable and aversive tactile stimulation 
embedded within a hybrid fMRI design. The threat of painful tactile stimulation 
significantly increased autonomic arousal during both social and non-social decision-
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making and was associated with consistent self-reports of the experience of aversive affect. 
Behaviorally, we observed that aversive affect significantly reduced transfer rates to 
partners in a trust game, indicating a significant reduction in participants’ willingness to 
trust a stranger. Importantly, despite the fact that aversive affect was incidental to the 
decisions made by subjects, we observed significant behavioral, autonomic and neural 
effects of the aversive affective state. The behavioral impact of aversive affect contradicts 
economic models of choice (Loewenstein, 2000) and underlines the importance of emotions 
in decision-making, even when they are unrelated to the choice outcomes. 
Our neuroimaging results provide information about the neural mechanisms behind 
the suppression of participants’ propensity to trust. Several regions such as the 
temporoparietal junction, dorsomedial (dmPFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) were preferentially engaged during trust decisions, and aversive affect led to a 
trust-specific breakdown of this activation pattern (Figures C-3a-b) in the left 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Moreover, in the absence of aversive affect, we observed 
significant connectivity between TPJ and amygdala during trust taking, but this connectivity 
was completely disrupted during aversive affect (Figures C-3c-d). Aversive affect also 
disrupted the relation between the connectivity patterns in the neural network underlying 
trust and behavioral levels of trust taking. In particular, functional connectivity strength 
with the TPJ predicted mean trust levels for a network of regions consisting of amygdala, 
dorsomedial PFC, superior temporal sulcus, as well as ventrolateral and dorsolateral PFC 
(Tables S5 and S6, Figures C-4a-c). Aversive affect caused a specific breakdown of this 
association for the posterior STS, such that the connectivity between left TPJ and right 
pSTS no longer predicted overall trust taking (Figure C-4d). Our results therefore identify a 
network of interconnected regions consisting of left TPJ, amygdala and right pSTS, whose 
connectivity patterns during trust taking are significantly impacted by aversive affect. These 
results provide potentially important insights into the neural circuitry that enables people to 
trust, and they may, therefore, generalize to many social situations that require trust. Given 
that psychiatric diseases, such as pathological anxiety, social phobia or depression, are 
characterized by a particularly pronounced susceptibility to negative affect, our results may 
also be useful in understanding the neural circuitry associated with affect-related distortions 
of social behavior in psychiatric diseases.  
The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) has repeatedly been implicated in representing 
and interpreting others’ mental states and behaviors (Behrens et al., 2009; Morishima et al., 
2012; Young et al., 2010). During trust taking, humans have to form expectations about 
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their partners’ responses to their trust, which critically involves their mentalizing faculties. 
Our results suggest that enhanced connectivity between TPJ and regions important for 
social cognition (dorsomedial PFC, superior temporal sulcus), emotion processing 
(amygdala) and cognitive control (vlPFC, dlPFC) supports individuals’ trust taking. 
Aversive affect suppresses these neural mechanisms by (1) reducing the activation level in 
TPJ, (2) by disrupting the association between TPJ connectivity and mean trust taking, as 
well as (3) by reducing the connectivity between TPJ and amygdala. Together, these results 
suggest that aversive affect weakens neural mechanisms important for representational 
capacities in the social domain, as well as the transfer of these representations to emotion 
and cognitive control regions during decision-making, thereby leading to a decrease in trust 
taking. 
In conclusion, we report results that show a strong behavioral impact of incidental 
emotions on social (trust) and non-social (control) decision-making and we identify the 
neural mechanisms associated with the impact of aversive affect on trust taking. These 
effects were observed even though induced emotions were unrelated to the choice outcomes 
in our task, confirming that incidental emotions can have a powerful impact on behavior 
and its underlying mental operations. Our findings inform the development of economic and 
social theory and call for the integration of incidental affect in behavioral models of social 
and non-social decision-making. In addition, by identifying the specific distortions of the 
neural circuitry supporting trust taking, we provide a first step towards neural models that 
help us better understand such distortions. In particular, our results support the notion that 
an important mechanism through which aversive incidental affect impacts social decision-
making is the suppression of activity and connectivity between regions known to be crucial 
for social cognition, such as the temporoparietal junction, superior temporal sulcus and 
amygdala. We therefore tentatively suggest that one potential effect of aversive emotions 
may be a reduced ability to consider the consequences of one’s actions for others or on 
other’s behavior. Such enhanced self-orientation during heightened aversive emotional 
arousal, such as anger or the threat of negative outcomes, has perhaps an evolutionary 
origin that may have served survival during social conflict situations. In the context of the 
modern world, however, such emotional reactions can cloud our judgments and thereby 
lead to maladaptive behaviors. 
C  The neural circuitry of emotion-induced distortions of trust 
148 
C.5 Experimental procedures 
Participants  
41 right-handed volunteers (mean age (std.) = 22 (2.145), 17 females) from various 
Universities in Zurich participated in the current experiment. Participants gave written 
informed consent to procedures approved by the local ethics committee (Zurich, 
Switzerland) before participating in the study. Subjects were right-handed as assessed by 
the Edinburgh handedness questionnaire and did not report any history of psychological 
illness or neurological disorders, as assessed by a standard screening form.  
Prescanning procedure 
Particular care was taken to ensure that subjects understood all aspects of the experiment. 
To this end, subjects were instructed to carefully read detailed instructions and were 
required to fill out an extensive questionnaire probing their understanding of the 
experimental procedures. The accuracy of each subject’s answers was confirmed by the 
experimenters and discussed in a brief interview that lasted for ca. 10 minutes. Subjects 
were then placed inside the scanner for a brief practice session consisting of 12 trials to 
ensure that they could view all stimuli, perform the task, make decisions in the allotted 5.5 
seconds per trial, understood the experimental setup and to give subjects the opportunity to 
ask further questions.  
After completion of practice, subjects were taken out of the scanner and washed 
their hands before placement of SCR and stimulation electrodes. Subjects were then placed 
inside the scanner and two ring electrodes were attached to the dorsum of the left hand: (1) 
the electrode providing relatively higher intensity stimulation was placed between one to 
two cm below the second carpometacarpal joint, and (2) the electrode providing relatively 
lower intensity stimulation was placed one to two cm below the fifth carpometacarpal joint. 
To determine individual thresholds for high-intensity and low-intensity stimulation, we 
followed a standard procedure (Brooks et al., 2010; Singer et al., 2006) and employed a 
visual analog rating scale (VAS) with endpoints defined as 0 = ‘cannot feel anything’ and 
10 = ‘maximum tolerable pain’. Tactile stimulation was delivered via two Digitimer DS5 
isolated bipolar constant current stimulators (bipolar constant current, 5V, 50mA, Digitimer 
Ltd, Welwyn Garden City, UK) and a custom-made fMRI compatible 5-mm ring electrode, 
which delivered a maximally focused and centered tactile stimulus. By varying current 
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amplitude between 1 and 99 % of maximum amperage, stimuli with varying intensity levels 
were repeatedly delivered to each participant until stable ratings were achieved at least three 
times according to the following criteria: between 1 and 2 for the low intensity stimulus, 
and between 8 and 9 for the high intensity stimulus. Visual and tactile stimulus 
presentations, as well as recording of responses, were controlled by Cogent2000 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). 
Task 
To investigate the effect of incidental affect on trust-taking, we employed a hybrid fMRI 
design, in which aversive affect was manipulated in a blocked fashion while social (trust) 
and non-social (control) tasks were presented in an event-related fashion. Specifically, we 
varied aversive affect by creating an expectancy of weak or strong unpredictable electrical 
stimulation that could occur at any time for the duration of an entire block. This expectancy 
was created by means of a block cue presented at the beginning of each block that informed 
participants about the game type (trust or control game) and the intensity of stimulation 
(weak or strong) for the current block (Figure C-1). Stimulation intensity was 
communicated to subjects in three ways: (1) via a verbal cue embedded in the 750-ms block 
cue “strong” for treatment (“threat” condition), “weak” for control (“no-threat” condition); 
(2) via a tactile reminder cue presented 700 ms after visual cue onset that reflected the exact 
stimulation intensity of the current block; (3) via a specific background color that was 
consistently associated with either threat or no-threat blocks for each subject (color was 
counterbalanced across subjects) and remained constant for the duration of a block. The 
number and time points of electrical stimulation events throughout the blocks were 
determined to be completely unpredictable to subjects, in order to augment the efficacy of 
the threat-of-shock treatment. For this purpose, the number of stimulation events was 
determined for each block by random draw from a gamma distribution (shape parameter = 
1; scale parameter = 1). The exact timing of these stimulation events was then determined at 
random time points between the offset of the cue display and onset of the resting screen 
drawing from a uniform distribution, with the constraint that at least 0.2 s separated 
successive electrical shocks. 
Each block commenced with the set of cues described above that indicated the type 
of decision to be made (non-social control or trust) and the level of stimulation (weak, 
strong) to be expected by subjects for the rest of the block. After a brief and jittered 
interstimulus interval of 3-9 seconds, the first trial was displayed. In both the trust and the 
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control game, subjects were presented with a multiple-choice scenario, in which one of five 
amounts between 0 and 24 Swiss Francs (CHF) could be transferred to Player B or invested 
in a lottery. While subjects always had the options to either invest all (24 CHF) or none (0 
CHF) of their endowment, each trial presented a novel choice scenario by (1) varying the 
intermediate options between 4, 6, or 8 CHF in the low category, 10, 12, or 14 CHF in the 
medium category, and 16, 18, or 20 in the high category of intermediate transfer amounts; 
(2) varying the location of each choice option and (3) varying the location of the originally 
highlighted choice option. This variability was introduced in order to ensure that subjects 
paid attention to all choice options on every trial and to avoid excessive use of heuristics. 
Intermediate amounts, location of choice options and location of the initially highlighted 
choice option were fully counterbalanced across conditions. Subjects selected their 
preferred option by moving a yellow dot that highlighted the currently selected choice 
option up and down by pressing two dedicated buttons on a standard MR-compatible 4-
button response box and confirming their choice by pressing a third button. At this point the 
selected choice option was highlighted in red for the remaining duration of a trial. After a 
jittered intertrial interval (3-9 seconds) a new trial began.  
Payment determination 
We collected trustee responses in separate behavioral sessions that were conducted prior to 
the fMRI experiment using the same trust game. We elicited the trustees’ choices with the 
strategy method, i.e. the trustees indicated their responses to each feasible transfer level. 
The trustees gave written and informed consent that we could use their strategies in follow-
up experiments. In the fMRI part of our experiment the subjects (investors) thus played 
against the pre-recorded strategies of the trustees, i.e. a subject’s transfer level together with 
the strategy of the (randomly) matched trustee determined the final monetary outcome in a 
trust game trial. Given the absence of the trustee on the scanning day, we informed 
participants that they were interacting with trustees in a temporally delayed fashion. 
Specifically, we emphasized to subjects that their payoffs were determined by decisions of 
real persons in the trust game, and by a computer algorithm in the control game, and that 
they were assigned different real persons across trust game trials. Finally, to maintain the 
interactive nature of the trust game, we informed our subjects that their choices had real, but 
delayed, consequences for trustees, who were sent additional payments according to the 
decisions made by the investor in the scanner after completion of the experiment. During 
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the experiment, the subjects did not receive any feedback about the behavior of their 
matched trustees, or the payoff amounts from lottery investments. 
After completion of the fMRI part of the experiment, the subjects selected two trials 
at random by dice throw and payment was determined according to the decisions made by 
the subject and the trustee on the selected trials. In order to avoid hedging, both payout 
trials were drawn from the entire experiment, i.e. the payout trials were not specific to a 
condition, such as the trust or control game. If a trust game was randomly chosen for payout 
determination, the investor’s payout was determined based on the amount transferred to the 
trustee and the backtransfer amount of the specific trustee the investor was paired with on 
that trial (payout investor = 24 - transfer to trustee + backtransfer from trustee; payout 
trustee = 24 + transfer from investor * 3 - backtransfer to investor). If a control game was 
randomly chosen, the computer algorithm randomly drew a payout amount from the 
distribution of trustees’ backtransfer amounts. Our procedure therefore created equivalent 
payout amounts and likelihoods for the trust and control game. 
Exit questionnaire 
After completion of the experiment, subjects filled out an exit questionnaire that probed 
their beliefs about the accuracy of our instructions, as well as emotional reactions to our 
experimental manipulations. The main goal of the exit questionnaire was to measure 
whether subjects believed our instructions. Note that we implement such measurements 
routinely although we have little reason to believe that subjects doubt our instructions. Our 
laboratory uses deception only as a very rare exception, and we also did not use any 
deception in this experiment and fully disclosed all information truthfully to the subjects. 
Subjects were asked to rate 7 statements on a scale from 0, indicating very unbelievable, to 
4, indicating very believable. The statements declared that the trust games were played with 
real persons, that each trust game was played with an anonymous trustee, that decisions of 
trustees were made by actual persons, and that trustees will receive additional payments 
based on the decisions of subjects on the relevant trial. Subjects’ responses were entered 
into one-sample t-tests testing whether responses were significantly greater than the mid-
point of the scale (2, indicating neither believable nor unbelievable). Mean ratings for all 
statements were significantly greater than two, indicating that subjects believed the 
statements (all t-tests survive the Bonferroni-corrected threshold of 0.007; average rating 
(SD) over all statements is 3.37 (0.86). 
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Skin conductance responses (SCRs) 
Skin conductance responses were collected using a PowerLab 4/25T amplifier with a GSR 
Amp (ML116) unit and a pair of MR-compatible finger electrodes (MLT117F), which were 
attached to the participants' left middle and ring finger via dedicated Velcro straps after 
application of conductance gel. Subjects’ hands had been washed using soap without 
detergents before the experiment. Stable recordings were ensured before starting the main 
experiment by waiting for signal stabilization during training and stimulation intensity 
calibration. LabChart (v. 5.5) software was used for recordings, with the recording range set 
to 40 µS and using initial baseline correction (“subject zeroing”) to subtract the participant's 
absolute level of electrodermal activity from all recordings (all specs for devices and 
electrodes from ADInstruments Inc., Sydney, Australia). 
Due to technical problems, data from 4 subjects included 1 run (out of 2) and data from 1 
subject was lost. Each participant’s SCR data were initially smoothed with a running 
average over 500 samples (equivalent to 500 ms at a sampling rate of 1KHz) to reduce 
scanner-induced noise. Data were then resampled from 1KHz to 1Hz and subsequently z-
transformed. Statistical analysis of the pre-processed skin conductance data followed the 
approach commonly employed in analyses of fMRI data. Specifically, multiple linear 
regression implemented in AFNI was used to estimate SCR during decisions made in each 
of the task conditions, that is, during trust and non-social control tasks and in the context of 
threat and no-threat treatment blocks. The statistical model included a total of 7 regressors 
that reflected the onset times of decision screens in trust and non-social control trials under 
expectancy of strong and weak electrical shocks, cue times indicating the onset of a block, 
as well as delivery times of strong and weak tactile stimulation. To avoid making 
assumptions about the shape of the SCR response, a finite impulse response (FIR) model 
was used to estimate average responses (beta weights) during each trial type via 
deconvolution from event onset to 16s post onset using 17 cubic spline basis functions. 
Constant, linear and quadratic terms were included as regressors of no interest for each run 
separately to model baseline drifts of the SCR. Regressor estimates (beta weights) at each 
time point and for each condition were then used in follow-up analyses reported in the 
Results section. 
fMRI data acquisition 
Magnetic resonance images were collected using a 3T Philips Intera whole-body magnetic 
resonance scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-
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channel Philips sensitivity-encoded (SENSE) head coil. Structural image acquisition 
consisted of 180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75-mm slice thickness). For functional 
imaging, a total of 1095 volumes were obtained using a SENSE T2*-weighted echo-planar 
imaging sequence (Pruessmann et al., 1999) with an acceleration factor of 2.0. We acquired 
45 axial slices covering the whole brain with a slice thickness of 2.8 mm (inter-slice gap of 
0.8 mm, sequential acquisition, repetition time = 2470 ms, echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 
82°, field of view = 192 mm, matrix size = 68 × 68). To optimize functional sensitivity in 
orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes, we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique 
orientation at 15° relative to the AC-PC line. 
fMRI data analysis 
Preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department 
of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). To correct for head motion, all functional volumes 
were realigned to the first volume using septic b-spline interpolation and subsequently 
unwarped to remove residual movement-related variance due to susceptibility-by-
movement interactions. Slice timing correction was performed after realignment/unwarping. 
To improve coregistration, bias-corrected anatomical and mean EPI images were created 
and subsequently coregistered using the new segment toolbox in SPM. Images were 
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute T1 template using the parameters 
(forward deformation fields) derived from the nonlinear normalization of individual gray 
matter tissue probability maps. Finally, functional data underwent spatial smoothing using 
an isotropic 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.  
Statistical analyses were carried out using the general linear model. Regressors of 
interest were modeled using a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) with time 
and dispersion derivatives in order to account for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel 
variation in response peak and dispersion (Henson et al., 2002). Since our main interest was 
the impact of aversive affect on trust-taking, we modeled the decision period for the full 
response time on each trial, that is from the onset of the decision screen until subjects 
pressed the confirm button. This was done in the following four conditions: (1) trust game 
during relatively high-intensity stimulation expectancy (threat condition), (2) trust game 
during relatively low-intensity stimulation expectancy (no-threat condition), (3) control 
game during relatively high-intensity stimulation expectancy (threat condition) and (4) 
control game during relatively low-intensity stimulation expectancy (no-threat condition). 
Finally, the following regressors of no interest were included in our model: the actually 
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realized weak and strong tactile stimulations during a block (one reminder shock and, on 
average, one additional shock randomly drawn from a gamma distribution were 
administered per block), block cues indicating game type (trust, control) and stimulation 
intensity of the reminder shock (weak, strong) at the beginning of each block, as well as 
omissions of behavioral responses during a trial.  
The main goal of the current investigation was to identify the impact of aversive 
affect on the neural correlates of trust decisions. Trust-specific neural effects of aversive 
affect can be identified via an interaction between threat and choice domain, in which threat 
significantly alters the neural correlates of decision-making in trust relative to non-social 
control trials. To investigate the interaction between threat and choice domain, an ANOVA 
was computed by entering contrast estimates obtained from first level models into a flexible 
factorial model with the factors choice domain (trust, control), threat (absent, present), as 
well as subject. We were particularly interested in trust-specific affect-induced suppression 
of activity and connectivity, which we tested via the interaction contrast  
(TrustNo threat > TrustThreat) > (NS ControlNo threat > NS ControlThreat) in the context of the 
flexible factorial design. A covariate reflective of each subject’s mean transfer in each 
condition was also included to probe for brain-behavior correlations. All analyses were also 
conducted without the behavioral covariate and results did not change.  
We expected regions commonly implicated in the major cognitive and affective 
component processes of trust taking to be affected by aversive affect. ROI analyses in 
relevant cortical regions were conducted using small volume correction with masks created 
via relevant search terms on neurosynth.org (Yarkoni et al., 2011). Neurosynth.org offers a 
means to obtain automated meta-analyses over a large number of prior fMRI investigations 
and thereby provides an independent method to obtain masks for ROI analyses. Our 
hypothesized component processes implicate the following regions in processing specific 
aspects of decision-making: 1. Evaluating the anticipated outcomes of choice options, 
which involves regions commonly implicated in reward processing and valuation, such as 
ventral striatum and vmPFC (Levy and Glimcher, 2012) (neurosynth search: “reward”),  
2. Assessing the trustworthiness of the trustee to make predictions about payout probability 
in the trust game, which involves regions commonly implicated in theory of mind and social 
cognition, such as TPJ and dmPFC (Van Overwalle, 2009) (neurosynth search: “theory of 
mind”), and 3. Regions implicated in emotion processing, such as the amygdala (Lindquist 
et al., 2012) (neurosynth search: “emotion”). We entered the search terms specified above 
into neurosynth to extract cortical ROI masks. ROI analyses in anatomically well-defined 
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subcortical regions, such as the amygdala, as well as the caudate head and putamen in 
ventral striatum were conducted using anatomical masks created via the AAL atlas 
implemented in WFU Pickatlas. Taken together, we employed the following masks in 
region of interest analyses: (1) bilateral temporoparietal junction (neurosynth: theory of 
mind), with peak voxels in left (-60,-56,14) and right TPJ (56,-58,20) and sizes of 1031 and 
1416 voxels, respectively; (2) bilateral amygdala (AAL) with sizes of 439 (left) and 492 
(right) voxels; (3) bilateral ventral striatum (combined mask of AAL putamen and caudate 
up to z = 8), with sizes of 3239 (left) and 3429 (right) voxels, respectively; (4) dorsomedial 
PFC (neurosynth search term: theory of mind), with a peak voxel in medial dmPFC (-2, 28, 
62) and a size of 3175 voxels; (5) ventromedial PFC (neurosynth search term: 
ventromedial) with a peak voxel in medial vmPFC (8, 24, -12), with a size of 1327 voxels. 
For the analysis of trust decisions, we employed a combination of valuation- (vmPFC, 
vStr), social cognition- (TPJ, dmPFC) and emotion- (amygdala) related ROIs. 
Furthermore, to identify whether extended networks outside our regions of interest 
show effects of interest, we conducted whole brain analyses at an FWE-corrected extent 
threshold of p < 0.05 (k > 499, initial cluster-forming height threshold p < 0.005). Finally, 
to characterize activation patterns of interest, such as time courses and activation 
differences due to aversive affect, regression coefficients (beta weights) for the canonical 
HRF regressors were extracted with rfxplot (Gläscher, 2009) from a 6 mm sphere around 
the peak voxel that showed significant effects of interest on BOLD responses and functional 
connectivity. Follow-up tests that characterize the single components of significant 
interaction effects were conducted in neuroimaging space via tests of simple effects of 
interest. 
PPI analyses 
Psychophysiological Interaction analyses were conducted using the generalized form of 
context-dependent psychophysiological interactions toolbox (gPPI toolbox; McLaren et al., 
2012), using the same statistical model as outlined above. All voxels that survived SV 
FWE-correction for the interaction contrast in left TPJ (-60, -54, 19, k=95) were used as 
seed region (shown in blue color in Figure C-3c). To obtain an estimate of neural activity 
within the seed region, the BOLD signal from the seed region was extracted, the signal was 
corrected by removing effects of noise covariates and the corrected signal was deconvolved 
(Gitelman et al., 2003). Psychological interaction regressors for each of the task type and 
stimulation intensity combinations control decisions during (1) weak and (2) strong 
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stimulation, trust decisions during (3) weak and (4) strong stimulation were created by 
multiplying the estimated neural activity during the relevant decisions with condition-
specific on- and offset times convolved with the canonical HRF. A new GLM was then 
estimated for each subject that consisted of the original design matrix with the addition of 
the four psychological interaction regressors and the time course from the seed region. To 
investigate the impact of aversive affect on trust-specific functional connectivity with 
relevant seed regions, we probed the functional connectivity data for an interaction between 
threat and choice domain. To investigate the interaction between threat and choice domain, 
an ANOVA was computed by entering contrast estimates obtained from first level models 
into a flexible factorial model with the factors choice domain (trust, non-social control), 
threat (absent, present), as well as subject. To investigate trust-specific brain-behavior 
correlations due to threat, we estimated two additional flexible factorial models with (a) the 
factor choice domain and (b) the factor threat and (c) importantly, separate covariates 
reflecting mean transfer in each condition that were interacted with the factor of interest 
(choice domain, or threat). A subject factor was included in all models. Given that we were 
particularly interested in trust-specific changes in functional connectivity, we first 
contrasted the covariate reflecting mean trust to that for mean transfer in the non-social 
control task. In the context of our model, a significant result for a region indicates a 
difference between the trust and the control task in the (linear) relationship between the 
functional connectivity with the TPJ and mean transfer levels. In Figure C-4 we illustrate 
these results by extracting regression coefficients reflecting functional connectivity strength 
in each of the conditions from 6-mm spheres around interaction peak voxels and performing 
the following equivalent regression analysis: 
yik = β0 + β1 Transferik + β2 Choice Domaink + β3 (Transferik * Choice Domaink) + εik 
where the dependent variable yik is the functional connectivity strength observed within a 
given brain region for individual i in Choice Domain k. Transferik is the mean amount sent 
by individual i in Choice Domain k and Choice Domain is a dummy variable encoding 
whether decisions were made in the trust or the control task (1 indicates trust, 0 indicates 
control task). In this regression, the coefficient for Transferik measures the slope of the 
relationship between TPJ connectivity and mean transfers in the control task (see blue lines 
in Figures C-4a – c), and the sum of the coefficients for Transferik and the interaction term 
(Transferik  * Choice Domaink) measures the slope of the relationship between TPJ 
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connectivity and mean transfers in the trust task (see orange lines in Figures C-4a – c). 
Equivalent analyses were performed to probe for significant differences between the threat 
and the no-threat condition in the trust game in the (linear) relationship between functional 
TPJ connectivity and mean transfer levels. 
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C.7 Supplemental information 
Supplementary Figures 1-4 
a b 
  
Figure S1: Manipulation checks (related to Figure C-2). (a) Self-reported experience of emotion during 
threat blocks. Venn diagram illustrating proportions and overlap between self-reported emotional 
reactions to painful tactile stimulation, in which subjects were able to report multiple emotions. We asked 
subjects to report how they felt during threat blocks in an open-ended exit questionnaire. 95.12% of 
subjects indicated that they experienced aversive emotional arousal during pain blocks, such as tenseness 
and/or anger and/or sadness. To illustrate the frequency of emotional reactions to painful tactile 
stimulation, subjects’ answers were binned into three emotion categories that best summarize their 
emotional responses: angry and annoyed responses were grouped into the “Angry” category (25), tense, 
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stressed and surprised responses were grouped into the “Tense” category (27), and scared, nervous, 
helpless, and sad responses were grouped into the “Anxious” category (11). Most subjects reported angry 
(61%) and tense (66%) emotions while a minority also felt anxious (27%). Of note, due to the open-ended 
nature of the questions, subjects were able to indicate more than one emotional reaction, as illustrated by 
the overlap between different sets in the Venn diagram. (b) Administration of painful compared to just-
noticeable tactile stimulation led to increased activity within key regions of the pain matrix, including 
primary (SI) and secondary (SII) somatosensory cortex, anterior (Ant) and posterior (Post) insula, as well 
as mid cingulate cortex (Cing). The contrast images reflect activation at the time of strong vs. weak tactile 
stimulation and are thresholded at p < 0.05 FWE-corrected at the cluster level (with a cluster-forming 
voxel-level threshold of p < 0.001). 
 
Figure S2: Additional post-hoc inspection of the significant interactions reported in the main paper 
within all voxels of independent TPJ and amygdala masks (related to Figure C-3). To characterize the 
interaction patterns reported in the main paper, we extracted subject-specific regression coefficients (beta 
weights) from all voxels within the entire left TPJ (k = 1031) and amygdala (k = 439) masks and 
performed post-hoc statistical analyses in independent ROIs. (a) Post-hoc pairwise comparisons in the 
TPJ ROI revealed significantly greater choice-related activation during no-threat relative to threat when 
subjects made decisions in the trust task [t(40) = 2.769, p = 0.0085], but not when they made decisions in 
the control task [t(40) = -0.167, p = 0.8682]. (b) Post-hoc pairwise comparisons in the amygdala ROI 
revealed significantly greater choice-related activation during no-threat relative to threat when subjects 
made decisions in the trust task [t(40) = 2.097, p = 0.0424], but not when they made decisions in the 
control task [t(40) = -0.812, p = 0.4216]. These results confirm that the presence of aversive affect during 
trust decisions led to a significant suppression of (a) TPJ activity and (b) TPJ-amygdala connectivity 
relative to the presence of aversive affect. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; n.s.: not significant 
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Figure S3: The impact of aversive affect during trust trials in those regions that remain after we remove 
regions that show a domain-general effect of threat (related to Figure C-3). Regions that showed a domain 
general effect were removed via an exclusive mask identified by the main effect of threat. ROI analyses 
(Supplementary Table 4) show that aversive affect causes a significant deactivation in vmPFC (8, 30, -11, 
k = 72), and ventral striatum (-3, 3, -6, k = 40). Whole-brain analysis at cluster-level FWE-correction 
investigated whether an extended network outside our a-priori regions of interest shows a specific impact 
of aversive affect on the neural correlates of trust decisions. This additional analysis (Supplementary 
Table 5) revealed that the threat condition caused a reduction of activations relative to no-threat in (a) 
posterior cingulate cortex [-6, -46, 7, k = 859] and (b) left superior temporal sulcus [-63, -25, 4, 
k  =  1322], and in left inferior parietal lobe [-52, -60, 45, k = 691] which is not shown in Supplementary 
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Figure 4. Time courses in (a) and (b) illustrate a significant suppression due to aversive affect during trust 
decisions (green > red), but not during the control task (aquatic green = orange). 
                                                                                                                                               
Figure S4: The impact of aversive affect on choice-domain independent neural correlates of decision-
making. A domain-general network consisting of bilateral posterior dlPFC [(a) left: -62, -4, 18, k = 1901 
and (d) right: 62, -6, 28, k = 1010], left amygdala [(c) -24, -15, -23, k = 552], posterior paracentral lobule 
[not shown, 4 -36, 69, k = 887], and a large cluster in ventral anterior prefrontal cortex (k = 4082) that 
includes left vlPFC [(b) -48, 41, -8] and vmPFC [(e) -10, 44, -8], shows significant threat-related 
reduction (no threat > threat, regions shown in green) in choice-related activity during both trust and non-
social control trials. Significant threat-related enhancement of activity (threat > no threat, regions shown 
in red) during the decision phase was obtained in the thalamus [(f), 18, -6, 1, k = 559] and cerebellum [not 
shown, -4, -46, -24, k = 849]. Time courses illustrate similar suppressions (a – e) and enhancements (f) 
due to the aversive affect during decisions in trust and non-social control trials. Time courses are shown 
for both trust (left, threat shown in red, no threat shown in green) and control (right, threat shown in 
orange, no threat shown in aqua green) trials in separate graphs and were extracted from 6 mm spheres 
around peak voxels. The 5.5-second choice period is displayed in yellow.  
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Supplemental Tables 1-7 
Table S1: OLS Regression results reflecting the influence of experienced electrical stimulation on choice 
behavior (related to Figure C-2d, see text S1 for more information on statistics employed) 
Dependent Variable: Amount Transferred     
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Threat -0.821 **** -0.928 **** -0.866 **** 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.255) 
 
(0.217)  
Unpredictable S 0.627 
 
0.640 
 
  
 
(0.519) 
 
(0.507) 
 
  
Threat x Unpredictable S -0.528 
 
-0.550 
 
  
 
(0.710) 
 
(0.714) 
 
  
Choice Domain 2.825 **** 2.827 **** 2.715 **** 
 
(0.589) 
 
(0.590) 
 
(0.589)  
Choice Domain x Unpredictable S -0.935 
 
-0.879 
 
  
 
(0.702) 
 
(0.661) 
 
  
Threat x Choice Domain x Unpredictable S 0.536 
 
0.424 
 
  
 
(0.945) 
 
(0.917) 
 
  
Predictable S 0.243 
   
0.359  
 
(0.489) 
   
(0.486)  
Threat x Predictable S -0.488 
   
-0.614  
 
(0.687) 
   
(0.687)  
Choice Domain x Predictable S 0.256 
   
0.084  
 
(0.588) 
   
(0.570)  
Threat x Choice Domain x Predictable S -0.498 
   
-0.325  
 
(0.841) 
   
(0.813)  
Gender 1.265 
 
1.264 
 
1.266  
 
(1.372) 
 
(1.372) 
 
(1.372)  
Age 0.264 
 
0.264 
 
0.264  
 
(0.330) 
 
(0.330) 
 
(0.330)  
(Intercept) 12.244 **** 12.298 **** 12.326 **** 
 
(0.911) 
 
(0.915) 
 
(0.928)  
       
F 18.67 
 
27.82 
 
27.8  
P <0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001  
N 3437 
 
3437 
 
3437  
Corrected AIC 22717 
 
22711 
 
22711  
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the 
individual level in parentheses). The dependent variable in both columns is the amount invested in either 
Player B or the lottery. Column (1) contains the results from the full regression that includes both 
predictable shocks (i.e., reminder shocks) and unpredictable shocks and all interactions, while columns 
(2) and (3) reflect results from reduced models that exclude the influence of predictable (2) and 
unpredictable (3) shocks. “Threat” is a dummy variable reflecting the expectation of impending painful 
electric shock during the current choice scenario. “Choice Domain” is a dummy variable that indicates 
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trust trials. “Unpredictable S” and “Predictable S” are dummy variables encoding the experience of at 
least one unpredictable and, respectively, predictable shock in the interval from 5 seconds prior to the 
display of the choice screen until button press. We also investigated shorter and longer intervals from 1 to 
10 seconds prior to the choice scenario in 1-second steps and in all cases only Threat and Choice Domain 
reach statistical significance. “Age” is the mean-centered individual’s age in years, and “Gender” is a 
gender dummy encoding the influence of being male on transfer rates. The number of observations is less 
than the total number of choice scenarios (3444) due to omissions (response times > 5.5 seconds). 
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.005, **** p < 0.001 
Table S2: Regions of interest analyses investigating trust-specific neural correlates in regions associated 
with social cognition and valuation (related to Figure C-3a and b). (a) Regions that are preferentially 
involved in the trust game relative to the non-social control task when aversive affect is absent. (b) Only 
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) shows a significant interaction effect reflective of a change in the 
neural impact of aversive affect during trust taking relative to the non-social control task. (c) Regions that 
show significant simple effects of threat during trust decisions.   
Structure L/R Cluster Size Peak t x y z Peak p 
        
(a) Simple effect: No threat (Trust > NS Control)    
 TPJ left 247 4.34 -57 -60 27 0.003 
 dorsomedial PFC left 39 3.85 -9 60 18 0.044 
 ventromedial PFC bil. 89 3.88 9 32 -12 0.031 
        
(b) Interaction: Trust (No threat > Threat) – NS Control (No threat > Threat)  
 TPJ left 95 3.63 -60 -54 19 0.035 
      
(c) Simple effect: Trust (No threat > Threat)      
 TPJ left 103 4.03 -58 -55 19 0.012 
 vmPFC bil. 72 3.94 8 30 -11 0.026 
 ventral striatum left 23 3.76 -26 9 -9 0.048 
      
Activation clusters survive small volume correction for multiple comparisons based on FWE correction at 
the peak level for a priori regions of interest using masks created with reverse inference maps from 
relevant search terms on the neurosynth.org database. The left TPJ masks contained 1031 voxels; the 
dorsomedial and ventromedial PFC masks contained 3175 and 1327 voxels, respectively, and the left 
ventral striatum mask contained 3239 voxels. 
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Table S3: Whole brain analysis investigating the neural effects of aversive affect (related to Figure S3). 
Results from whole brain analysis investigating the neural effects of aversive affect (i.e., no threat vs. 
threat condition) for trust decisions after removing regions that show a domain-general effect of threat 
(SE-ME, p < 0.005, cluster size > 499, FWE corrected at cluster-level).  
Structure  L/R Cluster Size Peak t x y z 
       
 inferior parietal cortex left 691 4.3 -52 -60 45 
 superior temporal sulcus left 1322 4.19 -63 -25 4 
 posterior cingulate cortex bil. 859 4.07 -6 -46 7 
       
 
Table S4: Region of interest analyses investigating TPJ-amygdala connectivity patterns (related to 
Figures C-3c – d). (a) TPJ-amygdala connectivity during decision-making in the trust relative to the 
control task when aversive affect is absent and (b – c) the differential impact of aversive affect on TPJ-
amygdala connectivity in the trust task relative to the control task. 
Structure L/R Cluster Size Peak t x y z Peak p 
        
(a) Simple effect: No threat (Trust > NS Control)     
amygdala left 14 3.26 -22 -9 -15 0.039 
         
(b) Interaction: Trust (No threat > Threat) – NS Control (No threat > Threat) 
amygdala left 29 3.68 -26 0 -23 0.012 
     
(c) Simple effect: Trust (No threat > Threat)     
amygdala left 110 4.03 -28 -6 -14 0.004 
        
Activation clusters survive small volume correction for multiple comparisons based on FWE correction at 
the peak level for a priori regions of interest using anatomical masks created with reverse inference maps 
from relevant search terms on the neurosynth.org database. The left amygdala mask contained 439 voxels. 
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Table S5: Region of interest analyses investigating brain-behavior relationships in the absence of threat 
(related to Figure C-4). ROI analyses investigated whether, in the absence of threat, there is a difference 
between the trust and the control task in the correlation of mean transfers with functional TPJ 
connectivity and its target regions.  
Structure L/R Cluster Size Peak t x y z Peak p 
        
Amygdala right 48 3.53 27 2 -21 0.026 
Activation clusters survive small volume correction for multiple comparisons based on FWE correction at 
the peak level for a priori regions of interest using masks created with reverse inference maps from 
relevant search terms on the neurosynth.org database. The right amygdala mask contained 492 voxels. 
 
Table S6: Whole-brain analyses investigating brain-behavior relationships (related to Figure C-4). 
Results from whole-brain analysis investigating whether there is a difference between the trust and the 
control task in the correlation of mean transfers with functional TPJ connectivity with its target regions, 
in (a) the absence of threat and (b) the presence of threat (p < 0.005, cluster size > 499, FWE corrected at 
cluster-level). 
Structure  L/R Cluster Size Peak t x y z 
       
(a) In the absence of threat     
 Superior Temporal Sulcus right 1076 5.49 63 -45 6 
 ventrolateral PFC / IFG left 695 4.93 -50 23 -8 
 Paracentral Lobule / SFG left 827 4.75 -12 -15 75 
 dorsomedial PFC bil. 5069 4.48 -3 18 55 
 ventrolateral PFC / IFG right 544 4.17 57 20 10 
 dorsolateral PFC right 1464 4.06 50 12 37 
 intraparietal Sulcus right 532 4 46 -58 45 
 dmPFC / SFG right 546 3.93 29 50 39 
       
(b) in the presence of threat     
 Superior Temporal Sulcus right 514 4.97 64 -43 4 
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Table S7: Whole-brain analyses investigating the main effect of threat (related to Figure S4). Results 
from whole-brain analysis investigating the main effect of threat on neural activity during decision-
making independent of choice domain (p < 0.005, cluster size > 499, FWE corrected at cluster-level). 
Structure  L/R Cluster Size Peak t x y z 
       
(a) No threat > Threat       
 ventromedial/ventrolateral PFc bil. 4082 5.91 -14 68 3 
 posterior dorsolateral PFC right 1010 4.67 62 -6 28 
 posterior dorsolateral PFC left 1901 4.49 -62 -4 18 
 posterior paracentral lobule bil. 887 4.36 4 -36 69 
       
(b) Threat > No threat       
 cerebellum bil. 849 -2.61 -4 -46 -24 
 thalamus right 559 -2.61 6 -7 4 
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Supplemental Text 
 
Text S1: Additional Behavioral Analyses and Results (related to Figure C-2 and Table S1). 
It is possible that the main driving force of the behavioral change that we report in the main 
paper is not due to the affective impact of our threat of shock manipulation, but to the actual 
experience of electrical stimulation immediately prior to decision-making. To assess this 
possibility, we investigated the effects of experienced electrical stimulation on choice 
behavior in the trust and the non-social control game. To this end, we ran comprehensive 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression analyses in R version 2.5.12. These analyses 
predicted for each individual i the observed choice Ti,t on trial t with the following equation: 
 
Ti,t = β0 + β1*Threati,t + β2*Choice Domaini,t + β3* USi,t + β4*PSi,t + β5*Threati,t*USi,t + 
β6*Choice Domaini,t x USi,t + β7*Threati,t x Choice Domaini,t x USi,t + β8*Threati,t x PSi,t + 
β9*Choice Domaini,t x PSi,t + β10*Threati,t x Choice Domaini,t x PSi,t + β11*Xi + εi,t    
(eq. 1) 
 
Ti,t reflects the transfers to either a lottery or Player B on a given trial. Threati,t is a dummy-
coded variable (1 = threat of shock, 0 = safety) reflecting the expectation of impending 
painful electric shock during the current choice scenario, not the experience of shock. 
Choice Domaini,t is a dummy-coded variable (1 = trust game, 0 = control game) reflecting 
transfers within the context of a trust game. USi,t and PSi,t are dummy variables (1 = shock, 
0 = no shock) encoding the experience of at least one unpredictable (US) and, respectively, 
predictable shock (PS) in the interval from 5 seconds prior to the display of the choice 
scenario until button press. We included PS in our regression models, in order to control for 
the influence of reminder shocks presented during the block cue. Of note, we also 
investigated shorter and longer intervals from 1 to 10 seconds prior to the choice scenario in 
1-second increments and in all cases only Threat and Choice Domain reach statistical 
significance, no other factors or interactions. The model also contains a constant parameter 
(β0), which measures the average transfer to the lottery in the no threat condition. Finally, 
the model includes a set of socio-economic control variables (Xi, e.g., age and gender) and 
relevant interaction terms that reflect differential effects of experiencing shocks on transfer 
behavior in different Choice Domain and emotion contexts. We employed a random-effects 
model with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the subject level. 
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The results show significant treatment (threat) and Choice Domain (trust) effects, which we 
also report in the ANOVA analyses in the main paper. At the same time, regression results 
do not show significant effects of both unpredictable (p = 0.23) and predictable (p = 0.62) 
experienced electrical stimulation on choice behavior. Specifically, we do not observe a 
significant effect of, or interaction with, both unpredictable and predictable electrical 
stimulation. Together, regression results support and extend the results reported in the main 
paper. Specifically, threat of shock remains a significant predictor of choice behavior 
(p  <  0.001) in the trust and the non-social control game, even when controlling for the 
presence of actually experienced electrical stimulation. Furthermore, we show that the 
experience of shock does not significantly impact behavior in any of our analyses, 
indicating that the expectancy of shock, not the experience of shock, significantly impacted 
choice behavior. 
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D.1 Abstract 
Individual differences in decision-making are often pragmatically assessed in healthy and 
psychiatric populations via personality traits that relate to real-life decision-making. 
Putative neurobiological bases of such personality traits have been identified in MRI studies 
reporting systematic relationships with stable (i.e., structural) as well as dynamic (i.e., 
functional) brain properties. However, the conceptual overlap of the psychological 
constructs used for personality assessment makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions 
regarding brain properties that uniquely predispose an individual towards a particular 
decision style. Here we employ voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to derive brain 
morphometric correlates of three personality dimensions relevant for decision-making: 
Impulsivity, sensation seeking and negative emotionality. These dimensions were identified 
by means of a factor analysis (FA), which was employed in order to address the possible 
colinearity of a broad range of personality characteristics associated with decision-making. 
With this approach, we yielded an improved assessment of the variance uniquely associated 
with the above-mentioned dimensions. Our VBM analysis showed that increased 
impulsivity and sensation seeking were uniquely associated with reduced grey matter (GM) 
volume in medial orbitofrontal (mOFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), respectively. 
Negative emotionality showed a unique negative relationship with GM volume in sections 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC) and inferior parietal cortex. Our results suggest that 
nonclinical individual differences in brain morphometry may constitute a neurobiological 
predisposition for impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality, which may 
modify decision-making dependent on contextual and cognitive demands. Our findings also 
demonstrate that neurobiological information may be usefully employed in psychiatric 
research, since aberrant personality features and their modifying influence on behavior are 
hallmarks of psychiatric disorders. 
D.2 Introduction 
Individual differences in decision-making have been validated in different dimensions and 
their importance for explaining healthy as well as pathological behavior is commonly 
acknowledged (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012; Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2013; 
Steinberg et al., 2008). Differences in observed choice behavior are systematically 
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associated with variation in self-reported personality dimensions such as negative 
emotionality, risk attitudes, impulsivity, and sensation seeking (Lauriola & Levin, 2001; 
Lauriola et al., 2013; Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2014). Many researchers in applied 
settings therefore pragmatically measure individual differences in decision-making with 
questionnaire measures of those personality dimensions, as it is non-trivial to use economic 
game paradigms (e.g., Jimura, Chushak, & Braver, 2013; Pine, Shiner, Seymour, & Dolan, 
2010) for assessment of real-life decision-making styles (e.g., in routine clinical settings). 
Previous studies suggest that individual personality differences may be rooted in 
biological factors such as differences in brain structure and function (Diekhof et al., 2012; 
Morishima, Schunk, Bruhin, Ruff, & Fehr, 2012). In the current study, we were especially 
interested in the neuroanatomical bases of the personality concepts such as impulsivity, 
sensation seeking, and negative emotionality, which show well-established correlations with 
everyday decision-making and are often used to quantify differences in decision-making 
(Ersche et al., 2012; Lauriola et al., 2013; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, & Ersche, 2012; 
Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). Understanding the neurobiological sources of individual 
variation in these personality traits thus bears considerable value for research on clinical 
disorders, since aberrant degrees of impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative 
emotionality are often reported for psychiatric disorders such as addiction, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, as well as mood and anxiety disorders (e.g., Giorgetta et al., 2012; 
Lee, 2013; Paulus & Yu, 2012). Brain morphometric correlates of variation in these 
personality dimensions may therefore provide important information on possible 
neurocognitive endophenotypes of different subtypes of psychiatric disorders (Robbins et 
al., 2012). 
Although studies have begun to identify neuroanatomical correlates of individual 
differences in impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality (Matsuo et al., 
2009; Schilling et al., 2012; Spampinato, Wood, De Simone, & Grafman, 2009), it is 
currently difficult to draw conclusions about the unique association between these 
personality constructs and brain morphometry. This is because most studies only 
investigated the association between a single personality construct and brain structure. 
Possible overlaps and colinearity between the different personality constructs (Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2001) are often not explicitly considered, so that many results may at least partially 
reflect the effects of confounding personality dimensions that were not concurrently 
assessed. Moreover, this issue is aggravated by the fact that it is hard to find a canonical 
conceptualization of the different personality dimensions. Competing theories use 
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overlapping concepts, and similar characteristics are defined with different names and 
slightly different meanings in multiple models. For instance, impulsivity is defined as a 
predisposition to choose unduly risky but enticing behavior paired with behavioral 
disinhibition (Daruma & Barnes, 1993), while sensation seeking describes a general 
tendency to seek novel, intensive emotional and highly stimulating experiences 
(Zuckerman, Eysenck, & J, 1978). It is evidently hard to adequately distinguish these 
concepts on purely theoretical grounds, even though some assessment instruments 
acknowledge the possible overlap and multidimensionality of these two constructs 
(Zuckerman, 1996b). Moreover, negative emotionality is defined as the tendency to 
experience unpleasant emotional states such as fear, nervous tension or anger (Hicks & 
Patrick, 2006). This concept is therefore related to emotional reactivity, which refers to the 
experience and magnitude of emotional arousal in terms of both negative and positive 
emotions (Glenn, Blumenthal, Klonsky, & Hajcak, 2011; Karrass et al., 2006). 
In line with these conceptual difficulties of personality measurement, previous 
studies have not converged on distinct morphometric brain measures that uniquely relate to 
impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality (e.g., Cho et al., 2013; Matsuo et 
al., 2009; Spampinato et al., 2009). The reasons for the inconsistent results yielded by the 
different studies (Cremers et al., 2011; DeYoung et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2011) are still 
debated, but are most likely attributable to insufficient sample sizes and differences in 
psychometric measures used to assess the same personality construct.  
In the current study, we therefore employed a more comprehensive assessment 
approach that allows identification of unique variance in the relation between personality 
and brain morphometry. We acquired multiple questionnaire measures of personality 
characteristics traditionally found to be associated with individual differences in 
impulsivity, sensation seeking, and negative emotionality from 80 healthy student subjects, 
and submitted these to FA. The FA was performed in order to reduce redundancy between 
the multiple measures and produce a multidimensional assessment of personality patterns 
relevant for decision-making. These personality patterns were combined with VBM in order 
to investigate the neuroanatomical basis of the identified personality dimensions. This 
approach enabled us to identify associations between brain anatomy and specific personality 
traits while at the same time controlling for the influence of other choice-relevant 
personality characteristics. 
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D.3 Materials and methods 
Subjects 
T1-weighted images from 80 healthy subjects (63 male, mean age [SEM] = 22.23 [0.2]) 
were used in the VBM analysis. The structural brain scans as well as the questionnaire set 
were acquired in the context of two fMRI studies (Engelmann, Meyer, Fehr, & Ruff, 2015; 
Engelmann, Meyer, Ruff, & Fehr, submitted for publication). All procedures were approved 
by the ethics committee of the canton Zürich, Switzerland, and written informed consent 
was obtained from all participants. 
Questionnaire measures 
Questionnaires included in the current study were selected based on their hypothesized 
relevance for risky decision-making.  
The multidimensional Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Five-Factor-Inventory 
(NEO-FFI; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) was used to measure individual differences in the 
personality dimensions Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness, which have previously been shown to modulate risky choices (Capra, 
Jiang, Engelmann, & Berns, 2013). Multiple dimensions of impulsivity and sensation 
seeking were measured using the Barratt Impulsiveness scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995) and Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1996a). Negative 
emotionality was assessed on multiple dimensions as well. Temporary and stable qualities 
of anxiety were assessed via the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, & Keller, 1995) was employed to measure depressive symptoms 
and severity. Different facets of risk-taking attitudes were assessed via the Domain-
Specific-Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).  
Factor analysis 
To account for possible redundancy and colinearity of the 20 subscales that were employed, 
the item-level responses were scrutinized for underlying patterns via factor analytic 
procedures using Stata (StataCorp LP, College Station, Texas, USA). We applied Principal 
Factor analysis and a varimax rotation of the matrix of loadings in order to achieve 
orthogonal factors.  
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The factorability of the variable set was assessed with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) and Bartlett's test of sphericity. A parallel 
analysis (Horn, 1965) was performed on the data set in order to identify the appropriate 
number of factors. Furthermore, the result of this parallel analysis was confirmed by use of 
a scree test (Cattell, 1966) of the eigenvalues plotted against the factor numbers. According 
to the Kaiser Criterion, we considered factors with eigenvalues < 1 as substantial (Kaiser, 
1960). After identification of clearly defined and interpretable factors 
(item  loadings  >  0.40 were considered to be relevant factor loadings), we saved the 
subjects’ loadings on these factors in the form of Bartlett factor scores. These factor 
scores were used to analyze the structural brain data for systematic relationships 
between personality measures and brain structure (see below). 
MRI acquisition and VBM preprocessing 
A Philips Achieva whole-body MR Scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The 
Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips sensitivity encoded (SENSE) head coil 
was used for image acquisition. High-resolution structural T1-weighted 3D-TFE (3D-turbo 
fast echo) images (TR = 7500ms; TE = 3.5 ms; FA = 8; FOV 250 × 250 mm; voxel size 
1.04 × 1.04 × 0.6 mm; 301 sagittal slices) were acquired for each participant. 
We used SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) for MRI data preprocessing and 
analysis. Segmentation of native space images into gray and white matter and cerebral 
spinal fluid was conducted with the New Segment Toolbox (Ashburner & Friston, 2005). 
The segmented gray and white matter images (GM and WM, respectively) were aligned and 
warped to template space, followed by the resampling to 1.5 mm isotropic voxels. Inter-
subject alignment was improved by registration of the resliced GM and WM images to a 
subject-specific template using the DARTEL Toolbox (Ashburner, 2007). After the 
normalization of both GM and WM images to MNI space (using the normalization function 
of the DARTEL Toolbox), the images were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of full-width 
half-maximum of 8 mm. 
ROI definition 
Statistical analyses of the relationship between the personality dimensions identified by the 
FA (see “Results”) and brain structure were performed for predefined ROIs. These 
anatomical regions were based on a-priori hypotheses derived from previous fMRI, VBM 
and MRS studies investigating functional and structural neural correlates of the personality 
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components identified in the current factor analysis (see below). Inference in the ROI 
analyses was performed using small volume correction (SVC; family-wise-error (FWE)-
corrected at p < 0.05) for anatomical masks of these brain regions, which were created in 
the WFU Pickatlas (http://www.fmri.wfubmc.edu) using automated anatomical labeling 
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). For exploratory purposes, we also conducted whole-brain 
analyses corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE-corrected at p < 0.05). The following 
ROIs were selected based on published findings of associations with the relevant constructs: 
Impulsivity/Risk-taking (IRT; factor 1): Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and ventral 
striatum (Cho et al., 2013; Cohen, Schoene-Bake, Elger, & Weber, 2009; Gallinat et al., 
2007; Matsuo et al., 2009; Schilling et al., 2012).  
Negative Emotionality (NE; factor 2): Amygdala, insula (Paulus & Stein, 2006), 
hippocampus (Hamilton et al., 2012; Hasler, Drevets, Manji, & Charney, 2004; Pitman, 
Shin, & Rauch, 2001; Yamasue et al., 2008), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
(Bishop, 2009; Fitzgerald et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 2012; Spampinato et al., 2009) and 
inferior parietal cortex (BA 40) (Schutter & van Honk, 2005; Schutter, Van Honk, 
Koppeschaar, & Kahn, 2002). The DLPFC mask was limited to BA9 intersected with 
middle frontal gyrus in order to restrict our analysis to a NE-relevant DLPFC subregion 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2006). 
Sensation seeking (SS; factor 3): Medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), inferior 
frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and striatum (Cohen et al., 2009; Gardini, 
Cloninger, & Venneri, 2009; Joseph, Liu, Jiang, Lynam, & Kelly, 2009; Jupp & Dalley, 
2013; Van Schuerbeek, Baeken, De Raedt, De Mey, & Luypaert, 2011). The right and left 
mOFC masks combined medial orbitofrontal cortex and gyrus rectus masks from the WFU 
PickAtlas in order to cover the whole medial OFC region of interest (in line with Lim, 
O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2011).  
Statistical parametric mapping of segmented tissue density 
In order to investigate the covariation between grey matter (GM) tissue density and the 
factorized personality parameters, the preprocessed segmented images were entered into a 
multiple regression model in SPM8. The calculated factor scores were entered as covariates 
of interest for each subject. Age and gender of each subject were included into the GLM as 
nuisance covariates to account for variance due to these variables. Each subject’s GM 
image was proportionally scaled by his individual total intracranial volume (TIV) using 
SPM’s proportional Global Scaling option (as also used in, e.g., Morishima et al., 2012). A 
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GM mask was calculated by thresholding the mean of all subjects’ smoothed DARTEL-
normalized GM images at a signal intensity of 0.2 in order to restrict the search volume to 
GM. The resulting image was used as explicit mask in the multiple regression analysis.  
D.4 Results 
Summary statistics 
A summary of the calculated questionnaire scores can be found in Table D-I. The individual 
scores yielded by each subject were used as items in the factor analysis.  
Table D-I: Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation [SD]) of personality questionnaire set 
Variable Mean SD Variable Mean SD 
STAI X1 36.41 6.3 STAI X2 38.85 8.76 
NEO NE 19.1 7.09 DOSPERT ET 18.94 5.36 
NEO EX 30.14 6.25 DOSPERT FI 17.15 5.02 
NEO OP 34.1 6.74 DOSPERT HE 22.64 5.4 
NEO AG 31.36 5.66 DOSPERT RE 26.06 6.87 
NEO CO 28.81 8.22 DOSPERT SO 28.96 3.54 
SSS TA 7.73 2.44 BIS-11 AT 16.35 3.3 
SSS DI 6.36 2.36 BIS-11 MT 23.65 4.72 
SSS EX 6.88 1.94 BIS-11 NP 24.3 4.38 
SSS BD 4.76 1.86 BDI 6.39 4.59 
Note: BDI: Beck Depression Inventory; STAI: X1 = state anxiety; X2 = trait anxiety, BIS-11 subscales: 
AT = attention, MT = motor; NP = non-planning; DOSPERT subscales: ET = ethical, FI = financial, HE 
= health, RE = recreational, SO = social, NEO (NEO-FFI): NE = neuroticism; E = extraversion, O = 
openness; AG = agreeableness, CO = conscientiousness, SSS subscales: TA = thrill and adventure 
seeking, DI = disinhibition, Ex = experience seeking; BD = boredom susceptibility 
Factor analysis 
Estimation of the KMO criterion for the single variables contained in the FA (performed on 
all subscales) revealed low MSA for the subscale “financial risk-taking” of the DOSPERT 
(KMO = 0.35) and the subscale “agreeableness” of the NEO-FFI (KMO = 0.35). These two 
subscales were thus excluded from the FA.  
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A Principal Factor analysis with a varimax (i.e., orthogonal) rotation of the 
remaining 18 questionnaire subscales was conducted on the data gathered from 80 
participants. The validity of this approach was confirmed by the KMO criterion (KMO = 
.72 for the current data set) and the finding that Bartlett’s test of sphericity rejected the null 
hypothesis of no intercorrelation between the variables (χ2 (153) = 777.57, p < 0.0001). 
Both parallel analysis and scree test suggested a three-factor solution for the revised 
data set, which was partly consistent with the Kaiser criterion suggesting four factors. 
Taking into account that the third factor built the “elbow” of the eigenvalue function and 
that the fourth factor (eigenvalue = 1.03) did not explain a substantial proportion of 
variance, the three-factor solution was chosen (Figure D-1). Approximately 82% of the 
variance found in the variable set was explained by this three-factor model (Table D-II). 
Most importantly, this solution yielded interpretable and theory-consistent factors. 
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Figure D-1: Scree plot of eigenvalues plotted against number of factors. Scree plot combined with Kaiser 
Criterion (eigenvalues: factor 1 = 4.41, factor 2 = 3.48, factor 3 = 1.36, factor 4 = 1.03) suggested a 3-
factor solution for the questionnaire set.  
Table D-II: Variance of data set explained by three-factor model 
Factor Variance Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 3.37 0.3 0.3 
Factor 2 3.32 0.3 0.6 
Factor 3 2.48 0.22 0.82 
Note: Table contains variance accounted for by each factor, proportion of variance accounted for by each 
factor, and cumulative proportion of variance accounted for by the factor plus previous factors. 
Marker variables of the first factor were impulsivity and risk-taking related items (short: 
IRT), as we observed strong positive loadings of the BIS-11 subscale non-planning, the 
DOSPERT health risk-taking subscale and a negative loading of the NEO conscientiousness 
subscale onto this factor. The second factor reflected multiple dimensions of negative 
emotionality (NE), as marker variables of this factor were the BDI, quality of long-term 
anxiety (STAI-T) and the NEO subscale neuroticism. The third factor explained facets of 
sensation seeking (SS), as the DOSPERT subscale “recreational risk-taking” and the SSS 
“thrill and adventure seeking” subscales loaded onto this factor (Table D-III). 
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Table D-III: Factor loadings for the three-factor model 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
BDI   0.81   0.33 
STAIT X1   0.58   0.66 
STAIT X2   0.89   0.19 
BIS-11 AT 0.44 0.46   0.59 
BIS-11 MT 0.62     0.47 
BIS-11 NP 0.79     0.37 
DOSPERT ET 0.67     0.53 
DOSPERT HE 0.73     0.39 
DOSPERT RE     0.71 0.44 
DOSPERT SO       0.81 
NEO NR   0.87   0.22 
NEO EX     0.56 0.52 
NEO OP     0.57 0.59 
NEO CO -0.71     0.4 
SSS TA     0.69 0.48 
SSS DI 0.42     0.7 
SSS EX 0.53   0.55 0.41 
SSS BD     0.46 0.72 
Note: Factor 1 was identified as reflecting impulsivity- and risk-taking, factor 2 comprises different 
aspects of negative emotionality (NE), whereas factor 3 reflects facets of sensation seeking (SS). 
VBM: Brain-personality associations 
We performed a multiple regression analysis of the structural brain data on the complete set 
of factors identified by the factor analysis (plus nuisance covariates age and gender). This 
approach was taken in order to reveal the unique variance accounted for by a personality 
factor of interest, while at the same time controlling for the potentially confounding effects 
of the other personality factors.  
Morphometric brain correlates of impulsivity and risk-taking (IRT; factor 1) 
We found that IRT showed a systematic negative correlation with regional GM volume in 
the anterior mOFC. That is, higher degrees of self-reported facets of impulsivity were 
associated with decreased GM volume in both left mOFC (x = -6, y = 51, z = -24; T = 3.54, 
p < 0.05, SVC) and right mOFC (x = 9, y = 45, z = -21, T = 3.71, p < 0.05, SVC). This 
relation was highly specific. First, IRT was not significantly correlated with GM volume in 
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the other ROIs (amygdala, insula, striatum, DLPFC, inferior parietal cortex, inferior frontal 
cortex, ACC). Second, this relation was specific to IRT as no significant relation between 
mOFC GM volume and SS or NE was found (i.e., no significant voxels in these ROIs at 
p  <  0.05, SVC; Figure D-2, Table D-IV). Notably, these findings complement previous 
reports on morphometric brain correlates of impulsivity and risk-taking. Although both Cho 
et al. (2013) and Matsuo et al. (2009) found that OFC GM volume is related to impulsive 
tendencies, the specifics of the observed relationship between impulsivity and brain 
structure differed between these researchers. That is, whereas the former authors found that 
higher BIS-11-measured non-planning, attention-related and total score impulsivity were 
associated with higher mOFC GM volume, the latter reported an inverse correlation of BIS-
11-measured non-planning, total score and motor impulsivity and lateral OFC GM volume. 
We might speculate that study characteristics such as number of subjects, different 
measures of personality assessment or inclusion of nuisance variables led to these divergent 
results, as VBM is a very susceptible measure (Hu et al., 2011). 
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Figure D-2: Impulsivity and Risk-Taking (IRT) is associated with decreased GM volume in mOFC. The 
brain slices (right panel) show the SPM of the negative regression contrast (thresholded at p < 0.001 and 
p > 0.01 for display purposes) of the scaled GM volume (i.e., normalized by TIV) on individual IRT 
scores. For illustration purposes, the scatter plots (right panel) show the predicted GM volume estimates 
for each participant extracted from left mOFC peak voxel (x = -6, y = 51, z = -24; T = 3.54, p < 0.05, 
SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. Regression lines are shown to visualize the direction of the 
effects. A systematic relationship is evident for IRT (top plot) but not for NE and SS (middle and bottom 
plot, respectively).  
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Table D-IV: Negative relationship between IRT and left mOFC GM volume identified by multiple 
regression analysis 
Variables Coefficient SE T p 
IRT -0.00638*** 0.0018 -3.542 0.001 
NE 0.00188 0.00195 0.962 0.339 
SS -0.000869 0.00176 -0.493 0.623 
Age -0.000833 0.00098 -0.850 0.398 
Gender 0.0051 0.00498 1.021 0.311 
Constant 0.204*** 0.022 9.262 0.000 
     
R
2
 0.177    
Note: We controlled for individual differences in TIV by dividing GM volume at the selected voxel 
(x  =   -6, y = 51, z = -24) by TIV. In addition to the personality parameters of interest, we also include 
age and gender as regressors of no interest in our model. Only impulsivity shows a significantly negative 
association with mOFC GM volume. SE: standard error. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Morphometric brain correlates of negative emotionality (NE, factor 2) 
We identified a negative relationship between NE and regional left mid-DLPFC, 
specifically left BA9. Subjects with higher scores on the NE factor had lower GM volume 
in this part of the prefrontal cortex (x1 = -42, y1 = 23, z1= 34, T = 3.38; p < 0.05, SVC; 
x2  =  -41, y2 = 33, z2 = 39, T = 3.36, p < 0.05, SVC, Figure D-3a, Table D-V). Note that this 
region corresponds well with the portion of BA 9 that was shown to correlate with anxiety 
and depressive symptoms by Fitzgerald et al. (2006). Moreover, NE correlated negatively 
with GM volume in the right inferior parietal cortex (IPC; x = 46, y = -48, z = 58, T = 4.08, 
p < 0.05, SVC, Figure D-3b, Table D-VI). Again, the relation between NE and GM volume 
in left DLPFC and IPC was highly specific: We did not find any other significant 
relationships between NE and GM volume in the other ROIs (amygdala, insula, striatum, 
mOFC, inferior frontal cortex, ACC). Moreover, GM volume in both regions was clearly 
not correlated with individual IRT or SS at the applied statistical threshold of p < 0.05, 
SVC, confirming the selectivity of the association between NE and morphometry in the 
DLPFC and inferior parietal cortex 
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Figure D-3: (a) Negative emotionality (NE) correlates with reduced GM volume in the left DLPFC. The 
brain images (left side) show thresholded SPMs (at p<.001 and p<.01 for display purposes) of the 
negative regression weight for scaled GM volume (i.e., normalized by TIV) on individual NE scores. The 
scatter plots on the right show the predicted GM volume estimates in the DLPFC peak voxel (x = -42, 
y  =  23, z = 34; T = 3.38, p < 0.05, SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. GM volume in left 
DLPFC is negatively related to higher NE scores (top plot), but not to IRT or SS (middle and bottom plot, 
respectively). (b): NE correlates with reduced GM volume in the right inferior parietal cortex (IPC). The 
brain images on the left show thresholded SPMs (at p < 0.001 and p < 0.01 for display purposes) of the 
negative regression weight for scaled GM volume (i.e., normalized by TIV) on individual NE scores. For 
illustration purposes, the scatter plots on the right show the predicted GM volume estimates in the right 
IPC peak voxel (x = 46, y = -48, z = 58; T = 4.08, p < 0.05, SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. 
GM volume in right IPC is negatively related to higher NE scores (top plot), but not to IRT or SS (middle 
and bottom plot, respectively). Regression lines are displayed to visualize the direction the effects. 
Table D-V: Negative correlation between NE and local DLPFC GM volume identified by multiple 
regression analysis 
Variables Coefficient SE T p 
IRT -0.0004 0.00246 -0.162 0.871 
NE -0.00904*** 0.00267 -3.380 0.001 
SS 0.00185 0.00241 0.766 0.446 
Age 0.00075 0.00134 0.562 0.576 
Gender 0.00166 0.00681 0.244 0.808 
Constant 0.169*** 0.0301 5.631 0.000001 
     
R
2
 0.151    
Note: We controlled for individual differences in TIV by dividing GM volume at the selected voxel 
(x  =  -42, y  =  23, z = 34) by TIV. In addition to the personality parameters of interest, we also include 
age and gender as regressors of no interest in our model. We find a significantly negative relationship 
between local DLPFC GM volume and NE, whereas no other personality dimension shows a significant 
association with DLPFC GM volume. SE: standard error. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table D-VI: Negative correlation between NE and local inferior parietal cortex GM identified by 
multiple regression analysis 
Variables Coefficient SE T p 
IRT 0.0015 0.00208 0.730 0.468 
NE -0.0092*** 0.00225 -4.085 0.0001 
SS 0.0005 0.00203 0.247 0.805 
Age -0.0003 0.00113 -0.267 0.790 
Gender -0.0051 0.00574 -0.896 0.373 
Constant 0.119*** 0.0253 4.692 0.00001 
     
R
2
 0.245    
Note: We controlled for individual differences in TIV by dividing GM volume at the selected voxel 
(x  =  46, y = -48, z = 58) by TIV. In addition to the personality parameters of interest, we also include 
age and gender as regressors of no interest in our model. Increased NE scores were correlated with 
decreased GM volume in this brain region. No other personality dimension investigated showed 
significant correlations with inferior parietal cortex GM volume. SE: standard error *** p < 0.01, 
**  p  <  0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Morphometric brain correlates of sensation seeking (SS; factor 3) 
For the third factor, SS, we found a significant negative correlation with regional GM 
volume in bilateral ACC (xR = 11, yR = 41, zR = 28; T = 4.33, p < 0.05, SVC; xL = -2, yL = 
8, zL = 30, T = 3.5, p < 0.05, SVC). This finding corresponds with the hypothesized role of 
the ACC in motivation and drive and is in accordance with previous studies on ACC 
function for motivated behavior (e.g., Gallinat et al., 2007). We did not find significant 
correlations with SS for GM volume of the other ROIs (amygdala, insula, striatum, mOFC, 
DLPFC, inferior parietal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus) at p < 0.05, SVC. Moreover, neither 
IRT nor NE showed significant correlation with regional ACC GM volume (Figure D-4, 
Table D-VII).  
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Figure D-4: Sensation Seeking (SS) is associated with reduced GM volume in the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC). The brain images on the left show thresholded SPMs (at p < 0.001 and p < 0.01 for display 
purposes) of the negative regression weight for scaled GM volume (i.e., normalized by TIV) on 
individual SS scores. The observed significant relationship between SS and GM in ACC was highly 
specific as neither IRT nor SE GM was systematically associated with ACC GM volume. For illustration 
purposes, the scatter plots on the right show the predicted GM volume estimates in the right ACC peak 
voxel (x = 11, y = 41, z = 28¸ T = 4.33, p < 0.05, SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. Regression 
lines are also displayed to visualize the direction the effects. GM volume in ACC is negatively related to 
Higher SS scores (top plot), but not to IRT or NE (middle and bottom plot, respectively). 
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Table D-VII: Multiple regression analysis on the relationship between local ACC volume and personality 
parameters. 
Variables Coefficient SE T p 
IRT 0.000744 0.00135 0.550 0.584 
NE 0.0019 0.00147 1.291 0.201 
SS -0.00573*** 0.00132 -4.328 0.000046 
Age 0.00009 0.00736 0.125 0.901 
Gender -0.0001 0.00374 -0.042 0.966 
Constant 0.151*** 0.0165 9.146 0.000 
     
R
2
 0.221    
Note: We controlled for individual differences in TIV by dividing GM volume at the selected voxel 
(x  =  11, y = 41, z = 28) by TIV. In addition to the personality parameters of interest, we also include age 
and gender as regressors of no interest in our model. We find a significantly negative relationship 
between local ACC GM volume and SS, whereas no other personality dimension shows a significant 
association with ACC GM volume. SE: standard error. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
D.5 Discussion 
Our study captured the overlap and redundancy of multiple affective and personality 
dimensions relevant for daily decision-making by means of a factor analysis in order to 
identify unique anatomical brain correlates of these traits. We demonstrated systematic and 
specific associations between these personality dimensions and brain structure: A 
systematic negative correlation was found between impulsivity and regional mOFC GM 
volume, whereas higher degrees of negative emotionality were associated with lower 
regional GM volume in the DLPFC and inferior parietal cortex. Finally, sensation seeking 
was negatively correlated with regional GM volume in the ACC. Importantly, these brain 
regions have been routinely found to relate to various aspects of decision-making in 
neuroeconomic research (Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; 
Walton, Behrens, Noonan, & Rushworth, 2011). Our results thereby suggest that brain 
structure in these areas may predispose individuals towards particular affective and 
personality traits as well as a specific decision-making style. Furthermore, this 
neuroanatomical overlap might offer an explanation for why distorted decision-making 
processes in psychiatric disorders (e.g., depression, anxiety disorders, ADHD, addiction, 
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia) occur jointly with comorbid aberrations in the personality 
domains identified in the present study (e.g., Ersche et al., 2012; Reddy et al., 2014). 
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Our present VBM investigation demonstrates the need to distinguish between 
impulsivity and sensation seeking, since these constructs were identified as distinct on both 
the behavioral and the structural brain level, with unique relations between impulsivity and 
regional mOFC GM volume versus a unique association between SS and regional ACC GM 
volume. This dissociation underlines that the two concepts imply fundamentally distinct 
aspects – despite their colinearity and overlap – which can be identified if the two concepts 
are acquired simultaneously and included in the same model, as done in the present study. 
This procedure may improve the specificity of findings on brain structure-behavior 
relations. For instance, previous studies (Matsuo et al., 2009) have reported a significant 
correlation between impulsivity and ACC GM volume (as well as lateral OFC GM volume). 
Our new results suggest that these previous findings may reflect the variance that is shared 
between impulsivity and sensation seeking, which has not been controlled for in previous 
investigations such as the above mentioned, and, instead, show an association between 
mOFC GM volume and impulsivity.  
The observed relationship between regional ACC GM volume and SS is consistent 
with functional MRI results by Joseph et al. (2009) who report less ACC responsiveness to 
highly arousing stimuli in high relative to low sensation seekers. The authors interpreted 
their findings as a more active approach system (relative to inhibitory system) in high 
versus low sensation seekers. In addition, Gallinat et al. (2007) found that increased SSS-V 
scores correlated negatively with glutamate level in ACC. Our new results might bridge the 
gap between these functional and structural brain correlates of sensation seeking, by 
demonstrating a congruency between neural activity and brain morphometry associated 
with this personality trait. Regional ACC GM volume may be one structural index of a 
specific neurobiological basis for sensation seeking in this brain structure, which interacts 
with extrinsic and intrinsic factors in order to determine brain activity and thereby 
individual behavior. Our findings indicate a specific link of ACC GM volume and sensation 
seeking, as we did not observe a significant correlation between impulsivity and ACC 
volume (Matsuo et al., 2009).   
With respect to impulsivity and risk-taking, our results point to the mOFC as a 
putative neuroanatomical basis of this trait, as we found a negative correlation between IRT 
and mOFC volume. This finding dovetails with observations of decreased resting-state 
activity in medial OFC in persons with Borderline personality disorder (BPD) compared to 
healthy controls, a disorder known for elevated impulsivity (Wolf et al., 2012). However, 
contrary to the expectations of Wolf et al. (2012) to find a negative relationship between 
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impulsivity and mOFC baseline perfusion, the authors observed a positive correlation 
between BIS-11 total impulsivity scores and mOFC blood flow. That is, higher impulsivity 
was associated with increased resting-state blood flow in this brain region. In order to 
explain this puzzling result, Wolf et al. (2012) hypothesized that this positive association 
between impulsivity and mOFC blood flow might be indicative of different levels of arousal 
or decreased intrinsic alertness in BPD relative to healthy control subjects. Furthermore, the 
authors suggested that the observed relationship might reflect different functional activation 
patterns during resting state versus (experimental) external stimulation. It should be noted, 
however, that the researchers calculated the correlation between impulsivity and mOFC 
blood flow across BPD subjects and healthy controls. This approach did not consider 
systematically different relationships between impulsivity and blood flow in mOFC in BPD 
versus healthy controls, which might represent a bias of the performed correlation analysis. 
Furthermore, studies on ADHD, a clinical condition known for aberrant impulsivity levels, 
found decreased reward value coding in mOFC correlated with behavioral impulsivity 
(Wilbertz et al., 2012), that is, deficient mOFC coding of motivational changes in reward 
value correlated negatively with experimentally measured impulsivity. This finding 
underscores the functional role of mOFC in impulsive behavior and complements our 
results on brain structure-behavior correlation.  
However, inconsistent with our results, Cho et al. (2013) found a positive 
relationship between mOFC GM volume and BIS-11 measured impulsivity. In particular, 
the authors reported positive correlations of mOFC GM volume with BIS total score, non-
planning as well as attention-related impulsivity. We might speculate that experimental 
factors such as the smaller number of subjects and the restriction of impulsivity 
measurement to BIS-11 in their study are reasons for the divergent results. Matsuo et al. 
(2009) reported an inverse relationship between middle OFC and BIS-11 measured 
impulsivity. Specifically, BIS-11 motor impulsivity negatively correlated with left OFC 
GM volume, while higher BIS-11 non-planning impulsivity scores were associated with 
smaller right OFC GM volume. These results clearly differ from the negative relationship 
between impulsivity and medial OFC morphometry found in the current study.  
In a broader sense, the above outlined and to some degree inconsistent results point 
to the crucial and yet underinvestigated distinction between neurofunctional versus 
neuroanatomical patterns and their association with observed behavior. Future studies 
should thus address the relationship between impulsivity and OFC morphometry in a more 
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focused way than done until date in order to answer the open questions concerning the 
neurobiological basis of impulsivity raised by the conducted studies.   
Regarding IRT and SS, our results add to previous neuroimaging and VBM studies 
that have pointed to the role of the mOFC in impulsive and risk-taking behavior, and they 
underline the specificity of this relationship and the essential distinction from sensation 
seeking on the behavioral and brain level.  
Furthermore, negative emotionality was negatively associated with GM volume in 
the DLPFC and inferior parietal cortex. These results confer with previous studies that have 
revealed pathological activation of both DLPFC and parietal cortex in anxiety and 
depression (Pallanti & Bernardi, 2009; Pascual-Leone, Rubio, Pallardó, & Catalá, 1996; 
Vasic, Walter, Sambataro, & Wolf, 2009; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013).   
Furthermore, the finding of a negative association between regional DLPFC and 
inferior parietal GM volume with negative emotionality is consistent with the proposed 
functional left prefrontal – right parietal cortico-cortical depression circuit (Rosenberg et 
al., 2002; Schutter et al., 2002), which refers to a hypoactivation of left prefrontal and right 
parietal cortex in depression observed by these researchers. Our new results now extend 
these clinical findings, by showing that variations in morphometry of these brain structures 
also relate to pre-clinical individual variation in negative emotionality. This finding 
suggests that GM volume of these brain areas may possibly be used to identify 
endophenotypes of psychiatric disorders and in the context of dimensional diagnostics, but 
future studies should first further consolidate the association between brain structure and 
negative emotionality with a wider array of psychometric and physiological measurement 
instruments. 
At a more general level, the results from the present study support the notion that 
personality factors can be important mediators of the heterogeneity commonly observed in 
economic and social choice (Capra et al., 2013). We show that personality factors relate 
specifically to decreasing GM volume in mOFC, DLPFC and ACC. These regions are 
routinely found to relate to various aspects of decision-making in neuroeconomics research, 
such as value computations and action selection (Rushworth et al., 2011; Walton et al., 
2011). This neuroanatomical overlap between brain correlates of personality constructs and 
decision processes offers a possible explanation for why distorted decision-making 
processes observed in mood disorders (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012; Huys, Pizzagalli, 
Bogdan, & Dayan, 2013; Paulus & Yu, 2012) commonly occur in conjunction with 
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comorbid aberrations in the personality domains identified in the present study (e.g., Ersche 
et al., 2012). 
On a more critical note, the suggested possible links between brain function and 
structure described above clearly have to be taken with caution. Strong empirical evidence 
for precise structure-function relationships is largely missing until date (though see 
Morishima et al., 2012) and the theoretical basis for such links still need to be fully 
established (Koelsch, Skouras, & Jentschke, 2013; Wagner et al., 2008). Nevertheless, our 
current results suggest a congruency between functional responses and morphometric 
properties in the brain, as we found a negative relationship between brain morphometry and 
personality traits that are often observed to modify decision-related functional brain 
responses (Bishop, 2009; Joseph et al., 2009; Sripada, Gonzalez, Phan, & Liberzon, 2011). 
We thus speculate that differences in GM volume may account for the interindividual 
heterogeneity in baseline personality properties, which influence behavior depending on 
contextual and cognitive demands of the choice situation. However, this interpretation is 
clearly limited due to the correlative nature of the VBM approach, which prevents 
conclusions about causal mechanisms leading to the observed personality-morphometry 
associations. Is individual heterogeneity in personality traits caused by differences in brain 
morphometry or do differences in personality modify brain morphometry? While proper 
inferences about this may only be drawn from future longitudinal and interventional studies, 
previous demonstrations of genetic influences on the heritability of personality traits 
(Cloninger, Adolfsson, & Svrakic, 1996; Comings et al., 2000; Munafò & Flint, 2011) are 
consistent with the assumption that human personality may be at least partially determined 
by brain morphometry. 
To conclude, our study elucidates the neurobiological basis of personality traits that 
modify individual decision-making. By simultaneously assessing several of these 
personality traits and accounting for their shared variance in the analysis, we were able to 
distinguish two commonly confounded concepts, impulsivity and sensation seeking, on the 
behavioral and neural level. This distinction might be especially important in the domain of 
diagnostics and treatment of addiction. It has been shown that impulsivity might be a risk 
factor for the development of a stimulant dependency, whereas increased sensation seeking 
seemed to be a consequence of the stimulant addiction (Ersche, Turton, Pradhan, Bullmore, 
& Robbins, 2010). Our investigation thus informs psychiatric research and may lead to new 
impulses for the diagnostics of clinical disorders. For example, it may support identifying 
endophenotypes of psychiatric disorders and supporting dimensional diagnostics). At a 
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more general level, our investigation suggests that research on the relation between brain 
structure and personality traits clearly benefits from an approach that explicitly measures 
the colinearity and conceptual overlap of competing personality constructs.  
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weighted Catch_1 trials, i.e., trials in which the sure option had the higher expected value, 
in the TMS session. Subjects indeed preferred the sure option in Catch_1, which led to low 
gambling rates for Catch_1 trials in the TMS session. C: Gambling rates for lottery-
weighted Catch_1 trials in the Post-TMS session. High-gambling rates for lottery-weighted 
Catch_1 trials were also found in the Post-TMS session. D: Shown are gambling rates for 
sure option-weighted Catch_1 trials in the Post-TMS session. Low gambling rates for 
Catch_1 trials were also observed in the Post-TMS session. These results evidenced 
participants’ attention to the task during the Post-TMS session. Error bars: SEM .............. 68 
Figure A-4: Gambling rates for sure option-weighted Catch_2 trials in TMS session (A) 
and Post-TMS session (B). Subjects were able to notice the dominance of the sure option in 
Catch_2 trials, reflected in low gambling rates for those trials. Error bars: SEM ................ 70 
Figure A-5: Mean target trial gambling rates in LF and GF for each TMS group during the 
TMS and Post TMS session. A: Mean gambling rates (SEM) in TMS session: Left PFC: LF 
= 0.53 (0.05), GF  =  0.4  (0.05); Right PFC: LF = 0.52 (0.04), GF = 0.41 (0.04); Vertex: LF 
= 0.52 (0.03), GF = 0.42 (0.05); B: Mean gambling rates in LF and GF for each TMS group 
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Figure A-6: Gambling rates per probability of winning level in LF and GF in (A) vertex 
group, (B) left PFC group and (C) right PFC group in the TMS session. Error bars: SEM . 74 
Figure A-7: Reaction times in LF and GF in the three treatment groups in the TMS session. 
Apparently, subjects took their decisions faster in the GF relative to LF. This pattern 
seemed to be true for all TMS groups. ................................................................................. 79 
Figure B-1: Hybrid fMRI-Design. (a) The top row illustrates the timing of different blocks 
and the bottom row the timing of the gambles. Blocks that were threatening (strong 
stimulation) or safe (weak stimulation) were randomly interleaved (two of ten blocks per 
run are shown). The type of block was indicated by the screen color (blue or green), which 
was constant throughout the block. At the beginning of each block, a cue (STRONG or 
WEAK) was displayed, followed by delivery of a "reminder shock" (dark or light red 
arrow, respectively, following the cue display). After a jittered ITI (empty screen), the 
beginning of a gamble was signaled by a fixation cross, followed by the gamble screen. 
Subjects were instructed to choose their preferred option (lottery or sure outcome) as fast 
and accurately as possible via button press. Each block comprised 4 gambles and was 
followed by a REST period. Electrical stimulation was delivered randomly and 
unpredictably during the whole block (indicated by the varying positions of dark red [strong 
stimulation] or light red [weak stimulation] arrows, the only stimulation-free phases were 
the rest periods). (b): Possible gains and losses for mixed gambles. Gain and loss values 
were sampled from the gain-loss matrix depicted on the left (columns: gains; rows: losses). 
Each of the resulting combinations was shown once in the safe and once in the threat 
condition. For this purpose, the lottery with the corresponding outcomes was shown on one 
side of the screen, whereas the corresponding safe outcome was shown on the other (see 
right panel for example screen). The presentation sides for lottery option and sure option 
outcomes were counterbalanced across participants. ........................................................... 95 
Figure B-2: Evidence for efficacy of the threat-of-shock paradigm in inducing anticipatory 
anxiety. (a): SCR changes due to threat-of-shock manipulation. The plots show mean (+/- 
SEM.) SCRs during choices under threat-of-shock (left panel) and during the experience of 
the electrical shocks (right panel). Significantly increased SCRs were observed for choices 
during anticipation of strong compared to weak stimulation, and following strong versus 
weak stimulation. This demonstrates the psychological and physiological efficacy of the 
threat-of-shock manipulation. (b): Influence of choice and threat-of-shock manipulation on 
reaction times. RTs were decreased under anticipatory anxiety and for choices of the lottery 
option. (c): Neural correlates of strong versus weak electrical stimulation. Strong compared 
to weak stimulation intensity led to activation of the “pain matrix” including bilateral 
insula, anterior and mid cingulate cortices, right somatosensory cortex and cerebellum (p < 
0.05, FWE-corrected). Mean (+/- SEM) beta estimates extracted from middle cingulate 
cortex (x = 14, y = -33, z = 46, left panel) and from right insula (x = 41, y = -1, z = -5) 
showed signal increase during strong electrical stimulation and no signal increase during 
weak stimulation. These activation patterns due to strong versus weak electrical stimulation 
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demonstrate the physiological effectiveness of the threat-of-shock manipulation. *** p < 
0.001, ** p < 0.01 ............................................................................................................... 105 
Figure B-3: Effects of the threat-of-shock manipulation on choices. (a): Gambling rates 
(mean +/- SEM) did not differ for the two affective contexts. (b): Histogram of participants’ 
consistency rates (match of responses [in %] for the identical choices across the affective 
contexts). Participants chose the same options on average in 89% (+/- 11% SEM) of all 
gambles that were repeated across contexts. (c): Average (+/- SEM) loss aversion parameter 
λ across both contexts. Both threat and safe trials led to similar degrees of loss aversion. (d): 
Histogram of the participants’ changes in loss aversion due to the affective manipulation. 
The changes were not different from zero and normally distributed (mean (λS - λT) [SEM] = 
-0.0007 [0.0085]). Thus, the analysis of different behavioral parameters revealed the 
stability of choice across affective contexts. ...................................................................... 107 
Figure B-4: Changes in the correlation of regional BOLD signals with subjective values 
due to threat-of-shock (interaction contrast ESVS > ESVT). Such changes were observed in 
(a) VMPFC (x = -3, y = 39, z = -5), and VS (x = 6, y = 6, z = -6) as well as (b) insula (x = 
39, y = 0, z = 0). Voxels in blue show positive correlation with subjective value during safe 
trials, voxels in red show negative correlations with SV during threat trials, and voxels in 
yellow show a significant interaction. (c-e) ROI analyses confirm the pattern of interactions 
found in the SPM analyses. To avoid circularity, a LOSO approach was employed to extract 
beta weights from independent ROIs (see text for details). The plots show the average trial-
by-trial relationship (lines +/- SEM as shaded area) between regional activity and subjective 
value, as estimated in regression analyses of these betas (see main text). For both VMPFC 
(c) and VS (d), positive correlations between subjective value and BOLD activity were 
present in safe trials, but were significantly weaker (and in fact absent) during threat trials. 
In contrast, the insula (e) showed no correlation with subjective value during safe trials, but 
significantly stronger negative value coding (increasing activity for decreasing expected 
subjective value) during threat trials. These findings suggest that anticipatory anxiety 
caused a distinct style of neural value coding, by disrupting positive value coding in the 
VMPFC and the VS and simultaneously enhancing negative value coding in the anterior 
insula. All imaging results are displayed at p < 0.005 for display purposes. The shaded error 
bars reflect robust and clustered SEM. ............................................................................... 109 
Figure B-5: (a) Results from logistic regressions predicting choice based on regional 
activity in VMPFC, VS, and insula. Both VMPFC and VS predict choice only during safe 
trials, but not during threat trials. In contrast, the insula shows the opposite pattern of 
predicting choice (negatively) only during threat trials, but not during safe trials. (b) 
Decreases in average VMPFC BOLD signals during choices due to threat-of-shock (TS > 
TT). Anticipation of strong electrical stimulation led to general BOLD signal reduction in 
VMPFC (x = -8, y = 35, z = -2) pooled across all ESV levels. Anticipatory anxiety led to 
decreases in overall activity for valuation brain regions during choice, possibly due to the 
inherent negative value of the impending strong stimulation. The bar plot shows mean 
regression coefficients extracted from a 12 mm sphere around the VMPFC activation peak 
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to illustrate the pattern of suppressed activity during choices in the threat vs safe context. 
The imaging results are displayed at p < 0.005 for display purposes. Error bars reflect SEM.
 ............................................................................................................................................ 112 
Figure B-6: Changes in functional connectivity within the valuation network during 
anticipatory anxiety. Threat-of-shock led to decreased connectivity between (a) the seed 
region in VMPFC (x = -3, y = 39, y  =  -5); and both VS (x = -6, y = 14, z = -11, T = 3.64; 
Figure B–6b and c) and insula (x = -38, y = 17, z = -8, T = 4.9; Figure B–6b and d). Thus, 
anticipatory anxiety disrupted the functional integration of the brain’s valuation network. 
Error bars reflect SEM. All results are displayed at p < 0.005 for display purposes. Error 
bars reflect SEM. ................................................................................................................ 114 
Figure C-1: Schematic representation of hybrid fMRI design, trial sequence and timing. (a) 
Subjects faced blocks of trust and non-social control (NSC) trials in random order. During a 
trust block they played 3 trust games with different anonymous partners. During an NSC 
block they played 3 non-social control (NSC) games in which a pre-programmed computer 
chose “back transfers”. Both during trust and NSC blocks subjects expected either strong 
(“threat”) or weak (“no-threat”) tactile stimulation at unpredictable times during the block. 
(b) Sequence and timing of a trial in a trust block with strong tactile stimulation (“threat”). 
(c) Sequence and timing of a trial in a non-social control block with weak tactile stimulation 
(“no-threat”). At the beginning of each block, a 750-ms visual cue reminded subjects of the 
game type (trust or non-social control) and stimulation intensity (weak or strong) for the 
current block. The “human” icon indicated a trust block, the “computer” icon represented a 
control block. Two additional cues indicated the threat level to the subjects: (i) an actual 
tactile stimulation (“reminder shock”) at the end of the block cue indicated the current 
block’s stimulation intensity level and (ii) the background color informed the subjects 
throughout the entire block whether they have to expect a strong or weak stimulation (in 
Figure C-1, e.g., red = strong and green = weak shock, stimulation intensity-color 
association was counterbalanced). After a jittered interstimulus interval of three to nine 
seconds, the first of three trials was presented. In a trust game trial, subjects chose how 
much of their endowment of 24 CHF to transfer to a stranger (“How much do you invest in 
B?”). In a non-social control game trial, subjects chose how much of their endowment to 
invest in an ambiguous lottery that provided a 40-60% probability of returning an amount 
greater than the investment (“How much do you invest in L?”). To ensure subjects’ 
attention, the discrete investment opportunities – in the range between 0 and 24 CHF – 
randomly changed from trial to trial. .................................................................................. 134 
Figure C-2: Psychophysiological and behavioral results. Aversive affect (threat condition) 
significantly influences emotional arousal, mean transfer rates, and reaction times. The 
threat of an aversive tactile stimulation leads to a strong increase in skin conductance 
responses (SCR) in (a) the trust game [main effect of threat: F(1,39) = 90.74 , p < 0.0001 , 
η2 = 0.699] and (b) the non-social control game [main effect of threat: F(1,39) = 110.95, p < 
0.0001, η2 = 0.74]. Note that these increases in SCR’s reflect generalized arousal during the 
decision-period [5.5 sec., shown as yellow background in (a) and (b)] due to the threat of 
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strong tactile stimulation and are independent of the shock itself. The SCR effect of the 
shock itself is illustrated in (c), which shows the SCR after an actually experienced strong 
tactile stimulation (red line). The actual experience of a weak tactile stimulation leaves SCR 
almost unchanged (green line). (d) In the threat condition (relative to the no-threat 
condition) subjects transferred significantly less to an anonymous stranger in the trust game 
[t(40) = -3.4, p < 0.005] and invested less into an ambiguous lottery in the non-social 
control game [t(40) = -3.16, p < 0.005]. These results are driven by the emotional arousal 
induced by the threat of a shock and not by the actual experience of shocks shortly before 
choice (Table S1). (e) In the threat condition (relative to the no-threat condition) subjects 
made their decisions significantly faster in both the trust [t(40) = -3.3, p < 0.005] and the 
control [t(40) = -2.5, p < 0.05] game. *** p < 0.005; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. .................. 138 
Figure C-3: The impact of aversive affect on trust-specific activity and connectivity in the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). (a) Preferential involvement of the left temporoparietal 
junction (-57, -60, 27; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, region shown in red, k = 247;) as well 
as the dorsomedial (-9, 60, 18; k = 39; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, region in PFC shown in 
red) and ventromedial PFC (9, 32, -12; k = 89; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, not shown) in 
trust decisions when aversive affect is absent (see Table S2a). Importantly, the threat of a 
shock reduced activation in left TPJ (relative to “no threat”) significantly more during the 
trust game compared to the nonsocial control game (-60, -54, 19; p < 0.05, SV FWE 
corrected, k = 95, see Table S2b). Voxels whose activity reflects this interaction effect are 
shown in yellow. (b) Aversive affect significantly suppresses activity in left TPJ only 
during decisions in the trust game (-58, -55, 19; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, k = 103, 
Table S2c), but not in the non-social (NS) control game. (c) The left amygdala shows both 
significantly greater connectivity with TPJ during trust relative to control when aversive 
affect is absent (-22, -9, -15; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, k = 14, Table S4a) and a 
significant interaction effect [red, -26, 0, -23; p < 0.05, SV FWE corrected, k = 29, Table 
S4b]. (d) The interaction is characterized by a significant suppression of functional 
connectivity between the left TPJ and left amygdala during decisions in the trust game (-28, 
-6, -14; p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected, k = 110, Table S4c), while no suppression is observed 
in the non-social control task. The follow-up statistical tests were conducted via simple 
effects contrasts in neuroimaging space testing activation (or connectivity) suppression due 
to aversive affect during trust and non-social control decisions separately. Activation 
patterns illustrated in the bar charts reflect signal (b) and connectivity (d) change within a 6-
mm sphere around the interaction peak voxel in left TPJ (b) and left amygdala (d). ........ 142 
Figure C-4: Trust-specific functional connectivity (a-c) and threat-induced breakdown of 
connectivity (d) between TPJ and a network of target regions. (a-c) Connectivity between 
left TPJ and its targets (shown in red) is positively associated with trust taking (orange 
regression lines) during the no-threat condition in (a) dorsomedial PFC [-3, 18, 55, k = 
5069], (b) posterior superior temporal sulcus [63, -45,6, k = 1076], (c) bilateral ventrolateral 
PFC [left: -50, 23, -8, k = 695; right: 57, 20, 10, k = 544]. In contrast, mean transfers (i.e. 
investments) during the non-social (NS) control task (blue regression lines) are associated 
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with reduced connectivity strength between TPJ and these regions. In all cases (a-c), the 
correlation between mean transfer and connectivity strength is stronger in the trust game 
compared to the non-social control task (whole brain analysis, p < 0.05, FWE corrected at 
cluster level, see Table S6a). The intraparietal sulcus [46, -58, 45, k = 532] and dorsolateral 
PFC [50, 12, 37, k = 1464] show a similar pattern (see Table S6a) but are not shown in the 
figure. (d) Aversive affect causes a breakdown of the association between TPJ-pSTS 
connectivity and mean trust. The correlation between mean trust levels and TPJ-pSTS 
connectivity is stronger in the no threat compared to the threat condition [yellow region, 64, 
-43, 4; k = 514; whole brain analysis, p < 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level, see Table 
S6b]. Specifically, there is a positive association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and the 
mean trust level when distortionary aversive affect is absent (green regression line), which 
is eliminated by threat (red regression line). This suggests that connectivity between TPJ 
and its target region in pSTS supports general trust taking only in the absence of threat. The 
regression lines in (a-d) predict functional connectivity strength as a function of mean 
transfer levels based on an extended OLS model that estimates both the slope of the 
relationship between mean transfers and functional connectivity in the non-social control 
task and the increase in this relationship in the trust task (relative to the non-social control 
task). For this purpose we extracted the data from 6 mm spheres around interaction peak 
voxels (see online methods). Confidence bounds around regression lines reflect 95% 
confidence intervals around the model fit. ......................................................................... 144 
Figure D-1: Scree plot of eigenvalues plotted against number of factors. Scree plot 
combined with Kaiser Criterion (eigenvalues: factor 1 = 4.41, factor 2 = 3.48, factor 3 = 
1.36, factor 4 = 1.03) suggested a 3-factor solution for the questionnaire set. ................... 182 
Figure D-2: Impulsivity and Risk-Taking (IRT) is associated with decreased GM volume in 
mOFC. The brain slices (right panel) show the SPM of the negative regression contrast 
(thresholded at p < 0.001 and p > 0.01 for display purposes) of the scaled GM volume (i.e., 
normalized by TIV) on individual IRT scores. For illustration purposes, the scatter plots 
(right panel) show the predicted GM volume estimates for each participant extracted from 
left mOFC peak voxel (x = -6, y = 51, z = -24; T = 3.54, p < 0.05, SVC) plotted against all 
three factor scores. Regression lines are shown to visualize the direction of the effects. A 
systematic relationship is evident for IRT (top plot) but not for NE and SS (middle and 
bottom plot, respectively). .................................................................................................. 185 
Figure D-3: (a) Negative emotionality (NE) correlates with reduced GM volume in the left 
DLPFC. The brain images (left side) show thresholded SPMs (at p<.001 and p<.01 for 
display purposes) of the negative regression weight for scaled GM volume (i.e., normalized 
by TIV) on individual NE scores. The scatter plots on the right show the predicted GM 
volume estimates in the DLPFC peak voxel (x = -42, y  =  23, z = 34; T = 3.38, p < 0.05, 
SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. GM volume in left DLPFC is negatively related 
to higher NE scores (top plot), but not to IRT or SS (middle and bottom plot, respectively). 
(b): NE correlates with reduced GM volume in the right inferior parietal cortex (IPC). The 
brain images on the left show thresholded SPMs (at p < 0.001 and p < 0.01 for display 
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purposes) of the negative regression weight for scaled GM volume (i.e., normalized by 
TIV) on individual NE scores. For illustration purposes, the scatter plots on the right show 
the predicted GM volume estimates in the right IPC peak voxel (x = 46, y = -48, z = 58; T = 
4.08, p < 0.05, SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. GM volume in right IPC is 
negatively related to higher NE scores (top plot), but not to IRT or SS (middle and bottom 
plot, respectively). Regression lines are displayed to visualize the direction the effects. .. 187 
Figure D-4: Sensation Seeking (SS) is associated with reduced GM volume in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). The brain images on the left show thresholded SPMs (at p < 0.001 
and p < 0.01 for display purposes) of the negative regression weight for scaled GM volume 
(i.e., normalized by TIV) on individual SS scores. The observed significant relationship 
between SS and GM in ACC was highly specific as neither IRT nor SE GM was 
systematically associated with ACC GM volume. For illustration purposes, the scatter plots 
on the right show the predicted GM volume estimates in the right ACC peak voxel (x = 11, 
y = 41, z = 28¸ T = 4.33, p < 0.05, SVC) plotted against all three factor scores. Regression 
lines are also displayed to visualize the direction the effects. GM volume in ACC is 
negatively related to Higher SS scores (top plot), but not to IRT or NE (middle and bottom 
plot, respectively). .............................................................................................................. 189 
 
 
